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the proposal for a change in the judicial approach to the application of the defamation law set 
out in Chapter 9 and Part 2 of Chapter 10 is inconsistent with the conclusions drawn from the 
empirical research data, and would have preferred those sections of the thesis be deleted. 
The author and Associate Professor Rosemary Tobin are of the view that Chapter 9 and Part 2 
of Chapter 10 are integral to the thesis because they address and advocate continued 
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examined in the empirical study. Therefore Chapter 9 and Part 2 of Chapter 10 are consistent 
with the conclusions of the empirical research.  
Although this point was not directly addressed in the report of the external examiner, 
Professor Hazel Genn in her Examiner report, and Professor Genn was not present at the oral 
examination, it should be noted that the final sentence of the first paragraph of her report 
states: ‘[t]his is a robust approach to the research questions which provides original and 






In 2001, I began the field work in an empirical study of the laws of defamation in New 
Zealand. This study involved a comprehensive mail-out survey of the New Zealand media, 
and an adapted survey of defamation lawyers, which were designed to discover how the laws 
of defamation affected both groups, and what the respondents thought about those laws. The 
survey was augmented by an extensive search of defamation court files in the most important 
New Zealand High Court registries. The question behind the survey was essentially whether 
New Zealand’s defamation laws have a chilling effect on the media, to the extent that stories 
which should be told do not see the light of day.  
 
In this thesis, I contextualise and report on the results of the survey. I first describe and 
analyse the sources and trends in current defamation law, the other forms of regulation of the 
media in New Zealand, and the patterns of media ownership. I go on to utilise background 
data from the survey to present a character and business profile of the media who responded 
to the survey and find the data confirms the representative nature of those respondents. I then 
complete contextualisation of the survey by analysing the nature of the chilling effect doctrine 
itself, a canon which began as a predictive theory importing sociological concepts into legal 
analysis, but which is now a doctrine applied somewhat inconsistently, but with substantive 
effects, by the courts. In the following chapters I present the results of the media survey, the 
court file search and the survey of defamation lawyers, both in narrative and graph or tabular 
form. My tentative initial finding, that New Zealand’s defamation laws do not have an 
excessive chilling effect on our media, although they do have some, is progressively 
confirmed, with each set of data appearing to mirror and corroborate that which went before. 
In the final chapters, I take this somewhat surprising finding and augment it by theorising 
about future developments in defamation law. I suggest that increased constitutionalisation of 
this area of private law, in the form of full incorporation of a Bill of Rights methodology, is 
both desirable and necessary to protect against any chilling effects, such as they are. I 
conclude by posing a question about a possible joint future for defamation and privacy claims. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
… “uncertainty in both the principles of defamation law and their practical 
application induce great caution on the part of the media. Virtually every 
interviewee, in all branches of the media, emphasised the lottery aspect attached to 
this area of the law.” 1 
 
“The newspapers in this case brought about the total and utter destruction of 
mine and my family's life and caused immense distress…I'm pleased that the 
publications concerned have today admitted the falsity of all their allegations 
and I can now start to rebuild my life….Today's statement of full apology in 
open court means I can emerge from this action with vindication and with the 
recognition and acknowledgement that what was said against me was wholly 
untrue."2 
“Generalisations in this area are dangerous but it is possible to say that New 
Zealand has not encountered the worst excesses and irresponsibilities of the 




This thesis presents an analysis of the results of an empirical study of the effects of 
defamation laws in New Zealand carried out in 2001. The study sought to discover whether 
such laws have a chilling effect on the media, to the extent that stories with a high element of 
public interest are suppressed or edited, with detrimental effects on freedom of expression. 
The idea for the research came from a number of sources. In 1977, a government-appointed 
Committee, the McKay Committee, reported after a comprehensive investigation into the 
defamation laws at that time.4 The report formed the basis for a bill, which after many years’ 
gestation became the Defamation Act 1992, the current legislation which operates in New 
Zealand in conjunction with the common law. The McKay Committee commissioned a study 
of the practical effects of the defamation laws as a background to its work. The passage of 
                                                          
1
  Eric Barendt, Laurence Lustgarten, Kenneth Norrie and Hugh Stephenson, Libel and the Media: The 
Chilling Effect (1997), at 186, referred to in Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, at 394-5. 
2
  Extracts from a statement made by Robert Murat outside the High Court, after four United Kingdom 
national newspaper groups apologised for publishing false allegations in over 100 articles about Mr Murat and 
two other people suggesting they were involved in the abduction of four year old Madeleine McCann, and 
agreed to pay £600,000 in libel damages, 17 July 2008. Prompted by these cases, a parliamentary committee is 
now investigating privacy, libel and standards in the press in the United Kingdom: The Guardian, 18 November 
2008.  
3
  The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, [34]. 
4
  ‘Recommendations on the Law of Defamation,’ Report of the Committee on Defamation, December 
1977. The empirical research carried out for the Committee is discussed by a member of the Committee, 
Professor Geoffrey Palmer, (as he then was), in ‘Defamation and Privacy Down Under’ 64 Iowa Law Review 
1209 1978-1979, together with the results of Professor Palmer’s own analysis of reported Australian and New 
Zealand defamation cases in the period 1969-1978. 
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time and the size of that study eventually rendered its results completely outdated. This meant 
it was timely to carry out a further study in 2001.  
 
In the United Kingdom a complex study has been made of this issue in the late 1990’s. After 
analysing the results of that empirical study,5 its authors concluded “the chilling effect 
genuinely does exist and significantly restricts what the public is able to read and hear.”6 In a 
leading New Zealand defamation case,7 the Court of Appeal acknowledged a chilling effect of 
defamation law, but based its conclusion on the English research.8 In 2001, no such research 
had been carried out in New Zealand for over twenty five years. It was therefore appropriate 
to investigate the issue in an empirical way.9   
 
It was important to determine as a preliminary matter the limits of the question being asked 
when seeking to determine whether New Zealand’s laws have a chilling effect on freedom of 
                                                          
5
  Barendt et al (1997) n. 1 above. I define legal empirical research as being that which seeks to collect 
and analyse quantitative and qualitative factual data impacting on legal issues.  Another useful definition is 
offered by Baldwin and Davis: ‘the study, through direct methods rather than secondary sources, of the 
institutions, rules, procedures, and personnel of the law, with a view to understanding how they operate and what 
effects they have,’ John Baldwin and Gwynn Davis ‘Empirical Research in Law’, Ch 39, Cane and Tushnet, The 
Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies,(OUP 2003), 880-881. 
6
  Barendt et al (1997) n. 1 above, 191. However, the United Kingdom Law Commission more recently 
carried out a small study of certain aspects of defamation law, and concluded that there is no evidence there of 
abuse of defamation procedures by way of gagging writs or letters: The Law Commission, Aspects of 
Defamation Procedure: A scoping study, May 2002, 1, 5 (UK). The majority of the small number of media 
organisations which took part in this study did complain that the law of libel more generally created a ‘gagging’ 
or ‘chilling’ effect on the freedom of the press: ibid, 3. 
7
  Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385. 
8
  Ibid, 394. The Court referred to the United Kingdom research as careful and accepted its conclusions. 
See above, n. 1, 186.  
9
  The study was made possible by the grant of funding from the Research Committee of the University of 
Canterbury and by matching funding provided by the School of Law. Aspects of the study have been published 
in ‘Myths and Realities about the chilling effect: The New Zealand media’s experience of defamation law’ 
(2005) 13 Torts Law Journal 259; ‘Defamation in New Zealand and its Effects on the Media – Self-Censorship 
or Occupational Hazard?’, [2006] NZLRev 467-524, and ‘The Bill of Rights and the Chilling Effect’, Law, 
Liberty, Legislation: In Honour of John Burrows QC, S. Todd and J Finn eds, LexisNexis, (2008). I 
acknowledge the further support of the Centre for Media and Communications Law, Faculty of Law, University 
of Melbourne, and my appointment there as a Visiting Fellow in February 2004 and 2005, and as a Senior 
Fellow in 2004 and 2005, during which time I was able to complete much of the writing up of the empirical 
research. The Director of the Centre, Professor Andrew Kenyon, has also completed a three-year empirical 
research project on “Defamation Law in Context”, see: Andrew T. Kenyon, Defamation: Comparative Law and 
Practice (UCL Press, 2006) where the author puts forward evidence based on content analysis which suggests 
that Anglo-Australian defamation law has a chilling effect on media speech when compared to the US. See also 
R Weaver, A Kenyon, D Partlett, & C Walker, The Right to Speak Ill — Defamation, Reputation and Free 
Speech (Carolina Academic Press, 2006), where the authors detail comparative research carried out in Australia, 
England, and the United States, and C Dent & A Kenyon, “Defamation Law’s Chilling Effect: A Comparative 
Content Analysis of Australian and US Newspapers” (2004) 9 MALR 89; T Marjoribanks & A Kenyon, 
“Negotiating News: Journalistic Practice and Defamation Law in Australia and the US” (2003) 25 Australian 
Journalism Review 31; and R Weaver, A Kenyon, D Partlett & C Walker, “Defamation Law and Free Speech: 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers and the English Media” (2004) 37 Vand J of Transnat’l L 1255. Previous 
comparative work has also been carried out by Australian academics: see ‘The Sociology of Defamation in 
 3 
expression of the media. To this end, it was necessary to define what is meant by ‘chilling 
effect’. All defamation laws create a chilling effect to the extent that protecting reputation will 
at times require prevention of publication or payment of damages if wrongful publication has 
occurred. That is what defamation laws are intended to do. The issue, therefore, is not merely 
whether any chilling effect exists, but whether, accepting that a society desires some laws to 
protect reputation, the chilling effect of those laws is unacceptable and too damaging of 
freedom of expression and of the press. In Chapter Four and Chapter Nine of this thesis, I 
examine in detail the development of the chilling effect doctrine and how New Zealand courts 
and overseas jurisdictions have utilised it. It is clear that in this era of human rights, freedom 
of expression is accorded increasing significance.10 Therefore, this thesis is essentially a study 
of the relationship between a so-called right of reputation and a right to freedom of 
expression. In the end, the question asked in my study had to reflect the reality, which is a 
process in which public and private interests in these rights are balanced in some way. The 
question I posed ultimately was: Do New Zealand’s defamation laws create a chilling effect 
on the media which is not justifiable in a free and democratic society? 
2. Survey Methodology 
Collection of data for the study essentially broke down into three parts: a survey of the 
media,11 a survey of media lawyers and a search of civil court files. Information was collected 
in 2001-2002, but the period studied covered the six years between 1996-2001. The data 
collected was analysed, and also compared to work carried out in other jurisdictions where 
relevant.12  
 
For the survey of the media, approximately 800 confidential postal surveys were sent to every 
identifiable member of the New Zealand media in the first half of 2001. This included 
newspapers, television and radio broadcasters, magazines, book publishers, independent 
writers and journalists, information service providers and advertising agencies and public 
relations firms. A follow-up letter was sent some time later to encourage the completion and 
return of the surveys. A postal survey was chosen for the reason that it is still a well-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Australia and the United States’ Michael Newcity, (1991) 26 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1; ‘Politicians, Defamation Law and 
the ‘Public Figure’ Defence,’ Brendan Edgeworth and Michael Newcity, (1992) 10 Law in Context 39. 
10
  In New Zealand, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind 
in any form. The Bill is not supreme law, however, as it cannot invalid inconsistent legislation (s 4), and the 
rights in it are subject to reasonable limits ‘…prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society’ (s 5). See further Chapter Nine below.  
11
  A copy of this postal survey, which was the main survey used in the study, is attached in the Appendix, 
p 236 below. 
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recognised form of data collection which can reach a dispersed population,13 and because of 
the financial limitations imposed on the research. Postal surveys also offer anonymity and 
time for the respondents to check and confirm responses.14 Against this lie the disadvantages 
of the risk of a low response rate and declining response rates to surveys world-wide in recent 
years – ‘survey exhaustion’. 
 
Responses to the media survey were received from a total of 225 media, being 52 newspapers, 
6 television broadcasters including the state-broadcaster and its largest private rival, 31 radio 
broadcasters, 26 magazines, 9 individual writers and journalists, 24 book publishers, 68 
advertising agencies or public relations firms, 2 information service providers and 7 multi-
media interests. The response rate overall was just over 28%. This figure was augmented by a 
response from the New Zealand section of the Commonwealth Press Union, which voluntarily 
submitted its views on some of the questions contained in the media survey.15  
 
While any information collected in survey form needs to be comprehensive and 
representative, there appears to be disagreement about a norm for response rates in academic 
studies,16 and what effects non-responses can have. Non-responses can be of concern when 
significant groups in the survey cohort do not complete and return the survey. But poor 
response alone may not undermine the results if the findings are still representative of the 
population being surveyed. If those who do not respond do not differ significantly from those 
who do, the results are arguably still valid.17 Therefore, if the character of respondents can be 
confirmed as representative in other ways, then the results will have substance. 
 
Furthermore, it is at least clear that postal surveys have been shown to have lower response 
rates than those employing other methodologies such as face to face interviews or delivered 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12
  See ns 4-6  and 9 above. 
13
  D A Dillman, ‘The design and administration of mail surveys’ (1991) 17 Annual Review of Sociology 
225.  
14
  L Kanuk and C Berenson, ‘Mail Surveys and Response Rates: A Literature Review’, Journal of 
Marketing Research Vol XII (November 1975), 440. 
15
  The CPU has as its members all editors of daily and Sunday newspapers in New Zealand. 
16
  Y Baruch, ‘Response rate in academic studies – a comparative analysis’, Human Relations, April 1999, 
Vol 52, 421.  Don Dillman, of the Social & Economic Sciences Research Centre, Washington State University, 
has developed a methodology for mail out surveys which can achieve a high response rate, but which requires 
extensive resources: see Mail and Telephone Surveys: the Total Design Method Don Dillman (John Wiley & 
Sons, 1978) and the papers available at http://134.121.51.35/dillman/papers.html  See also Social Research 
Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Harvey Russell Bernard, (SAGE, 2000).  
17
  See n. 14 above. 
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surveys.18 For this methodology, a response rate of 30% is in fact considered reasonable, and 
private surveying companies appear to consider anything in the 20-30% range as typical and 
acceptable.19  
 
Ultimately, I judged the response rate to my mail-out survey to be valid and publishable, for 
two reasons. Firstly, at 28% (and higher with the CPU results factored in), the response rate 
appears to be well within the norm for mail-out surveys. Secondly, my detailed analysis of the 
business composition of the respondents in Chapter Three of this thesis confirms that they 
were representative of the media and communications sector in New Zealand at the time the 
survey was carried out. Nonetheless, although I believe the overall response rate to be 
acceptable, to ensure full clarity, I have commented in detail on response breakdown 
throughout the relevant chapters of this thesis. 
 
The media survey was broken down into five parts. The first part sought background 
information such as what form the media respondent took, what sort of enterprise was 
involved, what sort of circulation the respondent had, did they have defamation insurance, 
what sort of training they had, and what sort of risks of defamation they faced. The second 
part investigated pre-publication procedures, how they worked and if these were always 
complied with. The third part of the survey asked for information as to actual experience of 
statements of claim (writs) in the years 1996-2001, and the fourth part investigated the 
experience of threats of action which did not proceed to trial for the same period. The final 
part of the survey sought the views of the respondents on aspects of the law, such as defences, 
delays, technicalities, damages, and injunctions, and also invited any general comments or 
suggestions for reform. 
 
To survey media lawyers, adapted media postal surveys were sent to legal practitioners (the 
legal practitioner survey) who are prominent defamation lawyers, both plaintiff and defendant 
representatives, to find out about their practices and views. As the response rate to these 
surveys was low, this part of the survey was bolstered by a small number of face to face 
interviews with specifically targeted practitioners, essentially those at the top of the 
defamation game. Although some data was collected from lawyers answering the postal 
                                                          
18
  J Ilieva, S Baron, N Healey, ‘Online surveys in marketing research: Pros and cons’, International 
Journal of Market Research Third Quarter 2002, Vol 44, 361. See also n. 14 above.  
19
  See n. 16 above, and see Research Note by Chanelle Gallant, ‘The Influence of Colour and Incentives 
on Mail Survey Response Rates’, ISR Newsletter 13(2) 1998, 
http://www.isr.yorku.ca/newsletter/fall98/research.html  
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survey as to actual threats and claims experience, the interviews sought answers only to the 
final section of the survey, to elicit views of legal practitioners on the state of the law. 
 
A vital part of the project proved to be a separate study (the court file search) based on the 
collection of information about defamation statements of claim (writs) involving media 
defendants filed in a significant sample of High Court registries in New Zealand, for the four-
year period 1998-2001. This part of the study involved collecting statistical information about 
the proportion of defamation statements of claim filed in the High Court and what proportion 
of those claims were filed against media defendants. Information was also recorded on the 
context of the claim, who the defendant was, the remedies sought (including levels of 
damages), and how the matter was resolved.  
 
All of the information in the study was gathered in a general and statistical way and no party 
was identified or identifiable publicly at any stage of the research. My aim throughout the 
project has been to use very simple and straightforward methodology. Although empirical 
research is commonplace in media studies,20 socio-legal research is in its infancy in New 
Zealand.21 I have received no formal training in the discipline such as that offered in other 
jurisdictions.22 The funding I received for the research was very small. For these reasons, I 
have endeavoured to present the empirical data in as straight-forward and non-technical a 
manner as possible. This then is by no means the work of an expert, but of an academic 
lawyer perhaps setting out on a path to acquire valuable skills in socio-legal research.23   
 
                                                          
20
  See eg: James Hollings, Geoff Lealand, Alan Samson and Elspeth Tilley, ‘Profile 2007. The big NZ 
journalism survey: Underpaid, under-trained, under-resourced, unsure about the future -  but still idealistic’, 
Pacific Journalism Review September 2007, 13(2), 175. 
21
  See ‘Law in the Real World: Improving Our Understanding of How Law Works’, Final Report and 
Recommendations of the Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research, Professor Dame Hazel Genn, Professor 
Martin Partington, Professor Sally Wheeler, November 2006, 26-27. 
22
  Eg: the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies in the United Kingdom. In the period 1990-1994 I was 
employed as a lawyer for the United Kingdom Law Commission, during which time I supervised an 
investigation into the laws governing personal injury in that jurisdiction. As part of that large project, socio-legal 
research was conducted for the Commission by Professor Hazel Genn, into the compensation experiences of 
victims of personal injury. The result was Personal Injury Compensation: How Much is Enough? Law Com No 
225, (1994).  
23
  During the completion of this thesis, I have developed and obtained funding for another smaller 
empirical project carried out for the Families Commission. This work was a collaborative one published as ‘The 
Family Court, Families and the Public Gaze,’ Ursula Cheer, John Caldwell and Jim Tully, Canterbury 
University, Families Commission Blue Skies Report No 16/07, March 2007. 
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3. Outline of the thesis 
Chapter Two of this thesis is a treatment of important background information. It briefly 
describes relevant characteristics of the law of defamation in New Zealand, and the various 
forms of regulation of the media as at 2001, the year the media survey at the centre of this 
investigation was carried out. This is followed by a description of media ownership in New 
Zealand in 2001 and currently. This analysis concludes that the small New Zealand media 
market is split between a number of mainly foreign interests, many of them now Australian. 
 
In Chapter Three, I make first use of some of the empirical background data collected in the 
media survey, to develop a comparatively detailed character and business profile of the media 
which took part. This analysis confirms the representative character of those responding, and 
prepares the ground for the analysis which follows in later chapters. The presentation of this 
material, and of that outlined below, is augmented by the use of graphs and tables where 
appropriate. I conclude that there are many reasons why stories might not see the light of day, 
the chilling effects of defamation laws being only one of these. I go on to suggest that New 
Zealand’s small media market, dominated by foreign interests, might support a reasonably 
robust approach to potential defamation claims. 
 
Chapter Four augments the two preceding chapters by interrogating the origins of the chilling 
effect doctrine in the USA, and tracing how both overseas and New Zealand courts have used 
and developed it. Here I conclude that the doctrine may have thrown off its original 
sociological precepts to become a doctrine with real substantive effects in most western 
jurisdictions. While the legal approach to the doctrine is currently somewhat haphazard, the 
approach in defamation law appears to unite around a broad function of developing media 
responsibility while giving appropriate weight to freedom of expression. 
 
Chapter Five presents results collected from the main part of the empirical study, the media 
survey carried out in 2001-2002. The chapter deals with responses about what material is 
regarded as risky, training in defamation law, pre-publication procedures and how they impact 
on alterations and deletions, whether defamation insurance is held, and the impact of 
regulatory bodies such as the Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Press Council. An 
analysis of data collected from the media about threats of legal action follows. Finally, data 
about actual claims collected from the media is presented and examined. The analysis of both 
threats and actual claims breaks down the data and looks at whether defamation threats and 
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claims against the media appear to be increasing, who the potential and actual plaintiffs and 
defendants are, the context of threats and claims, the nature of remedies sought, and 
outcomes. The material on actual claims is compared to that compiled from the media survey 
about threats where relevant. I discuss and compare previous research carried out in Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom throughout. I conclude the chapter by summarising the 
data presented and put forward initial conclusions. Here I present a tentative view that the 
quantitative data demonstrates the operation of defamation law on a dynamic, generally 
assertive New Zealand media, backed by strong foreign ownership, and does not produce 
excessive chilling effects although clearly it does produce some.  
 
In Chapter Six I present and analyse the results of the court file search which was carried out 
at the most important High Court registries. Because this data was not collected from media,  
I was able to use it as independent control data against which the results of the media survey 
could be tested. The court file search revealed a fairly low level of filed claims, and no 
evidence of any trend towards an increase in numbers of filed claims, at least for the years 
1998-2001. The context and characteristics of the claims mirrored those reported by the 
media. Here I concluded that the most remarkable feature of this data was the extent to which 
it confirmed and reinforced the data derived from the media survey. 
 
Chapter Seven does for defamation lawyers what Chapter Five did for media respondents. 
Here I produce the results of surveying and interviewing both plaintiff and defendant lawyers 
on their general experience of defamation claims, covering pre-vetting, threats, and claims 
which did not, and did, come to a full hearing. The data is presented as of qualitative rather 
than quantitative value, because numbers responding to the survey were not high, and further 
information had to be sought through selective interviews. Nonetheless, the data from both 
groups tended to mirror and reinforce that collected from the media and from court files 
previously – it did not suggest an excessive chill factor arising from New Zealand’s 
defamation laws. 
 
Chapter Eight deals with the final part of the survey – that which sought opinion data on 
various aspects of New Zealand’s defamation laws. Here I detail responses from both media 
and defamation lawyers on the developing defence of constitutional qualified privilege, the 
need for a special media defence, and on costs. I also present unsolicited comments which 
expressed the view that the balance of the law was about right. The responses to this part of 
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the survey were small, and therefore the data is presented as being of qualitative value only. 
However, this chapter contains a selection of significant and representative extracted 
responses which have a strong flavour and allow the respondents to give the benefit of their 
experience ‘in their own words’. Once again, the results point to reasonable satisfaction with 
the current state of affairs generally, although a clear view emerged that the issue of costs 
requires further investigation. This chapter draws to a close with a general conclusion on all 
of the data. Here I find that when examined in the round, the empirical data suggests that 
arguments about the chilling effects of defamation laws on the New Zealand media have been 
somewhat overstated. 
 
Chapter Nine is a final substantive chapter which looks forward rather than back. Here I 
examine the growing influence on New Zealand law of the right of freedom of expression. 
This involves an investigation of the impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on 
the common law and on defamation law in particular. I then suggest a transparent and 
consistent methodology for applying the Bill to defamation which might apply in the future, 
and analyse how it might impact on the law. I conclude that a combination of full maturation 
of current common law developments, and application of a Bill of Rights methodology, would 
mediate, repair and limit possible chilling effects of our defamation laws, such as they are. 
 
In Chapter Ten, I draw the threads of discussion and analysis in the previous nine chapters 
together, to reach a final conclusion. Although my final deduction is that the data shows the 
balance of the current law is about right, I go on to outline the constant risks of a chilling 
effect which must be guarded against, and I draw attention to areas which my study suggests 
might need further investigation, such as costs and the difficulties faced by small media 
enterprises. Overall, however, I infer that the media can take heart from the state of the law 
generally. This final chapter draws to a close by asking the tantalising question: ‘What is to be 






Chapter Two – Defamation law, media regulation and ownership 
 
In this chapter, I paint a backdrop against which the results of the empirical study can be 
posed. This is made up of a summary of the main points of defamation law impacting on the 
media in the New Zealand jurisdiction, an outline of how the media is regulated, and a 
discussion of media ownership generally. 
 
1. Defamation law in New Zealand 
1.1 Sources 
New Zealand defamation law is very similar to that in the United Kingdom and some 
Australian states. The requirements of the tort are often argued by the media as overly 
plaintiff-friendly. Although New Zealand has a statute which has refined certain elements of 
the law of defamation and offers some new remedies,24 it is still basically a common law 
subject.25 The definition of ‘defamation’ remains untouched, and it is necessary to look to the 
case law, including that from the United Kingdom and Australia. There is no single 
comprehensive definition of what amounts to a defamatory statement. However, four case law 
definitions tend to dominate the discourse. They are: a statement that might tend to lower the 
plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally;26 a false statement 
about a man to his discredit;27 a publication without justification that is calculated to injure the 
reputation of another by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule;28  and a statement 
about a man that tends to make others shun and avoid him.29 
 
1.2  Publication and identification 
Before a damaging statement about a person can be held to be defamatory it must have been 
published, in the sense of being communicated to some person or persons other than the 
plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff must show the statement was about him or her. A plaintiff 
who is suing for defamation is not required to prove that the statement made about him or her 
was false; it is enough if he or she can show that it was published, and that it had a tendency 
to affect his or her reputation.  
 
                                                          
24 
 Defamation Act 1992. 
25 
 See generally for the following: J Burrows and U Cheer, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005, 
OUP) Chs 2-3. 
26
          Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240 per Lord Atkin. 
27
       Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (1934) 50 TLR 581 at 584 per Scrutton LJ. 
28
       Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105 at 108 per Parke B. 
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1.3  Judge and jury 
In New Zealand, a defamation claim is one of the few civil claims which can still be heard 
before a judge and jury. If the case is tried by a judge and jury, the judge must decide whether 
the words used were capable of being defamatory. Submissions on this matter are made in the 
absence of the jury, to ensure that its members are not influenced in any way.30 If the judge 
rules that the case should proceed, it is for the jury to say whether or not in the circumstances 
of this case the words were, in fact, defamatory in that they tended to injure the plaintiff’s 
reputation. Where the judge sits alone, the two functions become blurred and can be 
addressed as one question.31 
 
1.4  Unintentional defamation 
A person publishing defamatory words in New Zealand may be liable even if he or she did not 
intend to defame anyone. It does not matter what the defendant intended the words to convey 
but rather what they do convey to a reasonable reader or listener. Thus, there is no defence of 
unintentional defamation, and problematic cases such as Hulton & Co v Jones 32 can apply.  
However, as the ‘spit and image’ exception for look-alike cases33 may also apply in New 
Zealand, it may be that the ambit of unintentional defamation will steadily decline, a 
development which would be welcomed by the media.  
 
1.5  Meanings 
In ascertaining the meaning of words, an approach very similar to that in the United Kingdom 
is taken, so that everything depends on the overall impression created by the publication,34 and 
the bane and antidote doctrine applies.35 The meanings of words can be coloured by their 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29
       Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (1934) 50 TLR 581 at 587 per Slesser LJ. 
30
       Defamation Act 1992, s. 36. See PPCS v NZ Rural Press Ltd Unreported, High Court Auckland, 14 
March 2000, CP412/SD99, Cartright J, at paras 10-12.  
31
  Jaques v Independent Radio News Ltd (1999) 13 PRNZ 294. 
32 
  [1910] AC 20. See also Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd  [1929] 2 KB 331, Newstead v 
London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 1 KB 377, Sattin v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 32. 
33
  O’Shea v MGN Ltd [2001] EMLR 40. In this case, a pornographic advertisement contained a 
photograph of a woman it was alleged was the exact look alike, or ‘spit and image’ of the plaintiff. The English 
court held it would impose an impossible burden on a publisher required to check if the true picture of someone 
resembled someone else who because of the context of the picture was defamed. The court thought that to 
impose such a burden would be an unjustifiable interference with the vital right of freedom of expression 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the reputations of ‘look alikes’ and contrary to art 10 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (also known as the European 
Convention on Human Rights and referred to by that title from hereon) and s 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 
1998 UK). Such reasoning could be advanced in New Zealand based on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990: see Chapter Nine below. 
34
   New Zealand Magazines v. Hadlee CA, 24 October 1996, CA 74/96. See also Charleston v News 
Group Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65, per Lord Bridge at 71–2. 
35
  Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65; [1995] 2 All ER 313. Under this doctrine, 
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surroundings and the overall style of a publication may be significant in deciding how words 
in it are likely to be understood by readers. An article that seems inoffensive by itself may 
assume a defamatory meaning when read in conjunction with other articles or news items, 
whether in the same newspaper or in earlier or even (possibly) later issues of the newspaper,36 
or within a television broadcast, and a later one, from the same broadcaster or otherwise. 
 
1.6  Publication and repetition 
The chain of publication rule applies. If a defamatory statement appears in a newspaper, all 
those concerned with the publication are liable—the newspaper company, the editor, the 
reporter, even the subeditors and typesetter. Similar principles apply to radio and television 
companies even though some aspects of broadcasting have no real equivalent in the 
newspaper world. Yet even in relation to the live interview and ‘talkback show’, where there 
is always the risk that the interviewee, without any involvement on the part of the broadcaster, 
may make an impromptu remark that is defamatory of some person, the broadcasting station 
will normally be held liable.37 Furthermore, liability can attach to repetition. As the news 
media can be liable for repeating the words of speakers, so they can also be liable for 
repeating defamatory words that other newspapers or broadcasting stations have used.38 
 
1.7  The internet 
There is no doubt that defamation can occur via the internet in New Zealand, based on 
ordinary principles. It has been held that the fact that the defamation appeared in ‘cyberspace’ 
makes no difference to the application of defamation law.39  It has also been held in a striking-
out action that references to a website in a defamatory article are sufficient communication of 
the defamatory contents of the website so as to constitute publication also of the contents of 
the website.40 The question of the liability of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is yet to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
words used elsewhere in an article may cancel out, or act as the ‘antidote’ to the ‘bane’ of defamatory words. 
36 
 See Pilcher v Knowles (1900) 19 NZLR 368; Simons Proprietary Ltd v Riddell [1941] NZLR 913, and 
Ballantyne v Television New Zealand Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 455. 
37
  Russell v Radio i Ltd, SC Auckland, A 590/74 (1976); Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Comalco 
Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 259. The Australian defence of innocent dissemination where the publisher can show that it 
was a mere conduit, (Thompson v ACTV (1996) 141 ALR 1), is unlikely to be of much assistance to either 
newspapers or broadcasters. New Zealand has a statutory defence of innocent dissemination in s 21 of the Act, 
but this mirrors the common law and is limited in application to parties akin to processors and printers. 
38
  Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television NZ Ltd [2008] NZCA 350, [74], [94]. 
39
  O’Brien v Brown [2001] DCR 1065, ‘…I know of no forum in which an individual has the freedom to 
say what he likes and in any manner he wishes about another individual citizen with immunity from suit for all 
consequences. Merely because the publication is being made to cyberspace does not alter this.’ per  Judge Ross 
at 1074. 
40
 International Telephone Link Pty Ltd v IDG Communications Ltd H C Auckland, 20 February 1998, CP 
344/97. 
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addressed in New Zealand. It is unclear whether English cases like Bunt v Tilley,41 which held 
that an ISP was not a publisher if it performed no more than a passive role in facilitating 
postings on the internet, will apply in New Zealand, although it appears the courts are inclined 
to focus on the existence of knowledge to determine liability for publication on websites.42 
The Australian case Dow Jones v Gutnick,43 establishing that the place of downloading will be 
the place where defamation may occur, may also have application,44 as may the English 
Loutchansky decisions45 which confirmed that multiple publications can arise from initial 
publication on the internet under the ‘multiple publication’ rule.46 Therefore, subsequent 
occasions upon which a website is accessed potentially give rise to separate causes of action, 
each with an individual limitation period.  
 
1.8  Defamation and negligence 
New Zealand courts hold steady in cases involving media defendants in refusing to adopt the 
principle in the English case Spring v Guardian Assurance,47 that a negligence action can be 
used to protect reputation. There have been a number of unsuccessful attempts to persuade the 
Court of Appeal to recognise a duty based on negligence which would bind the media.48 
 
1.9  Defences 
As to defences, the plaintiff will not succeed in a defamation action if the defendant can show 
that he or she has a recognised defence. In New Zealand, there is a form of absolute privilege 
which applies to those taking part in court proceedings,49 and to statements made in 
parliament. The latter is being cut back somewhat in a manner which has made it quite risky 
for members of parliament to give interviews about statements they have made in the House.50 
However, the media’s privilege defences are not absolute but conditional.  
                                                          
41
  [2006] EMLR 18. 
42
  Sadiq v Baycorp (NZ) Ltd, Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CIV-2007-404-6421, 31 March 2008. 
Copyright law now deals with such liability by use of a notice and take-down scheme: see the Copyright (New 
Technologies) Amendment Act 2008, ss 92A-92D. 
43 
 194 ALR 433. 
44
  Nationwide News Pty v the University of Newlands and Forrester, Unreported, CA, 202/04, 9 
December 2005; Solicitor-General v Siemer, Unreported, High Court Auckland, CIV 2008 404 472, 8 July 2008, 
at [70]. 
45 
 Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 4 and 5) Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 2, 3 
and 5) [2002] QB 783. 
46
  Sadiq v Baycorp (NZ) Ltd, Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CIV-2007-404-6421, 31 March 2008. 
47
  [1995] 2 AC 296. 
48
  Midland Metals Overseas Pty Ltd v The Christchurch Press Company[2002] 2 NZLR 289, King v TV3 
Network Services Unreported, Court of Appeal, CA221/02, 14 October 2003. 
49
  Rawlinson v Oliver [1995] NZFLR 481. 
50
  Jennings v Buchanan [2004] EMLR 22; [2005] 2 NZLR 577. The Privileges Committee of Parliament 
recommended amendment to the Legislature Act to make it clear that no criminal or civil liability will be 
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1.9.1 Qualified privilege  
The media’s privilege to report statements is a qualified privilege only. There exist extremely 
useful forms of statutory qualified privilege, but although common law qualified privilege 
also applies,51 it is usually defeated by excess publication on the part of media defendants. 
The most profound development in recent years in relation to defences which are of use to the 
media has been the appearance of an extended form of qualified privilege applying to political 
statements which are published generally. In Lange v Atkinson,52 it was held that the wider 
New Zealand public have a proper interest in respect of generally-published statements which 
directly concern the functioning of representative and responsible government. A proper 
interest only exists, however, in statements made about the actions and qualities of those 
currently or formerly elected to Parliament and those with immediate aspirations to such 
office, so far as those actions and qualities directly affect or affected their capacity (including 
their personal ability and willingness) to meet their public responsibilities. The width of the 
identified public concern justifies the acceptable extent of publication.  
 
There have been contemporaneous developments in the United Kingdom and Australia,53 
where forms of political discussion published generally are now protected although this is 
generally conditional upon some form of media responsibility in relation to investigation and 
publication of the story.54 Although the New Zealand defence did not come with a code of 
media responsibility, our courts have been developing their own idea of a responsible 
defendant based on the idea that qualified privilege is not a licence to be irresponsible. So far, 
the method by which this is done is in judicial application of s 19 of the Defamation Act, 
which provides that all forms of qualified privilege will be lost if the defendant was motivated 
by ill will or took advantage of the occasion of publication. 
 
The motives of the publisher and whether the publisher had a genuine belief in the truth of the 
statement can now come under scrutiny. The Court of Appeal stated  in Lange that lack of 
evidence of a genuine belief in truth may support an inference that no such belief existed. 
Furthermore, recklessness or indifference to the truth goes to genuine belief also. Carelessness 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
incurred as a result of endorsement, adoption or affirmation of statements made under parliamentary privilege 
where the statement would not, but for the proceedings in Parliament, give rise to the civil or criminal liability.  
The government announced that the change would be made, but it was never passed into law: see P A Joseph, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, (3rd ed, 2007), 427-430. 
51 
  Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 334 per Lord Atkinson. 
52
  [1998] 3 NZLR 424, [2000] 1 NZLR 257,  [2000] 3 NZLR 385. 
53
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 71 ALJR 818, 835; Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers Ltd, [1998] 3 WLR 862. 
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alone will not be sufficient to negate the defence, but may support an assertion of a lack of 
belief or recklessness.55 Therefore, the privilege may be lost if the defendant takes what in all 
the circumstances is a ‘cavalier’ approach to the truth of the statement. What is more, no 
consideration and insufficient consideration of the existence of truth or otherwise could also 
create an inference of misuse of the occasion.56 
 
How far the New Zealand approach differs from that in the United Kingdom is examined 
further below.57 In Lillie and Reed v Newcastle City Council58 Eady J examined the New 
Zealand approach and concluded that it was very close to the notion of responsible journalism 
introduced by Reynolds v Times Newspapers59 with its ten guidelines which were initially 
interpreted more like a code by the English courts.60 However, he acknowledged that in 
Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd61the English Court of Appeal described the New 
Zealand approach as having redefined the concept of actual malice to provide a stronger 
safeguard against abuse. Whether or not this is so, it is at least clear that the onus of proof is 
different in the different jurisdictions. In New Zealand, the plaintiff has to prove that the 
defendant was predominantly motivated by ill will or took improper advantage of the 
occasion of publication,62 while in the United Kingdom, the defendant must discharge any 
onus as to responsibility. 
 
It appears the courts in the United Kingdom,63 and in Australia,64 generously opened the 
gateway to the constitutional qualified privilege defences by interpreting their scope widely, 
but then limited application, at least initially, by developing defacto codes of journalistic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
54
  See the discussion below, Chapters Four and Nine. 
55
  Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, 401. 
56
  Ibid. 
57
  See Chapters Four and Nine. 
58 
 [2002] EWHC 1600. 
59
  [1998] 3 WLR 862. 
60
  Lillie and Reed v Newcastle City Council [2002] EWHC 1600, para 1293. The more recent English cases 
indicate a relaxation of the code-like requirements: see  Jameel v Wall Street Journal [2007] EMLR 2  where the 
House of Lords confirmed that the question is still whether steps taken to gather the information were 
responsible and fair, but the 10 Reynolds criteria are treated as pointers only, not a series of hurdles to be 
overcome. The approach is a more media-friendly one. See Chapters Four and Nine below. 
61
   (No 2) [2002] 1 All ER 652 . 
62 
 Defamation Act 1992, s 19(1) and s 41. 
63
 See eg: James Gilbert Ltd v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2000] EMLR 680, Grobbelaar v News Group 
Newspapers [2001] 2 All ER 437, [2002] UKHL 40, GKR Karate v Yorkshire Post Ltd [2001] EMLR 410, Al-
Fahig v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2002] EMLR 13, Al Misnad v Azzaman Ltd [2003] EWHC 
1783 (QB), [2005] EMLR 7, Galloway v Telegraph Group [2004] EWHC 2786 (QB),  Galloway MP v The 
Telegraph Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 17 (25 January 2006), [2006] EMLR 11. 
64
  See eg: Orion Pet Products Pty Ltd v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals  (Vic) 
[2002] FCA 860, Popovic v Herald & Weekly Times (2003) 9 VR 1 (CA), Brander v Ryan (2000) SASC 446,  
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conduct.65 This is in contrast to the New Zealand position, which on one view, appears to 
have developed the other way around. Although the privilege is generic in New Zealand, it is 
limited by the subject matter and by the requirement that the occasion of publication be 
appropriate.  
 
Only one other case has so far reached the New Zealand Court of Appeal, where it was held 
that the defence covers statements about the activities of national (and possibly local) 
politicians but not those about the activities of employees of public bodies.66 Further, it 
appears Lange will not apply to allegations of criminality, which are seen as serious enough to 
destroy the additionally required reciprocal relationship of duty/interest.67 However, a recent 
High Court decision demonstrates the natural propensity for expansion of such defences, once 
recognised. In Osmose New Zealand v Wakeling68 Harrison J apparently extended the 
coverage of the qualified privilege defence to matters of public interest. This leap is out of 
step with precedent and is discussed in more detail below.69 Suffice to state in a summary way 
at this stage that for the media, Lange v Atkinson is a mixed blessing, as similar developments 
are proving to be in other jurisdictions, but the defence is tantalisingly open to expansion in 
the future. 
 
1.9.2 Honest opinion 
Formerly New Zealand had the useful defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest. 
The Defamation Act 1992 renamed it honest opinion and apparently swept away the need for 
the matter to be one of public interest.70 The requirements now are that the opinion must be 
based on facts which are true, the opinion must obviously be opinion, and that it must clearly 
be genuine. The Act provides that a defence of honest opinion by a defendant who is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Conservation Council of SA v Chapman (2003) SASR 62 (FC) and Cornwall v Rowan (2004) 90 SASR 269 
(FC). 
65
  In the United Kingdom, it is unclear whether the defence is limited to the media. In non-media cases, 
the requirements of media responsibility may have no application or may require adjustment: see Kearns v 
General Council of the Bar  [2003] 2 All ER 534, cf Seaga v Harper ([2008] 1 All ER 695. 
66
  Vickery v McLean Unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 125-00, 20 November 2000.  There are brief obiter 
comments about the defence in Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television NZ Ltd [2008] NZCA 350, [73]. 
67
  Ibid. 
68
  [2007] 1 NZLR 841. 
69
  See Chapter Nine below. 
70
  Sir Ian McKay, who, as Mr I L McKay, was chairman of the Committee on Defamation that produced 
the report leading to the new Act, has written: ‘Under the statutory defence of honest opinion, however, there is 
now no requirement that the opinion be a matter of public interest.’: 10 The Laws of New Zealand, para 133, at 
99. It does seem rather remarkable that such a fundamental requirement would be swept away by a side-wind, 
due to statutory omission. See also Shadbolt v Independent News Media Ltd HC Auckland, 7 February 1997, CP 
207/95, Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 590, 595, Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424, 
436, Mitchell v Sprott [2002] 1 NZLR 766. A requirement for the matter to be of public interest would mirror the 
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author of the material fails unless the defendant proves that the opinion expressed was the 
defendant’s genuine opinion.71 The defendant must now prove that the genuine belief existed 
and it was subjectively held by the defendant.   
 
The Defamation Act 1992 also provides two new rules to cover the situation where the person 
sued is not the person who expressed the opinion, which often involves the media.  It provides 
that a defence of honest opinion fails where the author was an employee or agent of the 
defendant unless the defendant proves that the opinion, in its context and in the circumstances 
of the publication, did not purport to be the opinion of the defendant; and the defendant 
believed that the opinion was the genuine opinion of the author.72  This would cover, for 
example, articles written by journalists employed by a newspaper. The employer has to 
positively believe in genuineness, and it may not be easy to establish what the actual belief 
was.  
 
The Act also provides that where the author was not an employee or agent of the defendant, 
the defence fails unless the defendant proves that the opinion, in its context and in the 
circumstances of the publication, did not purport to be the opinion of the defendant or of any 
employee or agent of the defendant; and the defendant had no reasonable cause to believe that 
the opinion was not the genuine opinion of the author.73 This provision would cover the 
freelance writer or an ordinary member of the public writing a letter to the editor.  
 
It is by no means clear how a newspaper or broadcaster will establish whether an opinion is its 
own, or show it held a genuine belief.74 Clearly media defendants must adduce some evidence 
to satisfy the requirements, and calling the author would appear to be the normal approach. 
This will be possible where the author is an employee or agent of the defendant. Where an 
outside contributor is involved, his or her evidence will be useful to establish authorship if he 
or she can be tracked down.75  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
polticial discussion defence as it appears to be developing: see 1.9.1 above. 
71
  Section 10(1). See Hubbard v Fourth Estate Holdings Unreported, HCt, Auckland, Venning J CIV-
2004-404—5152, 13 June 2005. 
72
  Section 10(2)(a). 
73
  Section 10(2)(b). 
74 
 See eg: Shadbolt v Independent News Media Ltd HC Auckland, 7 February 1997, CP 207/95; see also 
Hubbard above, n. 71. 
75
  In Vague v Banks [2002] DCR 782, Judge McElrea made obiter comments on the liability of radio 
stations for comments of talk-back callers. The judge thought that it might not be too difficult for a radio station 
proprietor to establish that the station did not hold the opinions of callers to it and had no reasonable cause to 
believe the opinion was not genuinely held by the caller. However, he added the rider that the matter depends on 
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Haines v Television New Zealand Ltd76 dealt with the issue of how it is to be decided that 
imputations are capable of being expressions of opinion. The plaintiff argued that only the 
imputations it had pleaded should be considered by the jury in answering this question. The 
Court of Appeal rejected this approach, stating that this could not be considered in a vacuum, 
devoid of the context in which the words arise. Therefore, the jury must look at the 
publication as a whole when determining whether the imputation it has found to arise was an 
allegation of fact, or an expression of opinion.77 It is not confined to using only the meanings 
pleaded by the plaintiff.78 
 
1.9.3 Truth 
All a New Zealand plaintiff needs to do in a defamation action is to prove that disparaging 
statements have been made about him or her. The plaintiff does not have to prove that those 
statements are false, on the grounds that a person’s character is assumed to be good unless the 
contrary is proved. But once a plaintiff has established that defamatory remarks were made, 
the defendant is then allowed, if he or she can, to prove that the remarks were true. If the 
defendant succeeds in this, he or she has a complete defence. The Defamation Act 1992 
requires the defendant to plead particulars specifying which statements are statements of fact 
and the facts and circumstances relied on to show they are true.79 As in other jurisdictions, it 
is sometimes very difficult for the media to prove the truth of statements, particularly where 
this may require the disclosure of sources,80 or where media have been relying on the 
statements of others, rather than independent investigation.81 Further, although the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the nature of the talk-back programme, the style and approach of the host and whether the callers were known 
cranks rather than those giving their genuine opinion. 
76
  [2006] 2 NZLR 433. 
77
  Ibid, [90]-[95].                          
78
  See also Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television NZ Ltd [2008] NZCA 350, [126]. 
79
 Section 38. See Bunton v Kirton, Unreported, High Court, Wellington, CP 249/98, 15 April 1999, 
Wasan International Co Ltd v Lee Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CIV 2003-404-4113, 26 May 2004, 
Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television NZ Ltd [2008] NZCA 350. 
80
  In April 2005, the editor of the Sunday Star Times apologised for publishing a front-page story alleging 
that the New Zealand Intelligence Service had been involved in unlawful surveillance of Maori organisations, 
after an inquiry into the matter concluded that the allegations were not true. The sources used by the newspaper 
would not give evidence to the inquiry and became unavailable. The newspaper acknowledged that it should 
have been more cautious in presenting the claims but noted the difficulties it faced obtaining corroborating 
evidence. The editor suggested the publication had been used by unknown men for unknown reasons (ultimately, 
the newspaper found it was unsure whether the sources were in fact ex-SIS members, as they had previously held 
themselves out to be, and could not determine what the motives of the sources were): Sunday Star Times, 17 
April 2005.  
81
  Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television NZ Ltd [2008] NZCA 350, [82]. 
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has to prove truth only on the balance of probabilities, the courts have tended to require a 
fairly high standard of accuracy.82 
 
Recent skirmishes bearing on truth have produced a collection of judicial statements, many of 
them obiter and some contradictory, about the New Zealand approach to the meanings words 
bear in relation to truth. However, it now appears that the previously applied ‘pick and 
choose’ rule, whereby the plaintiff is able to select parts of a publication to sue on and thereby 
restrict the defendant from referring to the whole of the publication in order to prove truth,83 
has been relaxed.84 The complications attending this development are yet to be fully 
identified.85 As with the elimination of the public interest requirement in honest opinion, this 
change has been motivated by ambiguity in the statute.  
 
New Zealand also took a strict approach to attempts to plead lesser meanings in the past.86 
This meant a defendant was prevented from alleging that the words bear a lesser defamatory 
meaning than that claimed by the plaintiff and attempting to prove the truth of that meaning. 
Following the passage of the Defamation Act, which was silent on this issue, attempts were 
made to argue that relaxation of the ‘pick and choose’ rule referred to above also supported 
relaxation of the approach to pleading lesser meanings. However, the Court of Appeal has 
confirmed the conservative approach, in Haines v Television New Zealand Ltd.87 This is 
because, in contrast to the English courts,88 New Zealand judges consider the defendant has 
the chance to argue that the words used do not bear the meaning contended for by the 
plaintiff, at the earlier point when the plaintiff argues before a judge that the words are 
capable of having certain imputations and attempts to prove to the trier of fact that the words 
actually have the imputations identified. The defendant therefore cannot attempt to suggest 
lesser meanings at the later stage when raising the defence of truth. The Court of Appeal 
stated that this approach is necessary because proving a lesser meaning leaves the plaintiff’s 
alleged meaning undefended, and a parallel enquiry is unhelpful and confusing for the jury.89 
                                                          
82
  Reeves v Saxon CA, 17 December 1992, CA 134/89. The court has regard to the gravity of the case and 
the seriousness of the allegations, particularly where the allegation is one of fraud: at 16. 
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  Templeton v Jones [1984] 1 NZLR 448. 
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  Haines v Television New Zealand Ltd  [2006] 2 NZLR 433, [45]. 
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  See eg: Ansley v Penn Unreported, High Court, Christchurch, A36/98, 28 August 1998, 13,  Manning v 
TV3 Network Services Ltd [2003] NZAR 328. 
86  Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Crush [1988] 2 NZLR 234. See also Isbey v Broadcasting 
Corporation of New Zealand [1975] 1 NZLR 721. 
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  [2006] 2 NZLR 433. See also Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television NZ Ltd [2008] NZCA 350, [51]. 
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  Polly Peck (Holdings) plc v Trelford [1986] QB 1000. 
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Damages are the most common remedy sought in New Zealand defamation actions and the 
attempt in the Defamation Act to introduce other remedies designed to vindicate reputation 
has not altered this position. Damages are generally compensatory; however punitive damages 
are recoverable for defamatory statements where the defendant has acted in flagrant disregard 
of the rights of the plaintiff.90 The supposed difference between aggravated and punitive 
damages is maintained, although some members of the judiciary have expressed the view that 
there are in reality only two categories: compensatory and punitive.91 Punitive damages 
clearly remain in a separate category, whatever stance is taken to aggravated damages. The 
leading New Zealand case on punitive damages is still Television New Zealand Ltd v Quinn,92 
where the court emphasized that such damages were rare and have always been moderate.  
 
As to levels of damages, the highest jury award to date was made in Columbus v Independent 
News Auckland Ltd93 where the jury awarded a record $675,000 in damages. More recently a 
plaintiff defamed in three articles was entitled to an award of $125,000, while another, less 
well known and defamed in one article, was awarded $25,000 by a High court judge,94 and a 
High Court jury awarded sums of $280,000, $270,000 and $230,000 to three former police 
officers against a newspaper publisher and its columnist for a column and article criticising 
the officers.95 In the earlier Quinn case,96 the Court of Appeal rejected with little discussion an 
argument put forward that levels of damages were so high in New Zealand as to have a 
chilling effect on freedom of expression, and was of the view that this jurisdiction has no real 
difficulty with unrealistic levels being claimed and awarded.97 In the much more recent 
Columbus, the judge displayed confidence in the ability of juries to understand and carry out 
their roles. He referred to the nature of the jury, identifying their occupations to show they 
were truly representative and aware of the value of money and community values. The recent 
cases may indicate a movement upwards in levels; however it is really too soon to tell.  
 
                                                          
90
  Taylor v Beere [1982] 1 NZLR 81, s 28 of the Defamation Act 1992. 
91
  Midlands Metal Overseas Pte Ltd v The Christchurch Press Ltd [2002] NZLR 289, 302-303, per 
Tipping J. 
92
 [1996] 3 NZLR 24. The proceedings were filed before the Defamation Act came into effect, but Lord Cooke 
of Thorndon noted that there was little difference between the old law and the ‘flagrant disregard’ test in the new 
Act: at 36. 
93
  Unreported, 7 April 2000, HC, Auckland, CP 600/98. 
94
  Chinese Herald  Ltd & ors v New Times Madia Ltd & ors [2004] 2 NZLR 749. 
95
  The Press, 5 August 2004. The articles contained many factual errors and were unbalanced. 
96
  See n. 92 above. 
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1.10.2 Injunction 
Although uncommon, injunction to prevent publication is certainly a possible remedy in 
defamation cases in New Zealand. An injunction has been granted to stop the continued 
display of a defamatory poster98 and of a billboard sign,99 and to prevent publication in emails 
and on the internet.100 But the question that arises most often is whether an interim injunction 
should be granted. Normally the principles laid down by the House of Lords in American 
Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd,101 which require the plaintiff to establish no more than that there 
is ‘a serious question to be tried’ and that the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting 
the interim injunction, would apply. However, cases subsequent to American Cyanamid in 
England,102 Australia,103 and New Zealand104 have changed the approach in defamation cases. 
Hence the more restrictive rule laid down in Bonnard v Perryman105 governs because of the 
importance of the value of freedom of speech. 
 
Despite this rule of caution, in the late 1980s there was a number of unreported instances in 
New Zealand of interim injunctions being granted (sometimes ex parte), although they were 
discharged later. However, since the passing of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the 
Court of Appeal has emphasized that it is not part of the function of the court to act as a 
censor, and that the jurisdiction to restrain is exceptional.106 The leading case currently is TV3 
Network Services Ltd v Fahey,107 where the Court of Appeal affirmed its view that an interim 
injunction will not be granted readily in a defamation case because of the need to preserve 
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  Ibid  at 33–4 per Cooke P, at 56–8 per McGechan J. 
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 Mount Cook Group Ltd v Johnstone Motors Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 488. 
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  Auckland Area Health Board v Television New Zealand Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 406. 
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 [1999] 2 NZLR 129, at 132. 
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freedom of expression. The jurisdiction to prevent publication is 'of a delicate nature' and 
'ought only to be exercised in the clearest cases.'108  
 
In Hodgson v Siemer,109 the High Court granted a rare interim injunction to replace an ex 
parte interim injunction directing a billboard to be taken down and material to be removed 
from a website. The plaintiff was a receiver of a company in which the defendant was a 
managing director. During differences about the receivership, the defendant erected a 
billboard which mentioned the plaintiff and referred readers to a website which contained 
statements the plaintiff alleged were serious allegations of criminal conduct and scandalous 
and outrageous breaches of professional and ethical standards. An application for rescission of 
the injunction and for an amended injunction were heard together. The parties agreed that the 
threshold for injunction to restrain defamatory material is higher than that normally applied. 
Clear and compelling reasons are required and the circumstances must be exceptional.110 The 
judge noted determination of the matter was fact-dependant, and, having surveyed those, 
concluded this was one of those exceptional cases where the Court could say there was no 
reasonable possibility of a defence of truth, honest opinion or qualified privilege 
succeeding.111 However, Justice France noted her concern the injunction sought might be too 
broad. She did not think she could say the defences would fail in relation to statements that 
the plaintiff was not doing ‘a good job’ for example, or that comments to the effect that he 
had a ‘dark side’ or was a ‘bully’ should be restrained.112 Declining to comment on 
submissions of both parties that where the higher defamation threshold applied, there was no 
need to also consider where the balance of convenience lay, the Court found that in any event, 
this favoured the grant of injunctive relief, as there was no particular damage to the defendant 
which flowed from restraint.113 The ex parte order was rescinded and replaced with an interim 
order which prevented publication by the defendant of any information containing allegations 
of criminal or unethical conduct or as to improper personal enrichment on the part of the 
plaintiffs, and which directed that the defendants not reinstate the billboard (which had been 
recently taken down).114 
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  Ibid. 
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  Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CIV 2005-404-1808, 5 May 2005.  
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  Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CIV 2005-404-1808, 5 May 2005, at [39], affirming TV3 Network 
Services v Fahey, above, n. 107. 
111
  Ibid, [55]-[67].  
112
  Ibid, [60]-[62]. 
113
  Ibid, [68]. 
114
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December 2005. In this long-running litigation, the defendant continued to display defamatory material on 
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This decision demonstrates that while the courts are reluctant to act as censors, they will do so 
where the facts do not support tenable defences. Where, as in Siemer, the allegations are of 
serious criminality, documentation suggesting a defence of truth or honest opinion must be 
substantively supportive, and it seems likely that qualified privilege will be not be available at 
all.115 However, in terms of freedom of expression, it is heartening that even in one of these 
rare cases where censorship prevails, the courts take care to limit and control the eventual 
restraint order. 
 
1.10.3 Other remedies 
The Defamation Act 1992 provides for a number of other remedies intended to encourage a 
move away from the inexorable quest for damages. These allow the plaintiff to seek a recom-
mendation from the court requiring the defendant to publish a correction of the matter that is 
the subject of the proceedings.116 The recommendation may cover content, timing, and 
prominence of the correction.117 Further, a plaintiff may seek a declaration that the defendant 
is liable to the plaintiff in defamation.118 The Act also provides that anyone who claims to 
have been defamed in a news medium may, within five working days of becoming aware of 
the publication, request the person responsible for the publication to publish a retraction or a 
reasonable reply in the same medium, with substantially similar prominence and without 
undue delay.119  
 
1.11 Summary 
This brief survey of New Zealand defamation law demonstrates that it has a rich content made 
up of both legislative provisions and the common law. On the face of it, many of the basics of 
our defamation law do appear to be plaintiff friendly – for example, the publication rule and 
the repetition rule. However, this is a rather simplistic view. Furthermore, the common law 
provides some flexibility to adapt and change within a changing political, cultural and social 
backdrop. Developments such as that arising from the Lange litigation show that the law is 
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not set in stone. Some changes have favoured the media, some have not. At the time the 
media survey was carried out, defamation was probably regarded as the branch of the law that 
the New Zealand media fear most. The media survey was an attempt to determine whether 
this fear was justified. However, before turning to the results of the survey, it is also necessary 
to outline the regulatory framework within which the New Zealand media must operate, and 
to determine patterns of media ownership, as these too, limit how and what the media may 
publish. 
 
2. Media regulation in New Zealand 
The New Zealand media landscape has changed its bedrock since the mid-1970’s but the 
basic topography remains small and monopolistic. In 1974, Professor John Burrows described 
a regulatory framework which reflected ‘a very effective attempt to keep control of New 
Zealand newspapers and broadcasting stations out of the hands of overseas interests’.120 By 
1990, such regulation had been repealed and the result appeared to be the very opposite. New 
Zealand had entered the era of the so-called ‘New Zealand experiment’121 during which it 
privatized and deregulated many of its communications (and other) markets and opened them 
up to competition, including foreign competition.122 The New Zealand Government’s policy 
of deregulation generally encompassed a light-handed approach with little or no industry-
specific regulation. All special restrictions on overseas ownership of both newspapers and 
broadcasters were removed, allowing investment by overseas investors, with no regulation of 
cross-media ownership. Entry into these markets became regulated by the general law of 
competition as set out in the Commerce Act 1986.123 
 
2.1 Print media 
Regulation of the printed press in New Zealand currently derives from a number of disparate 
formal and informal sources. Although newspapers are no longer required to be registered, as 
stated, general competition laws have effect.124 Newspapers are also subject to consumer 
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protection legislation.125 In common with broadcasters, the activities of the print media are 
subject to censorship laws.126 The New Zealand Press Council administers a form of partial 
self-regulation of content based on a complaints procedure.127  It is a purely voluntary 
organisation with no legislative backing and no legally enforceable punitive powers. The 
Press Council’s own survey has recently confirmed that it is seen as biased, inconsistent, 
lacking in resources, and ineffective.128  The number of complaints received by the Council 
remains steady - it receives between 75-85 complaints a year and adjudicates about half of 
them. Currently, the uphold rate appears to be fluctuating although it has yet to return to a low 
point achieved in 2001 of 8%.  In 2003, 36% of the 52 adjudications released were upheld or 
part upheld, but this rate fell to 26% in 2004 and 19% in 2005/2006.129 In 2007, the uphold 
rate returned to 30%.130 This does not compare well with the Council’s sister bodies. The 
Australian Press Council upheld in whole or part 42.1 % of its adjudications in 2006/2007.131 
The United Kingdom Press Complaints Commission upheld approximately 50% of its 
2006/2007 adjudications.132 It must be recognised that both those bodies carry out forms of 
mediation, in contrast to the New Zealand body, and therefore steer complaints away from the 
more formal process of adjudication.  
 
The recent independent Press Council Review tried to address its difficulties.133 The 
recommendations focussed on giving the Council more kudos and credibility but maintaining 
self-regulation. They include better resourcing, adoption of mediation and conciliation 
processes, a review of the statement of Principles, and a graduated system of publication 
sanctions. Self-regulation will always be susceptible to charges of bias. Any changes which 
result from the Review will have to be significant to overcome this basic vulnerability. 
Furthermore, as the print media is moving onto other platforms and is itself becoming part of 
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an anticipated state of ‘convergence’ with other media, any reform of the Press Council may 
well be taken over by the major review of broadcasting I go on to discuss below. 
 
2.2 Broadcasting 
Regulation of broadcasting is also minimal. As for print media, general competition laws have 
effect, and so does consumer protection legislation.134 While it has backed away from 
broadcast regulation, the New Zealand Government maintains social objectives in the sector 
by preserving special access to radio and television for particular groups in the community, in 
particular for non-commercial broadcasters.135 Further social objectives are pursued by 
Government regulation of the content of broadcasting. The main form of regulation used in 
this regard is the Broadcasting Act 1989. The Act sets out responsibilities of broadcasters for 
programme standards, and provides for a Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) to oversee 
and enforce the standards regime.136 The Broadcasting Standards Authority’s regulatory work 
is based on a set of Broadcasting Codes agreed between government and broadcasters. The 
codes focus on standards which govern balance and fairness, accuracy, privacy, children’s 
interests, good taste and decency, violence and denigration and discrimination. Uphold rates 
for viewer complaints have tended to hover around 25% but recently this has fluctuated. In 
the year to June 2006, the BSA issued 156 decisions. Of these, 12 percent were upheld in full 
or in part. In the year to June 2007, that rate increased to 22 percent.137 Most complaints are 
usually about good taste and decency, or fairness and accuracy, but the former are upheld less 
and less often now.138 
 
The Broadcasting Act 1989 also established the Broadcasting Commission, an independent 
body which operates under the name New Zealand On Air.139 Its functions include reflecting 
and developing New Zealand identity and culture and it fulfils its requirements by providing 
funds for broadcasting, and for production and archiving of local programming.140 
Importantly, no Minister of the Crown may give directions to the state broadcasters TVNZ 
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and RNZ, as to particular programmes, news gathering and responsibility for programme 
standards.141  
 
Following a general election in 2000, the coalition government reformed the broadcast 
content requirements of its state broadcasters, TVNZ, which had no Charter, and Radio New 
Zealand, which had a legislated Charter set out in the Radio New Zealand Act 1995.142 As 
part of restructuring TVNZ, it approved a Charter containing a broad statement of objectives 
intended to govern the broadcast content of TVNZ, which became law in the Television New 
Zealand Act 2003.143 TVNZ is obliged to fulfil Charter functions144 while maintaining its 
commercial performance. Parliament must review the Charter at least every five years and the 
first review, to be carried out by the Commerce Select Committee, began in February 2008.145 
However, the matter of the Charter, and its funding and functions, remain intensely political 
issues. In May 2008, the Minister for Broadcasting, Trevor Mallard, announced changes to 
administration of Charter funding following criticism about lack of transparency in TVNZ’s 
reporting on its use of the public funds. This appeared to pre-empt the review referred to 
above.146 
 
The announcement by the Minister also appears to pre-empt the findings of a further, long-
term major review of broadcasting, telecommunications and internet media being carried out 
by the Ministry of Culture and Heritage.147 This review has been prompted by the rapid 
technological changes taking place in broadcasting, producing forms of communication and 
entertainment which look like broadcasting, but which do not behave like broadcasting as we 
have known it. Digital broadcasting, for example, provides platforms outside of conventional 
television and radio.148 Many in the media now look to a magic moment called ‘convergence’ 
when the new technologies and old forms of broadcasting will miraculously meld together. 
Meanwhile, some of the new platforms are not currently subject to regulation, reviving 
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concerns about content and access. The government review is considering what can be 
regulated, what should be regulated, and what part existing regulation should play in the new 
landscape. In September 2008, the Government announced the second phase of its review 
programme, part of which involves an examination of current regulation of broadcasting. Two 
options will be considered – a single umbrella regulatory body, (like the Office of 
Communication (OFCOM), an independent regulator of the United Kingdom communications 
industries, set up by statute),149or two converged regulators, one of which would deal with 
content issues and the other with network or delivery issues. Officials will report back to 
Cabinet on this phase of the review by 31 August 2009.150 
 
2.3 Summary 
Currently, media industries operate world-wide in a state of constant and major technological 
change. This has provoked and revived government interest in regulation of media content 
generally. Partly this interest relates to damage which can result from publication of 
information, and how complaints about such damage are dealt with. New forms of regulation 
will therefore continue to impact on the incidence and outcome of defamation claims. The 
self-regulation of most of the print media administered by the Press Council, and the mixed 
form of regulation administered by the Broadcasting Standards Authority are intended to 
provide easily accessible, informal processes whereby members of the public can complain 
after publication or broadcast takes place. Those processes may therefore pre-empt formal 
civil litigation, or take the heat out of a dispute so that threatened court proceedings never 
eventuate. Therefore, as important background, media respondents to the survey were asked 
what they thought of the current media complaints systems, and their responses are detailed 
and analysed below.151  
 
In preparing for this study, I also surmised that a related background issue – that of media 
ownership in New Zealand, required some investigation, in order to determine whether it 
impacted on the question of any chilling effect of New Zealand’s defamation laws. I turn now 
to investigate media ownership in this country. 
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3. Media ownership in New Zealand 
Burrows noted in 1990 that the centralisation of newspaper ownership in New Zealand was a 
matter of concern to some, and that two large companies controlled the majority of daily and 
weekly print publications. This was seen as a potential threat to editorial independence, and to 
raise the possibility of influence over advertising and business news, though that commentator 
concluded that there was no evidence this was occurring in practice at that time.152 These 
concerns do, however, remain, as will be evident from the discussion below.  
 
3.1 The media landscape in 2001 
Following the deregulation referred to above,153 by 2001 when the media survey which is the 
subject of this paper was carried out, New Zealand media ownership had shifted even more 
tectonically to admit significant foreign interests and to embrace market liberalism, and on the 
surface, assorted forms of monopoly control appeared to persist. One commentator has noted 
that every major media company in the private sector in New Zealand was at that time 
foreign-owned, ‘a situation without parallel in the Western world, which no doubt flows from 
the fact that there are no legal restrictions…’154 Another noted that two companies dominated, 
INL (in which Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited holding was then just over 49 percent)155 and 
Wilson & Horton, (originally a New Zealand-owned company but eventually taken over by 
Independent News and Media PLC, the Dublin-based company of media magnate, Tony 
O’Reilly) between them owning 81.9 percent of daily press circulation of provincial 
newspapers and 92.8 percent of metropolitan readership.156 In broadcasting, the only real 
commercial threat outside the state broadcasters, (Radio New Zealand in radio, and TVNZ in 
television), was an acquisitive Canadian competitor, CanWestGlobal. The remaining 
significant player in 2001 was made up of the publishing and broadcasting interests of 
Australian media magnate, Kerry Packer, who owned Prime Television and Australian 
Consolidated Press (ACP), the largest single publisher of magazines in New Zealand with 
over 17 titles.  
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This over-simplified snapshot of the main participants in the New Zealand media market in 
2001, the year the media survey was carried out, reveals a picture of significant foreign 
ownership. This was augmented by considerable cross-pollination of promotional agreements 
in the private sector. The print media was a competitive market in which players came and 
went. Most newspapers were foreign-owned, although there were some independently locally-
owned newspapers, including the Otago Daily Times157 and eight provincial dailies. The state-
owned broadcasting enterprises, in television at least, still enjoyed a majority of audience-
share due in large part to the historical state monopoly. However, they faced an uncertain 
future dependent on the broadcasting policies of future governments, the shape of 
technologies to come, and the vigour and tenacity of private rivals who stood ready to seize 
audience share while strongly resisting any government regulation of their content. Radio was 
a mix of public and privately-owned stations, with the New Zealand population having access 
to the highest number of stations per person in the world.158 This sector also featured 
continual consolidation of ownership in foreign hands. 
 
3.2 Ownership in the intervening years 
That consolidation continued from 2001 to the present. In 2003, Australian company John 
Fairfax Holdings acquired about 70% of New Zealand’s newspapers, magazines and sporting 
publications by buying the INL stable.159 APN News and Media, also an Australian company, 
took over the Wilson & Horton concerns in 2001, and owned them through a New Zealand 
subsidiary.160 The companies competed by consolidating publications. For example, in 
Auckland, where Fairfax dominated the community newspaper market, APN closed down a 
number of its own community newspapers and launched a single publication, the 
Aucklander.161 Fairfax closed the Wellington paper, the Evening Post and renamed its 
previous rival, the Dominion, the Dominion Post, because of a fall in advertising revenue.162 
 
In television, the battle over audience-share intensified, in particular over ratings for real 
news, with Prime Television ‘poaching’ some of TVNZ’s celebrity broadcast announcers and 
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unveiling plans to offer substantive news programmes.163 The CanWest company TV3 
continued to announce the capture of some TVNZ audience share among the younger age 
group. Some small regional stations also existed.164 Sky dominated the pay-television sector, 
having entered into platform agreements with all the terrestrial broadcasters. 
 
In radio, two foreign-owned groups, RadioWorks (owned by CanWest), and the Radio 
Network (a subsidiary of Australian Radio Network, Australia’s largest radio broadcaster, a 
joint venture between APN News and Media and Clear Channel International), dominated, 
although there were a handful of independent stations, as well as non-profit, community 
access radio broadcasters.  
 
3.3 Contemporary ownership patterns 
In 2008, these patterns of ownership appear to have become indelible. If anything, the 
consolidation of foreign-owned media interests has intensified, in the sense that the sector 
remains largely owned off-shore, but the make-up of those off-shore interests is constantly 
changing. One notable development is that new players have entered the market, in the shape 
of companies which have no experience in communications, but which seek to acquire media 
companies as part of investment portfolios.  
 
Rosenberg now reports that four overseas-owned companies currently dominate the New 
Zealand news media.165 The Australian company, John Fairfax Holdings Ltd and the 
Australian registered company166 APN News and Media (ANM) own 86.9% of audited daily 
press circulation of provincial newspapers and 92.2% of metropolitan readership between 
them.167 Both companies are increasing their already extensive ownership of community 
newspapers and magazines. ANM also has substantial radio holdings as it owns one of the 
two largest radio networks, but its rival is Mediaworks which owns the other. Mediaworks is 
now owned by an Australian private equity corporation called Ironbridge. Mediaworks also 
owns the private television channels, TV3 and C4. The other significant television 
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broadcasters are still the state broadcaster TVNZ, made up of TVOne and TV2, and News 
Corporation, which is US-based, controlled by Rupert Murdoch, and the third-largest media 
conglomerate in the world,168 and has a monopoly on pay television through Sky Television, 
but also owns the free-to-air channel, Prime Television. This media make-up mirrors overseas 
patterns of ownership.169 
 
Around these flagships, a few independents hover. In print, Allied Press, owned by the Smith 
family, still owns the largest independent daily, the Otago Daily Times, and some smaller 
South Island dailies and community newspapers.170 Other southland dailies, such as the 
Ashburton Guardian, are locally owned still. The national financial newspaper the National 
Business Review, having been in and out of the Fairfax stable,  is owned by New Zealander, 
Barry Colman’s Liberty Press, which has a subsidiary, Fourth Estate. Even that press has sold 
off some of its titles to Australian interests over the years. In television, Maori television, a 
state owned channel launched in politically charged circumstances in 2004, has surprised and 
impressed audiences with its depth and breadth of local content.171 Regional television 
stations come and go. Two which stand out are Alt TV which started as an alternative music 
channel and broadcasts free to air in Auckland, but also on the Sky network,172 and Triangle 
Television, originally Auckland-based but now broadcasting in Wellington as well, a self-
described public broadcaster, allocating air-time on a first-come, first-served basis, which 
appears to be a genuine attempt at community television.173  
 
The success of these independents is something of a lottery, because many of them lack a 
stable financial base, and they struggle to attract and retain sufficient advertising to sustain 
each operation. Even smaller foreign-owned ventures face difficulties. For example, in 
Christchurch, the New Zealand Media Group, owned by American businessman Jim 
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McCotter, closed the tabloid newspaper, the Citizen Today a year after it was launched in 
2001. The resulting redundancies appeared to surprise many of the journalists involved. At the 
same time, NZMG was reported to be consolidating its New Zealand television holdings, by 
buying and amalgamating the assets of regional television stations. This resulted in two South 
Island cities having no local television news programmes.174 
 
This brief survey would be incomplete without mention of new media. Digital television and 
the internet as information and entertainment platforms were tantalising unknowns at the time 
I carried out the media survey in 2001. Now it is accepted they will change the face of the 
communications industry as we know it. Digital broadcasting, using terrestrial and satellite 
services, is expected to replace traditional analogue broadcasting within the next eight 
years.175 A consortium of free-to-air broadcasters, including TVNZ, MediaWorks, Maori TV, 
Trackside and Radio New Zealand, agreed in 2006 to build a digital transmission network, 
largely in competition with Sky which currently dominates the pay-tv sector in this country. 
Transmission began in 2007 and by 2008, Freeview176 presented 13 television channels, 
including TVNZ 6, (offering advertising-free programming with between 50% and 70% local 
content divided into three distinct services targeting preschooler, families, and adult viewers), 
TVNZ 7, (a commercial-free “factual” channel made up of news and a mixture of 
documentaries both new and historical, and sports and current affairs programmes), Stratos 
Television (providing regional, ethnic and educational television programming from New 
Zealand and around the world);  Parliament TV (which broadcasts the full unedited 
proceedings of Parliament, approximately 17.5 hours per week live and unedited when the 
House is sitting) and New Zealand's first 100 per cent Maori language television channel (Te 
Reo, aimed at fluent Maori speakers and Maori language learners).177 Three radio 
broadcasters are also available - Radio New Zealand in its national and concert formats and a 
dance music station called George. Currently, although essentially commercial-free, the 
service is only available to those who purchase a set-top box decoder178 with additional costs 
for those who also want high definition television. It is clear that the eventual analogue 
switch-off will truly be akin to the earlier tumultuous arrival of television in the late 1950’s.179 
 
                                                          
174
  The Press 13 July 2002, D5. 
175
  Broadcasting Minister, Steve Maharey, Press statement, 15 June 2006. 
176
  http://freeviewnz.tv/ 
177
  http://freeviewnz.tv/index.php?section_id=5#cue  
178
  At a price of about $200 for those who already have a satellite dish, with dish installation requiring a 
further $800 investment: see Rosenberg, n. 165 above, 15-16. 
179
  See Voice and Vision: A History of New Zealand Broadcasting, Dr Patrick Day, (AUP, 2000). 
 34 
Originally a technology developed on a military and then a not-for-profit basis, the internet 
appears currently to embrace competing aims of setting information free, and the discovery  
and exploitation of seemingly endless commercial potential. Media websites began in a 
bandwagon fashion – as alternative means of getting conventional material published.180 Now 
they have a life of their own and no media outlet would be without a proliferation of websites 
for all their publications. Thus every newspaper now has its own website or link to a stable 
website providing text, audio and video material.181 This has produced a blurring of 
mainstream media functions. For example, it is now commonplace for newspapers to break 
stories using video before television news programmes can get to air. Rosenberg notes that 
media companies have now moved beyond news, advertising and information into online 
auctions, job advertising, dating services, holiday accommodation, house and car sales and 
managed funds.182 It remains true, however, that the proliferation of outlets and apparent 
explosion of information now being made available, is paid for, as with conventional media, 
by advertising.  
 
The first media websites were very simple affairs compared to the contemporary busy visual 
feasts containing pop-up ads from which there is no easy escape, games, trivia contests, 
celebrity stories and on-line surveys, which have replaced them today. In many ways, it is 
harder to find the real news amidst all these ‘noisy’ distractions. Rosenberg suggests the role 
of the internet in providing alternative news sources has been exaggerated.183 He does note, 
however, the emergence of internet-only media services, such as Scoop,184 ‘disintermediated’ 
news agencies which literally publish almost anything released as news, and in that sense, are 
perhaps true promoters of a marketplace of ideas. The internet has also facilitated a significant 
increase in ‘citizen journalism’, where ordinary folk voluntarily contribute recordings of 
newsworthy events, such as cell-phone photography or video, or are asked to contribute such 
material. This had produced mixed results – for example, hoaxing can be a common 
feature.185  
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This paper is not about the growth of new media, and so the fascinating question of its impact 
on trust, truth and on defamation law must remain for another day. I simply note here that 
these developments confirm a potent capacity of the media to reinvent itself. In that sense, it 
is at least clear that new media bring new forms of speech and publication, speech which can 
harm reputation, and so the question of the chilling effect of defamation laws remains 
germane. 
 
3.4 Conclusion on media ownership in New Zealand 
The New Zealand population is a small one and huge fortunes are not to be made on the back 
of purely New Zealand media empires. But because there is no restriction on foreign 
ownership or on cross-media ownership, any person with money to buy into or set up a media 
business may do so as long as the acquisition will not substantially lessen competition in the 
relevant market.186 This might imply the existence of a healthy competitive market, but it 
remains true that smaller enterprises face more of a struggle for basic existence whether 
foreign-owned or not.  
 
Currently, though, ownership by large, foreign conglomerates appears to have become the 
default model for most media in New Zealand. This has led to the identification of a particular 
form of chilling effect. Media commentators argue that ownership by such conglomerates, 
themselves also the subject of ongoing concentration of ownership, restricts and reduces local 
content and homogenises the general content of the news in particular.187 Concentration of 
ownership is identified as crushing of diversity because national media lose interest in 
reflecting a country’s own values and culture.188 Regulation of media ownership to prevent 
consolidation and increase competition would be a logical response.189 Rosenberg, however, 
does not agree that this is the only problem for New Zealand media. He suggests that 
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increased competition cannot be the whole answer to dominance of a few narrow viewpoints, 
because in a country as small as New Zealand, competition will invariably operate at a 
commercial level, with a drive for profit motivating a ‘sameness of voices for fear of driving 
off advertisers and mass audiences’.190 Indeed, there is empirical evidence to support the view 
that commercial motives may have increasing influence on the content of what is published in 
the media in this country. In a recent survey of New Zealand journalists, over half of the 
respondents agreed that newsrooms had been pressured to do a story because it related to an 
advertiser, owner or sponsor.191 Therefore Rosenberg advocates a combination of mandated 
levels of local content, and control of foreign ownership and cross-media ownership of New 
Zealand media, as solutions to commercially-induced media censorship.192 However, 
commercially-induced censorship is a different form of chilling effect than that investigated in 
this thesis, and so I do not address it further here. Nonetheless the question of media 
ownership does have other relevance to the effects of defamation law, as I surmise in the next 
chapter, where I use some of the first data obtained in the media survey to ascertain 
empirically the actual character and business profile of the media interests which responded to 
my survey. 
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Chapter Three -  Character and business composition  
of media survey respondents 
 
It is important to place the respondents to the media survey in the ownership and regulatory 
context set out above.  In fact, the background information collected in the media survey 
allowed a reasonably detailed picture of the character of the media respondents as media 
business enterprises to be developed. This part of the survey investigated the character and 
ownership structure of the sector group, the annual turnover and the number of employees 
involved. The data is presented below broken down for each type of media respondent, and 
then analysed as a whole in relation to business composition.193 
 
1. Responses 
Together, newspaper, magazine and book publishing businesses comprise the publishing 
industry in New Zealand. However, they were dealt with separately for the purposes of the 
survey. Newspapers dominate the sector, being larger than the others combined. The annual 
turnover of newspapers in 2002 was $1,071 million, of magazines, $375 million, of book 
publishers, $204 million and all others, $111million.194 
 
1.1 Newspapers 
New Zealand has been described as having a high number of daily newspapers in relation to 
its population size.195 In 2000, there were approximately 26 daily newspapers, of which 18 
were evening papers, nearly all of them published in provincial towns and cities.196 Of the 
eight morning dailies, the Auckland-based New Zealand Herald had the largest audited net 
circulation at 213,150 copies daily. The largest provincial paper was Hamilton's Waikato 
Times with an audited net circulation of 40,622. Other daily newspapers had circulations 
ranging from about 2,400 to about 100,000.  As already noted, the majority of the country's 
daily papers were owned by two major publishing groups, Independent Newspapers 
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Facts, Communication, Mass Media. This is the source for the remainder of the statistical information in this 
paragraph. 
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  One, Wellington’s Evening Post, closed in July 2002. It was described as the last metropolitan evening 
newspaper in Australasia. 
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Limited197 and Wilson and Horton Limited. Between them in 2000, these two groups 
accounted for almost 90 percent of New Zealand's aggregate daily newspaper circulation of 
about 850,000 copies. In 2000 there were two Sunday newspapers, Sunday Star Times and 
Sunday News, both published by Independent Newspapers Limited and distributed 
nationwide. The Sunday Star Times is a broadsheet and at that time circulated 197,619 copies 
every Sunday. There were also approximately 120 community newspapers in New Zealand of 
which the great majority are tabloid. Many of these community papers are owned by the two 
big newspaper publishing groups but some are owned by individuals, families or by small 
companies.  
 
Fifty-two newspapers responded to the survey. Of these, nearly 10% (5) had a national 
circulation, 21% (11) were regional, and over two-thirds (36) were community or free 
newspapers. (Fig.1 below). 
Fig. 1 
Newspaper circulation of newspapers responding to survey (N=52)





                                                          
197
  Now owned by the Australian media conglomerate, Fairfax Holdings. By 2002, almost all of New 
Zealand’s newspaper and magazine publishing businesses were owned by the two completely off-shore 
companies, APN and Fairfax. Statistics New Zealand is now prevented from publishing information for these 
industries for reasons of commercial confidence: New Zealand Book Publishing: Industry Development Issues, A 
report prepared for  the New Zealand Trade and Enterprise by Murray Ellis, Dr Tom Ludvigson and Dr Peter 
Phillips, December 2003, 8. 
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Daily newspapers comprised 17% (9), 40% (21) were published weekly, over a quarter (14) 
were published fortnightly, nearly 10% (5) were monthly publications, and the remaining 8% 
(3) were published twice and three times a week (community newspapers) and quarterly. (Fig.    
2 below) 
Fig. 2  












Twenty-one percent (11) of the newspapers identified themselves as broadsheet publications. 
Nearly 60% (31) identified as tabloid style newspapers, nearly 2% (1) as a business 
publication, a further 2% (1) as professional, nearly 8% (4) as community newsletters or 
community or in-house newspapers, 2% (1) as a student newspaper and 5% (3) did not 


























As to business composition, a quarter of newspapers who responded to the survey (13) 
identified themselves as parent companies, nearly 56%  (29) as subsidiaries, 4% (2) as 
partnerships, nearly 10% (5) had other forms of ownership (a division of Independent News 
Ltd, individual ownership, a professional society, a charitable trust, and  a member of the 
Independent Community News Group (ICN) (which is a subsidiary of INL), and 5% (3) did 
not identify their ownership structure.  
 
Two percent of newspapers (1) reported an annual turnover between 0 and $30,000, a further 
2% (1) between $30,000 and $50,000, 5% (3) had an annual turnover between $50,000 and 
$100,000, and a further 5% (3) between $100,000 and $200,000. However, nearly 35% (18) 
had an annual turnover of between $200,000 and $1 million, and nearly 37% (19) greater than 
$1 million. Fourteen percent (7) did not identify any range of figures for annual turnover. 

























Two percent (1) of newspapers comprised a single individual, 40% (21) had 2 to 10 
employees, nearly 31% (16) had 10 to 50 employees, nearly 10% (5) employed 50 to 100 
people, and the same percentage (5) had greater than 100 employees. Nearly 8 % (4) did not 
identify how many employees were involved in the publication of the newspaper. 
1.2 Television 
The public television broadcaster, TVNZ, had up to 75% of the free-to-air market in 2001.198 
TV3Network Services, Canadian-owned, took 25%, at times eating into the historical TVNZ 
monopoly to a greater degree.199 Prime Television, an Australian interest, remained on the 
edge of these figures. Sky Television, also foreign-owned, was New Zealand’s main pay-tv 
provider, penetrating into almost a third of New Zealand households by 2001.200  
 
 Six television broadcasters responded to the survey in 2001. Although this number seems 
small, it is reasonably comprehensive in terms of coverage, because these responses included 
the major competitors - the state broadcaster, TVNZ, the privately-owned TV3 Network 
(TV3), and the smaller privately-owned Prime Television. Therefore one respondent 
                                                          
198
  See New Technologies and the Digital Future, A report prepared for NZ on Air by Paul Norris and 
Brian Pauling, 2001, 69. 
199
  Ibid. 
200
  Ibid, 73-74. 
 42 
identified itself as a state broadcaster, four as private broadcasters, and one as both a 
community and regional broadcaster. (See Fig. 5 below, showing numbers not percentages). 
Fig. 5 






One television broadcaster was a parent company, four were subsidiaries and one was a trust. 
Two television broadcasters had an annual turnover of $200,000 to $1 million, and four 
identified their annual turnover as greater than $1 million. (See Fig. 6 below). 
Fig. 6 








One television enterprise employed 2 to 10 employees, a further television enterprise 




It has been said that it is quite remarkable that New Zealand’s population base seems able to 
support so many radio stations.201 Radio broadcasters operating in New Zealand at the time of 
the survey can be grouped under various networks: The CanWest network had approximately 
21 stations in 2001. The Radio Network, (formerly the government-owned Radio New 
Zealand Commercial), owned by a consortium comprising radio, newspaper and outdoor 
advertising group Australian Provincial Newspapers Holdings Limited, US radio and 
television operator Clear Channel Communications Inc., and local newspaper and publishing 
group Wilson and Horton Limited, comprised approximately 53 stations.202 Radio New 
Zealand, New Zealand's public radio broadcaster, consisted of three non-commercial radio 
networks: National Radio, Concert FM and the AM Network. New Zealand also developed a 
vigorous alternative radio system through its community access radio network.203   These 
stations shared the non-commercial radio spectrum with public radio, Radio Rhema (religious 
broadcasters), Iwi radio (Maori language broadcasters), student campus radio and a small 
number of local community owned and operated stations. The Rhema group numbered 3 
religious stations, and the numerous independent, guardband, iwi and access radio stations 
totaled approximately 40 stations. 
 
Thirty-one radio broadcasters completed the survey in 2001. This lively and diverse group 
included the state broadcaster Radio New Zealand (3%), 12 broadcasters (39%) which 
identified as private, (one being the Radio Network), 13 (42%) which identified as 
community, and 7 (23%) as other, the latter including such descriptions as Maori language or 
Iwi radio, community network, and Christian. (The fact that these responses total 33 rather 
than 31 indicates that two respondents chose more than one answer to the question about what 
type of broadcaster they were). (See Fig. 7 below). 
 
                                                          
201
  New Zealand Book Publishing: Industry Development Issues, A report prepared for  the New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise by Murray Ellis, Dr Tom Ludvigson and Dr Peter Phillips, December 2003, 76. New 
Zealand had the highest number per capita in the world. See also Rosenberg, n. 165 above, 22.  
202
  April 2002 figures: see http://www.waikato.ac.nz/film/NAME/extras/MediaNZ_06_2005.doc.  
203
  These numbered approximately 11 in 2002: see Rosenberg, n. 159 above, 19. 
 44 
Fig. 7 











Most radio broadcasters identified their business structure. Nearly 19% of these (6) were 
parent companies, and just over 26% (8) were subsidiaries. However, 48% (15) took some 
other form, such as a trust or charitable trust, a sole trader, a non-profit incorporated society, 
100% husband and wife owned, and a Crown owned entity. Seven percent (2) did not identify 
their structure. 
 
Nearly all radio broadcasters gave some indication of annual turnover. The greatest number of 
these, 48% (15) were in the range $200,000 to $1 million. Nearly 7% (2) had an annual 
turnover of 0-$30,000, 13% (4) chose a range of $50,000 to $100,000, 7% (2) chose $100,000 
to $200,000, 19% (6) had an annual turnover of greater than $1 million, and one respondent 
did not know its annual turnover. One radio respondent did not answer the question. (See Fig. 









Fig. 8  














Nearly all radio broadcasters also answered the question about the size of the radio 
undertaking. Over half (nearly 55%, or 17) employed 2 to 10 employees. The next most 
common enterprise (29%, or 9) employed 10 to 50 employees, one had 50-100 employees, 
nearly 6% (2) employed greater than 100 employees, and one undertaking was a single 
individual. One radio broadcaster did not answer the question. 
 
1.4  Magazines 
The New Zealand magazine market is extremely vibrant – we are estimated to be second or 
third in magazine readership in the world.204 With well over 2 million copies of magazines, on 
average, being circulated each week, New Zealand’s magazines come in all shapes and sizes, 
frequency of distribution and circulation.205 Types of magazine vary from the very small (for 
small niche markets) to the very large (with broad general appeal). Weekly magazines have 
powerful circulations and the ability to reach millions of New Zealanders. The three women's 
weekly magazines are regarded as having a powerful, combined circulation.206 It is difficult to 
establish the exact number of locally published magazines. However, it is estimated the 
approximate number published in 2001 was 700.207 
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  Rosenberg, n. 159 above, 8. 
205
  John McClintock, Executive Director of the Magazine Publishers Association, www.mpa.org.nz, 




  In 2003, John Mcclintock estimated from the MPA’s membership, media directories and distributors 
that there was a constant of at least 800 locally published magazines year on year. At that stage, there were 
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New Zealand's largest magazine publisher in the early 2000’s was ACP Media, and its 
subsidiary, Trader Group.208 ACP was also the proprietor of Netlink, one of New Zealand’s 
two main magazine distributors. The next largest publisher was the INL Group, made up of 
INL Magazines and News Media Ltd. INL was the owner of the other main magazine 
distributor – Gordon & Gotch (NZ) Ltd. The third largest magazine publisher was New 
Zealand Magazines, part of the Wilson & Horton newspaper group. This form of magazine 
publishing industry is atypical world-wide, in that two of the four main publishers were 
owned by newspaper publishing groups: Wilson & Horton and INL. The fourth largest 
publisher was Pacific Magazines, a division of PMP Communications, Australia.209 
 
ACP, INL Magazines, New Zealand Magazines and Pacific Magazines were primarily 
consumer magazine publishers.210 There were also large business publishers211 and some 
which were part of both consumer and business categories.212 Two other noteworthy 
publishers, which produced weekly tabloid business newspapers, were Liberty Press Group, 
which published the National Business Review, and Pauanui Publishing Co, which published 
the Independent.213 The remainder of the magazine market in the early 2000’s was made up of 
a proliferation of medium to small niche market publishers.214 
 
Twenty six magazine enterprises responded to the survey. This group included INL, the 
second largest publisher of magazines in New Zealand. Nearly 77% (20) of the respondents 
described their magazines as national magazines, and nearly 4% (1) one was a regional 
publication. One described itself as a community or free magazine, one as a student magazine 
and one had some international circulation. Seven percent (2) were business, or in-house or 
professional magazines (see Fig. 9 below). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
approximately 6,800 titles available in the country, which meant New Zealand imported about 5800-6000 titles. 
See www.mpa.org.nz  
208
  See www.mpa.org.nz   
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  Ibid. 
210  Woman's Day (ACP), New Zealand Woman's Weekly (NZ Magazines), and New Idea (Pacific 
Magazines) were then the three weekly women's magazines available in New Zealand. Other consumer 
magazine publishers were Readers Digest, Time, and the New Zealand Automobile Association, which 
published AA Directions. Sky watch and AA Directions were both contract-published by INL Magazines. 
211  Major multi-title business-to-business publishers were AGM Publishing , which published in architecture, 
building and design, IDG Communications, in computers, MediMedia New Zealand, specializing in medical 
publishing,  the NZ Rural Press, which covered the rural sector,  Profile Publishing, which covered advertising, 
marketing and business, and  TPL Media , publishing in hospitality, food/beverage, travel and local government. 
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Ninety-two percent (24) of magazines answered the question about publication frequency. 
Nineteen percent (5) were published weekly, 4% (1) was bi-weekly, 35% (9) were monthly, 
12% (3) were quarterly, and 23% (6) were published with varying frequency. Seven percent 
(2) did not identify their publication frequency. 
 
Most gave some indication of the sort of magazines published. Thirty-four percent (9) were 
consumer magazines (described as men/women/lifestyle/business/specialist). Half (50% or 
13) published trade/professional magazines, and 12% (3) chose the special category, 






















Twenty-five magazines responded to the question asking about business composition. Sixty-
two percent (16) of magazine respondents described themselves as a parent company, 12% (3) 
were subsidiaries, nearly 8% (2) were partnerships, and the remaining 15% (4) chose the 
‘other’ category, being a charitable trust, an incorporated society, an associated company and 
a government agency. One did not answer the question.  
 
Nearly all magazine respondents gave some description of their annual turnover. Twelve 
percent (3) had a turnover of $50,000 to $100,000, 19% (5) chose the range of $100,000 to 
$200,000, 38% (10) chose $200,000 to $1 million, and 27% (7) identified an annual turnover 
greater than $1 million. Four percent (1) did not answer the question. (See Fig. 11 below). 
Fig. 11  














As to size of undertaking, nearly 8% (2) of magazine respondents stated they were a single 
individual, nearly 81% (21) advised they had 2 to 10 employees, another near 8% had 10 to 
50 employees, and approximately 3% (1) had 50 to 100 employees. 
 
1.5 Publishers 
The publishing industry is made up of books, magazines, newspapers and a miscellaneous 
‘other’ category.  However, since newspapers and magazines have been dealt with separately 
in the survey, the category of publishers in this study represents book publishers in the main. 
Book publishing is below newspapers and magazines for turnover in New Zealand.  In 2001, 
newspaper publishing generated $1,071 million in turnover, while magazines generated $375 
million.215 Book publishing in New Zealand is, however, still a noteworthy contributor to the 
economy, with an estimated turnover in 2002 of $204 million.216 Over 3600 titles were 
published in 2002, 58% (2100) of which were exported. Educational titles made up 56% of all 
titles published.217 Book publishers are dominated by sole traders, and what are known as 
‘micro-businesses – 66% of these publishers employ 1 person.218 However, only a few 
businesses, mostly overseas-owned firms, generate most of the total turnover – in 2002, the 
top 5% of publishers generated nearly 90% of the total turnover and 74% together generated 
2%.219 Furthermore, more than half of the overseas-owned firms earned more than $1 million 
in 2002, while only 4% of the New Zealand firms did this.220 
 
Twenty-four publishers responded to the survey, 87% (21) of whom were book publishers, 
while 4% (1) was described as a information service provider or exclusive internet publisher, 
and 9% (2) placed themselves in the ‘other’ category, being a literary agent and a desktop 
publisher. Henceforth, this group can be taken to represent book publishers. 
 
Of the book publishers, a majority (76% or 16) published non-fiction works, followed by 38% 
(8) which published fiction works, while the next largest category, 29% (9) published pictorial 
books, a further 29% (6) of these respondents published professional books., and one third 
(33.3% or 7) published a variety of books, including educational texts (4), trade 
                                                          
215
  New Zealand Book Publishing: Industry Development Issues, A report prepared for  the New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise by Murray Ellis, Dr Tom Ludvigson and Dr Peter Phillips, December 2003, 8. 
216
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bibliographies, print information, and technique manuals. (Some respondents chose more than 
one category. (See Fig.12  below). 
Fig. 12 












Thirty-seven percent (9) of the publishers identified themselves as parent companies, while 
nearly 17% (4) were subsidiaries, one-quarter (6) were partnerships and nearly 21% (5) 
specifically identified themselves in the ‘other’ category as a sole trader, a New Zealand 
owned limited company, two single limited companies, a contract publisher and a university-
owned organisation functioning as an autonomous department (a university press). 
 
The turnover for most publishers was in the higher brackets. The largest group of 46% (11) 
stated that they had an annual turnover of greater than $1million. The next largest group of 
30% (7) had an annual turnover of between $200,000 and $1million. Eight percent (2) were in 
the range $50,000 to $100,000, while 4% (1) each identified their range as up to $30,000, 
$30,000-$50,000 and $100,000-$200,000. One respondent did not answer the question. (See 








Fig. 13  















The majority of publishers, (62% or 15) employed 2 to 10 employees, while 21% (5) had 10 
to 50 employees, 13% (3) were single individuals and 4% (1) had 50 to 100 employees.  
 
1.6 Advertisers and public relations firms 
Sixty-eight responses were received from advertising agencies and public relations firms. Of 
this number, 53% (36) were advertising agencies or consultancies. Forty-seven percent (32) 
were public relations firms. (See Fig. 14 below). 
Fig.14 







Most of the advertising agency and public relations firms respondents gave some idea of the 
commercial structure of the undertaking. Thirty-four percent (23) of these were parent 
companies, 12% (8) were a subsidiary, 13% (9) were a partnership, 19% (13) were sole 
traders or freelance operators, and 13% (9) described themselves as privately-owned limited 
liability companies. Nine percent (6) did not answer the question. 
 
Three percent (2) of ad agency and public relations firms respondents were not prepared to 
give any indication of their turnover. However, 2% (1) chose a range of 0 to $30,000, 16% 
(11) selected a range of $50,000 to $100,000, the same percentage (11) identified a range of 
$100,000 to $200,000, a quarter (17) chose a range of $200,000 to $1 million, and 38% (26) 
identified an annual turnover of greater than $1 million. (See Fig. 15 below). 
Fig.  15 















Twenty-nine percent (20) of the ad agency and public relations firms respondents were single 
individuals, but the majority, 56% (38) had 2 to 10 employees. Twelve percent (8) had 10 to 
50 employees, and 3% (2) had 50 to 100 employees. 
 
1.7 Independent journalists and writers 
Nine individuals identifying themselves as independent journalists and writers responded to 










Six of the journalist and writer respondents gave information on their business structure. One 
of these worked for a subsidiary company, one for a partnership and four were independent 
operators or sole traders. Three did not answer the question. 
 
Eight journalist and writer respondents identified a range of figures to indicate their annual 
turnover. Two earned in the range of $0 to $30,000 per annum, five were in the $50,000 to 
$100,000 range and one chose a range that was greater than $1million. One did not answer the 
question. (See Fig. 17 below, numbers only). 
Fig. 17 











Seven of the journalist and writer respondents gave some indication of the size of their 
undertaking. Six worked as single individuals, and one was within an organisation which 
employed 50-100 employees. Two did not answer the question. 
 
1.8 Multi-media 
Seven respondents identifying themselves as having more than one media function responded 
to the survey in 2001. Two of these were broadcasters and four were magazines, the same 
number were book publishers, two were individual journalists, two were individual writers, 
one was an information service provider or another type of internet publisher, one was an 
advertising agency, one was a public relations firm and one described itself as a society 
newsletter/magazine. This group is referred to collectively as multi-media respondents. 
Because of their involvement in multi-media some of these respondents chose more than one 
category answer in relation to these profile questions. (See Fig. 18 below, numbers only). 
Fig. 18 



















































Of the 2 broadcasters, one identified as being involved in television, one in radio and one also 
identified involvement in cable media. One of the broadcasters was involved in private 
television while the other identified as being a US network correspondent. 
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Of the four book publishers, one published fiction books, three chose non-fiction, one 
pictorial, one professional and two chose the ‘other category’ identified in one case as 
children’s picture books. 
 
Of the four magazines, all identified their publication as having national circulation. One was 
published bi-weekly, one quarter monthly and two of the magazines were published quarterly. 
Three of the magazine publishers identified what sort of magazines were published. Two were 
trade/professional magazines and one was a special type, such as for particular clients or in-
house.  
 
All of the multi-media respondents gave information on their business structure. Four worked 
for parent companies, one was a subsidiary, and two were ‘other’ being a professional 
organisation and a private limited liability company. 
 
All multi-media respondents identified a range of figures to indicate their annual turnover. 
One earned in the range of $0 to $30,000 per annum, one was in the $100,000 to $200,000 
range, four chose the range $200,000 to $1 million and one a range of greater than $1 million. 
(See Fig. 19  below, numbers only). 
Fig. 19  
 











All of the multi-media respondents gave some indication of the size of their undertaking. Two 
worked as single individuals, four were involved in enterprises with 2 to 10 employees and 
one was within an organisation which employed 10 to 50 employees. 
 
1.9 Internet service providers 
Only two respondents identifying themselves as Internet service providers responded to the 
survey in 2001 although a special effort was made to contact the main players. One had been 
publishing in this medium for one year and the other for three-five years. The information 
collected from the ISPs can be of interest only as numbers responding were so small. 
Both ISPs were parent companies. One had an annual turnover of between $30,000 to $50,000 
and the other of between $200,000 to $1 million. (No graph is shown for these figures.) Both 
companies employed 2-10 employees. 
2. Analysis of data on business composition – all media 
It is possible to amalgamate the business profile information detailed above to build an 
accurate picture of the media which responded. Two hundred and twenty five New Zealand 
media players responded to the survey. Of these, the largest group (one-third, or 74) were 
parent companies. The next largest group (one-quarter or 58) were subsidiaries. A further 
quarter (58) took other various business forms, while 9% (20) identified themselves as 
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Over half (53% or 119) of all media respondents employed 2-10 workers, while the next 
largest group, (19% or 42) employed 10-50. Therefore, of all media respondents, over two-
thirds employed between 2 and 50 people. Fifteen percent (35) were single individuals, 6% 
(13) employed 50-100 people, and 4% (9) employed greater than 100 people. Two percent (7) 
did not answer. (See Fig. 21 below). 
Fig. 21 
















Probably, annual turnover reveals most about these media enterprises. Thirty four percent (75) 
of all media respondents had an annual turnover of over $1million. A further 33% (74) had an 
annual turnover of between $200,000 to $1million. This means over two-thirds of the media 
respondents had a high annual turnover, indicating that they were substantial and significant 
enterprises. Twelve percent (28) earned $50,000 to $100,000, 10% (23) had an annual 
turnover of $100,000 to 200,000, 4% (8) were in the $0 to $30,000 bracket, and 1% (3) in the 
$30,000-$50,000 range. Six percent (14) did not answer this question or did not identify a 

























The Ministry of Economic Development has examined the structure and dynamics of 
enterprises in New Zealand, in particular, small and medium sized enterprises.221 Small and 
medium sized enterprises are defined by the Ministry as employing 19 or fewer full time 
equivalent employees.222 Eighty-five percent of enterprises in New Zealand employ 5 or less 
full time equivalent staff, while 97% of enterprises employ 19 or fewer staff.223 More than 
68% of the media respondents in the survey could be described as small and medium sized 
enterprises. This is consistent with the fact that such enterprises are dominant in the 
communications sector.224 
 
One percent of all enterprises in New Zealand employ 50-99 people and 1% employs over 
100 people.225 The figures for the survey respondents are higher, being 6% and 4% 
respectively. This reflects the structure of the media in New Zealand, with significant foreign 
ownership, particularly of newspapers, by large conglomerates and parent companies.226 The 
data as to business form and annual turnover is consistent with this conclusion. 
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This analysis suggests that the respondents to the survey were not only robust enterprises, 
some on a larger scale, but, reassuringly, were also a reasonably representative cross-section 
of the media sector in New Zealand.  
 
3. Relevance of the character of the New Zealand media  
What then is the character of the New Zealand press, apart from being mainly foreign-owned, 
and apart from the business characteristics outlined above? The Lange v Atkinson Court of 
Appeal defamation decision endorsed the following view of the New Zealand print media, 
contrasted with that in the United Kingdom:227 
The combination of the smallness of the population with the fact that the dailies are not national papers 
produces low circulation figures. In 1998 the largest circulation of a New Zealand daily was about 
220,000 and the other 27 dailies had circulations from about 2400 to about 100,000 (New Zealand 
Official Yearbook 1998 at p 257). Another consequence of the regional character of the dailies is that 
there is not the same competition that can arise, and has arisen, in the United Kingdom between national 
papers. The three weekly publications which contain extensive commentary on political matters have 
circulations of about 10,000 and 14,000 (two business weeklies) and about 90,000 (The New Zealand 
Listener, which is also a television and radio guide). Two general monthly magazines which include 
serious political commentary have circulations of about 35,000 (North & South, the publication in issue 
in this case) and 18,000 (Metro). By contrast, five of the British dailies have circulations of about one 
million or more with the highest being about 3.4 million. Another difference is that some of the British 
dailies have close associations with particular political parties; competing political positions are by 
contrast often expressed in the opinion pages of individual New Zealand dailies and weeklies. 
 
There has also been judicial recognition that the New Zealand print media at least is generally 
regarded as responsible. In Lange v Atkinson, the Court of Appeal went so far as to endorse 
the view that ‘New Zealand has not encountered the worst excesses and irresponsibilities of 
the English national daily tabloids’.228 But it also noted that the responsibility and 
vulnerability of the press are critically dependent on its ethics and practices, ownership 
structures and the independence of editors. Nonetheless, there is an emerging view that the 
broadcast media is becoming more tabloid in New Zealand, both in style and in the use of 
intrusive news-gathering methods, and that the print media is aping this development to some 
degree.229 This reflection of a global trend may bring with it an increased general risk of 
exposure of the media to legal action, including the possibility of defamation actions. 
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Conversely, it might also raise the level of tolerance of what would have been seen previously 
as unlawful behaviour. Palmer has argued further that an increasing drift to triviality of 
content, coupled with increasing fragmentation of outlets in the digital age, may also weaken 
incentives for plaintiffs to sue.230  
 
4. Conclusion 
The consideration in Chapter Two of the ownership and background of the New Zealand 
media, and in this Chapter of the character and business profile of the media survey 
respondents, has been useful for a number of reasons. First, it has revealed that there are many 
complex reasons why a journalist or editor might pull a story, and that the chilling effect of 
defamation laws is only one of these. Content control by media proprietors,231 direct or 
indirect political pressure,232 and commercial pressure exerted by client advertisers, may be 
others.233 In writing up and analysing the responses to the survey, it was necessary to isolate 
these influences where appropriate. 
 
Second, my investigation of New Zealand media ownership and business profile led me to 
give plausibility quite early on in the study to a position which suggested that foreign 
ownership of the majority of media players in New Zealand could support a more robust 
approach to defamation law and the risk of defamation actions than would otherwise be the 
case in a small market. It seemed to me one might reasonably expect that standing behind 
even the smaller community newspapers, for example, would be access to company lawyers, 
insurance policies and funds, if necessary. The expectation might then be that the data 
revealed in the survey would reflect this robustness in relation to number, frequency, 
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seriousness and the outcomes of defamation claims and potential claims. These possibilities 
should be borne in mind as I move on to present and analyse further results of the media 
survey, and the court file search in Chapters Five to Eight. Prior to this, however, I want to 
examine in more detail the origins of the chilling effect doctrine and its manner of 
development.  
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Chapter Four – The chilling effect doctrine 
 
1. Origin and theory 
In this Chapter, I contextualise my survey results more deeply before presenting them by 
examining the chilling effect doctrine in more detail. This is undertaken initially by 
investigating what North American scholars have said about ‘the chilling effect’, since it 
appears to have originated in that jurisdiction. I then discuss and analyse developments in the 
case law in the United Kingdom, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, and include a separate 
discussion of the possible chilling effects of levels of damages awarded. I conclude with some 
reflections on the doctrine. 
 
1.1 North American origins 
Schauer234 states that the US Supreme Court introduced the word “chill’ in a first amendment 
case in 1952,235 and that the label “chilling effect” appeared first in 1963.236 According to 
Schauer, the idea first attracted judicial scepticism because it appeared to introduce 
sociological principles into judicial analysis.237 Schauer concludes that although the concept 
was originally based on largely emotive appeal, it has since become much more 
constitutionally significant, with substantive impact on free speech jurisprudence in the US.238  
Schauer’s definition of a chilling effect for his thesis naturally takes its colour from the 
background provided by the US constitution. He suggests that ‘[a] chilling effect occurs when 
individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by the first amendment are deterred from 
doing so by government regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity.’239 More 
significantly, he uses defamation law as an example which has relevance to this thesis ‘…if a 
common-law sanction aimed at punishing the publication of defamatory factual falsehood 
causes the suppression of truth or opinion, chilling effect reasoning is …applicable.’240 
However, Schauer is careful to isolate benign chilling effects – those which are the proper 
result of government regulation, from those which chill invidiously, as in the defamation 
example.241 In his thesis, then, some chilling effects are permissible and indeed, desirable. I 
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have also taken this position in the introduction to this thesis, pointing out that in order to 
protect reputation, defamation law must chill some speech.242 One lawyer responding in my 
empirical study carried out in 2001 put it well: ‘Yes!  There is a chilling effect arising from 
our defamation laws in New Zealand.  Whether it is inappropriate is another question.  I am 
not totally convinced it is inappropriate…’ Schauer would draw the line where publications 
which are true, or which contain lawful opinion, never see the light of day. 
 
Lepofsky takes a less theoretical and perhaps more balanced approach. He offers a very 
practical description of libel chill as a claim that the law of defamation ‘improperly interferes 
with the full and effective reporting of important news to the public.’243 This arises from fear 
of litigation with its attendant costs, personal stress and pressure on journalists and editors, 
self-censorship, and the tendency for these effects to be particularly intense where the media 
organisation is small.244 However, while Schauer’s premise is that the chilling effect can be 
more than benign, Lepofsky believes this to be overstated.245 Lepofsky argues that adverse 
chilling effects are exaggerated by media because it is self-interested. He observes instead that 
as a matter of fact, the US print and broadcast media are full of real news, not bland coverage, 
journalists are not delicate flowers, but tough fighters, that any law of libel would give rise to 
the chill effects suggested by media, no matter how framed, because of the general risk of 
litigation, and that no matter where the burden of proof lies, in practice, discovery is possible, 
which means journalists’ methods always need to be scrutinised. Further, Lepofsky suggests 
ordinary citizens are not served by libel law either as they cannot afford to sue, and in 
contrast, many media interests are wealthy, well funded, and monopolitistic and oligopolistic.  
He concludes that freedom of the press may in fact be characterised as freedom from legal 
responsibility.246 For Lepofsky, ’[t]he libel chill may be the only thing which precludes the 
overheating of the newsroom,’247 and is thus largely, if not exclusively, benign. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the authors of the major study which inspired my own took as an 
object of their research the aim of investigating whether the law of libel was a significant 
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fetter on the freedom of the media to publish stories of real public interest.248 However, in 
their conclusion, they open out this ‘definition’ to include direct chilling effects, meaning 
changes to publications such as omission or amendment in order to avoid legal action, and 
structural chilling effects, meaning the complete failure to publish material in some subject 
areas and the predominance of a polemical tone in publication.249 
 
More recently, Australian commentators have examined the issue. Dent and Kenyon, 
embarking on a significant study comparing aspects of US, United Kingdom and Australian 
defamation laws, suggest a definition based on the idea that the risks of defamation liability 
deter publications. These commentators set out to investigate whether the quality of public 
debate about political and public interest matters is limited by the media’s fear of lengthy, 
complex and expensive defamation litigation.250 For Dent and Kenyon, excessive chilling 
effects are those which restrict media reporting on stories of political or public interest. 
 
It is clear that most definitions of the chilling effect converge on an understanding that 
defamation law has the potential to produce both acceptable and unacceptable censorship of 
speech. Commentators disagree, however, on what might amount to unacceptable censorship. 
Unacceptable censorship might relate to the spiking of ‘important’ stories or stories of 
genuine public interest, but what are these?  Making a Schaueresque distinction based on truth 
may not assist. Even if the assumption is that all true stories should be told, the nascent tort of 
privacy suggests there may not be genuine public interest in all true stories. Neither are 
commentators agreed on the extent of unacceptable censorship in fact, as the stand-off 
between Schauer and Lepofsky illustrates, and empirical research such as my own is intended 
to illuminate. Because of these uncertainties, content tends to be given to the chilling effect 
doctrine which is characterised either by an apparently media-friendly, or a non media-
friendly, stance. The former would give weight to freedom of expression without requiring 
any substantive press responsibility, while the latter would not. The approach of the judiciary, 
to which I will now turn, certainly reflects this dichotomy.  
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2. Comparative analysis  
Many commentators and judges do not attempt to define the chilling effect, or are prepared to 
assume it exists to some unspecified extent.251 An examination of dicta dealing with the issue 
is enlightening. It is at least clear that chilling effect arguments arise both in relation to the 
operation of substantive defamation law, and in relation to remedies, specifically as to levels 
of damages. 
 
2.1 The United States 
In the leading US case, New York Times v Sullivan252 Justice Brennan for the Supreme Court 
developed American defamation law to favour defendants, by requiring a plaintiff to establish 
that defamatory statements made about public officials (later extended to public figures) were 
made with malice. The Court accepted that fear of losing, or even simply fighting, a 
defamation case meant a ‘…pall of fear and timidity [was] imposed upon those who would 
give voice to public criticism…’253 The Sullivan decision remains the core of American libel 
law, and is a steady declaration of preference for speech protection.  
 
Later research has tended to suggest that the substantive change made in Sullivan had a 
limited effect only, because it can be undermined by procedural impediments. In 1991, 
American journalist and academic Anthony Lewis pointed out that the high cost of fending 
off suits, genuine or otherwise, caused a chilling effect which arises from fear of litigation 
alone.254 In 1995, David Boies, an American defendant lawyer, confirmed this occurs in spite 
of the fact that plaintiffs in the US do not win very often.255 As recently as 2006, Australian 
commentator, Andrew Kenyon, reporting on a large, comparative empirical study,  notes that 
US rates of defamation appear to have been falling,256 but that the discovery and depositions 
processes required to investigate editorial behaviour in order to determine the malice issue can 
be lengthy, and costly to implement.257 Boies and others have suggested procedural changes 
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to reduce litigation time and expense in defamation claims.258 Such an approach assumes that 
the chilling effect is worse for potential defamation defendants than defendants in civil 
litigation generally, and that specific procedural solutions can be found.  
 
2.2 The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords altered defamation law in the early 90’s after 
concluding that ‘[t]he threat of a civil action for defamation must inevitably have an inhibiting 
effect on freedom of speech.’259 In the Derbyshire case, the House held a local authority did 
not have the right to maintain an action against the publishers of a Sunday newspaper, its 
editor and two journalists, as it would be contrary to the public interest for the organs of 
government, whether central or local, to do so. In doing this, the House of Lords accepted a 
chilling effect as arising from mere threats of action. This approach was borne out by the 
results of the later UK Barendt study, which concluded that in that jurisdiction ‘the chilling 
effect…genuinely does exist and significantly restricts what the public is able to read and 
hear.’ 260 However, although the Derbyshire decision was applied in other cases,261 its 
development into a fully fledged doctrine has been stunted by another development in 
defamation law.  
 
The relevant English case in this respect is, of course, Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd,262 in 
which each of the judgments gives consideration to the chilling effect. The dicta reveal a 
House of Lords which is wary of the press and somewhat sceptical of a chilling effect. 
Nonetheless, because of an altered constitutional background,263 and a developing rights 
consciousness, their Lordships were prepared to have particular regard to the importance of 
freedom of expression. As a result, their Lordships extended the defence of qualified privilege 
within defamation law, where there is discussion of political matters. The scope of the 
defence was wide, with Lord Nicholls referring to ‘…matters of serious public concern.’264 
This covers such topics as the governance of public bodies, institutions and companies which 
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give rise to a public interest in disclosure, but excludes matters which are personal and 
private.265 However, having apparently altered the balance of the law in favour of the media, 
the House imposed conditions of care on those claiming the defence. As is well known, the 
Law Lords developed a 10 point code of journalistic conduct containing the matters to be 
taken into account in determining whether an occasion of privilege will arise for a media 
defendant.266  
 
In stating this non-exhaustive list, the House of Lords acknowledged that the outcome of 
checking media behaviour against it would vary from case to case. While this would have the 
benefits of being a flexible test, Lord Nicholls acknowledged directly it might also have a 
chilling effect. His understanding of the chilling effect is similar to Schauer’s, but he also 
considered that it might have different impacts on different sectors of the English media:  
…The outcome of a court decision, it was suggested, cannot always be predicted with certainty when 
the newspaper is deciding whether to publish a story. To an extent this is a valid criticism. A degree of 
uncertainty in borderline cases is inevitable. This uncertainty, coupled with the expense of court 
proceedings, may 'chill' the publication of true statements of fact as well as those which are untrue. The 
chill factor is perhaps felt more keenly by the regional press, book publishers and broadcasters than the 
national press.267 
 
However, his Lordship thought that uncertainty caused by any chilling effect should not be 
exaggerated and that practical problems could be managed through the development of 
guidelines. Lord Nicholls considered that the list of 10 factors had as its aim no more than 
responsible journalism, which the media would aspire to in any event.268  
 
Like Lord Nicholls, Lord Steyn took as a starting point that freedom of expression is the rule 
and regulation of speech is the exception requiring justification.269 He noted also the strictness 
of English defamation law and that the argument for addressing the chilling effect of the law 
on political speech and for striking a better balance between freedom of speech and 
defamation was strong.270 But in the end, he too preferred a flexible approach rather than a 
broader defence, balanced by media responsibility. 
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Lord Cooke noted the moral, intellectual and emotional attractiveness of freedom of speech 
arguments.271 Nonetheless, he was wary of the commercial pressures on media to present and 
package stories in exciting ways which might in fact distort, exaggerate or unfairly represent 
the truth. Lord Cooke also appeared to accept defamation law may have a tendency to chill 
the publication, not only of untruths, but also of that which may be true but cannot be proved 
to be true.272 But he thought there was nothing new in this. His Lordship did not know which 
tendency was greater, but his experience of defamation litigation suggested that it was more 
common for chill effects to be benign.273  
 
Lord Hope appeared particularly sceptical of the chilling effect idea generally, and thought 
the description of the current law ‘…as having a 'chilling' effect on free speech, as if this in 
itself shows that something is wrong with it, is too simple. Of course, it does 'chill' or inhibit 
the freedom of the communicator. But there are situations in which this is a necessary 
protection for the individual.’274  
 
Lord Hobhouse agreed with Lord Nicholls and Lord Cooke and was somewhat distrustful of 
the media. Although he did not engage in a direct chilling effect analysis, by implication, his 
Lordship rejected any suggestion of excessive chill arising from existing defamation law. He 
was concerned not to hand a broad, generic defence to the media, on the grounds that it 
‘…would be handing to what are essentially commercial entities a power which would 
deprive the subjects of such publications of the protection against damaging 
misinformation.’275  
 
In Reynolds, then, the House of Lords shared a view of the chilling effect as being the risk of 
the suppression of stories both true and untrue due to fear of litigation with its attendant 
uncertain outcome and cost. Their Lordships were prepared to accept a theoretical possibility 
of excessive chilling effects, although they were sceptical as to the reality, but in any event, 
they did not consider that imposing some sort of duty of care on the media in order to gain 
access to a wider form of qualified privilege ultimately gave rise to such an effect.  
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Reynolds was followed by the series of Loutchansky decisions which display continuing 
judicial uncertainty in the United Kingdom about chilling effect arguments. Loutchansky v 
Times Newspapers Ltd276 went against media interests. It confirmed that in defamation law, 
multiple publications can arise from initial publication on the Internet, so that subsequent 
occasions upon which the website is accessed give rise to separate causes of action, each with 
an individual limitation period. The defendant newspaper had argued this could mean a 
maintainer of a website is exposed to continuous and indefinite claims every time archived 
material is accessed. However, the Court considered that any chilling effect resulting from the 
multiple publication rule on the willingness of the media to maintain and provide access to 
such material was justified in terms of the UK Human Rights Act 1998, which protects 
freedom of expression. While once again acknowledging the theoretical possibility of a 
chilling effect, in this case, on the keeping of media archives, the court thought, like the 
House of Lords in Reynolds, that in reality it could be reduced and controlled in practical 
ways. It suggested that if archive material was known or suspected to be defamatory, the 
attachment of an appropriate notice warning against its reliability as truth will normally 
remove the sting from the material, and furthermore, subsequent actions arising from fresh 
publication on the Internet would be likely to give rise to only modest damage compared to 
the original publication.277 Such suggestions offered little reassurance to media. Warning 
notices, like denials and disclaimers, may not in fact remove the sting of a defamation, and the 
material may still give rise to defamation proceedings or threats of impending claims. In fact, 
the suggestion that only modest damage might arise implicitly recognises this possibility. 
 
A later decision in the Loutchansky litigation was more media-friendly. In Loutchansky v. 
Times Newspapers Ltd (No. 6),278 acceptance of conventional chill factor arguments led Gray 
J in the High Court to reduce remedial choice to the plaintiff. In this set of proceedings, 
Loutchansky applied to amend his particulars of claim to seek a declaration establishing the 
falsity of what was said about him. This was refused and the judge stated a declaration could 
not also be sought where the main defence relied on was qualified privilege. As well as 
subverting the balance between the claimant's right to reputation and the defendant's right to 
freedom of expression, the Court thought that to permit such a claim would open the 
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floodgates and increase the risk of the media's right to freedom of expression being blighted 
by the cost of defending defamation claims seeking declarations rather than damages.279  
 
More recent developments have also benefited the media. The Reynolds 10 point code 
ossified for a time, unduly restricting the usefulness of the defence. In James Gilbert Ltd v 
Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd,280 for example, Reynolds was treated as creating a need to 
address each of the criteria separately as relevant to the facts in every case, thus becoming an 
obstacle course for media defendants. However, in Jameel v Wall Street Journal,281 the House 
of Lords rejected this inflexible approach. In Jameel, the privilege metamorphised into the 
Reynolds ‘public interest’ defence,282 indicating that the material, and not the occasion, is 
protected, and that the defence is being developed with the media in mind. The context of the 
article as a whole is used to determine public interest,283 so if an allegation is serious, the 
article has to make a real contribution to that.284 The next question is still whether steps taken 
to gather the information were responsible and fair, but the 10 Reynolds criteria are pointers 
only, not a series of hurdles to be overcome. Weight is to be given to the professional 
judgment of the editor or journalist in the absence of evidence of any slipshod approach.285 
Thus, one inaccurate fact in a generally true article might not be irresponsible.286 Regard is 
had to matters such as the steps taken to verify information and the opportunity to comment. 
In Jameel, the article published about the use of bank accounts to channel funds for terrorist 
organisations  was clearly of public interest. The other relevant factors which indicated media 
responsibility were that the article was unsensational, it was by an experienced specialist 
reporter and approved by senior staff,  and although a response was sought at a late stage, it 
would not have been particularly useful anyway.287 Jameel has been described in a later case 
as ‘…releasing the shackles on the freedom of expression afforded to the media in matters of 
public interest.’288 
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Reynolds privilege is also apparently beginning to subdivide into further special forms in the 
United Kingdom – the first of these is called neutral reportage or simply reportage. This 
manifestation of the defence is very attractive, because if certain conditions are met, the 
journalist need not have attempted to verify. In Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing 
(UK) Ltd289 the defendant was a small newspaper with a circulation of 1500 in London, part-
owned by the Saudi-Arabian royal family, and supportive of the Saudi Arabian government, 
which reported a dispute between prominent members of a Saudi-Arabian dissident political 
organisation. The report stated that the reporter had been told by one party that the other had 
spread malicious rumours and allegations of immoral behaviour about him. The Court of 
Appeal held by majority that Reynolds privilege could protect a report of defamatory 
allegations and counter-allegations where attribution was clear, the matter was of proper 
interest to the reader, and the reporter did not adopt the allegations.290 In a case of true 
reportage, for example, where a political dispute is fully, fairly and disinterestedly reported, 
the reporter need not verify the information.291 
 
The Court of Appeal went on to apply the doctrine in Roberts v Gable,292 where Ward LJ 
clarified the following requirements:  
• the information must be in the public interest; 
• in a true case of reportage there is no need to take steps to ensure the accuracy of the 
published information; 
• the report as a whole must simply set out in a neutral fashion the fact that something 
has been said without adopting the truth; 
• the judge rules objectively on the effect of the article as a whole, by looking at all of 
the circumstances relevant to the gathering of the information, in particular, the 
manner and purpose of reporting; 
• if the journalist adopts the report or fails to report in a fair, disinterested and neutral 
way, the only possible defence will be Reynolds responsibility; 
• the Reynolds responsibility factors are still relevant, adjusted as may be necessary for 
the special nature of reportage, and looked at in all the circumstances; 
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• reportage can protect serious allegations as well as scandal-mongering – reported 
criminality does not automatically require verification, but may be relevant to the 
question of public interest;  
• relevant factors properly applied include the position of the protagonists in public life 
but there is no requirement that the defendant be a responsible prominent person or the 
claimant be a public figure as required under US law;  
• urgency is relevant to the weight given to editorial decisions, but every story must be 
judged on its merits at the moment of publication.293 
The Court accepted that in this case, Mr Gable was merely reporting conflicting positions 
arising from allegations and cross- allegations of criminal offences being made by British 
National Party factions against each other, and not necessarily their truth or falsity. This was 
so in spite of the use of one sarcastic reference in the article, because a whole, it did not adopt 
any position to the allegations, and the sarcasm was judged to be speculative.294 The article 
was also responsible in terms of the 10 Reynolds factors.  Crucially, however, Sedley LJ 
commented that neutral reportage must modify the repetition rule, and so should be used 
restrictively.295  
 
Reportage was not available to the defendant book publishers in Charman v Orion Group 
Publishing Ltd,296 because the author of a book ‘Bent Coppers’ had written an investigative 
account or ‘inside story’ of police corruption, by ‘sniffing out information like a bloodhound’, 
rather than acting as a ‘watchdog barking to wake us up to the story already out there’.297 
However, this case was celebrated as the first where Reynolds responsibility was argued 
successfully by a book publisher.298  Working methodically through the 10 points, although 
not required to, Ward LJ observed the parties had accepted the public interest element in the 
very serious allegations made, and found the author had used varied sources, and had taken all 
steps possible to verify the information.299 The claimant had rebuffed attempts to get his side 
of the story, but in any event, this was contained in the book. The tone of the book was 
essentially factual in context and unsensational. Readers were left to form their own 
impression. The circumstances of the publication were not relevant. However, while there was 
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no urgency as for newspapers or broadcasters, this criterion did have some relevance. The 
book was not a ‘perishable commodity’, but the lack of urgency was taken into account and 
actually weighed against the defendant, because greater care is to be expected of authors and 
publishers in such circumstances.300 However, Sedley LJ refused to engage in a retrospective 
editorial function, and held that even though the book was a selective and evaluative account, 
it was within the bounds of responsible journalism.301 
 
This on-going refinement of the public interest or responsible journalism defence, and the 
further fracturing of it into an even more specialist defence such as reportage, represent a sea-
change in English defamation law which must mediate any real chilling effects existing in that 
jurisdiction. These are changes to substantive law which provide more accessible defences for 
the media.302 Although they require responsible media behaviour, it appears the question of 




The European Court of Human Rights considers the domestic defamation laws of its member 
states as potential restrictions on freedom of expression, when a media applicant objects to a 
successful defamation claim or some other speech restriction. Freedom of expression is 
contained in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and is given a wide 
interpretation by the Court to include offensive, shocking and disturbing ideas and 
opinions,303 and the form in which those ideas are conveyed, such as photographs.304 The 
Court also makes a distinction between statements of fact and value judgments or opinions. In 
general, there is no requirement to prove the truth of the latter,305although where excessive, 
there must be some basis in fact.306 
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However, media responsibility has also been expressly recognised as required by the 
Convention.307 Therefore, although the Court has a very clear idea of the importance of a free 
press, it construes the character of that press as an ethical and responsible one:  
…a constant thread running through the Court’s case-law is the insistence on the essential role of a free 
press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society. Although the press must not overstep 
certain bounds, regarding in particular the protection of the reputation and rights of others and the need 
to prevent the disclosure of confidential information, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner 
consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public 
interest. 308 
 
Together with the wide interpretation given to speech referred to above, the Court interprets 
the Convention requirements in ways which are expansive of journalistic freedom. 
Responsible journalism can therefore include publication of material which has a degree of 
exaggeration, or even provocation,309 and the Court attempts to assess media behaviour 
without the benefit of hindsight, and in a realistic fashion.310  
 
For example, in White v Sweden,311 the ECHR found that domestic courts had struck a correct 
balance in holding that the public interest in a series of articles suggesting the applicant was 
guilty of criminal offences, including a prominent murder, outweighed his right to protect his 
reputation because the subject matter was of very serious public interest, and the newspapers 
had presented a balanced view and acted in good faith in attempting to verify.  
 
In Verlagsgruppe News GMBH v Austria,312 it found the absolute prohibition of publication of 
a photograph313 of a Mr G together with an article reporting pending investigations on 
suspicion of large scale tax evasion against him to interfere with freedom of expression, 
because the information contributed to a public debate on the integrity of business leaders, on 
illegal business practices and the functioning of the justice system, the tax offences were 
serious, and because an absolute prohibition was disproportionate.  
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In Tonsbergs Blad as and Haukom v Norway,314the Court made it very clear that ‘the right of 
journalists to impart information on issues of general interest requires that they should act in 
good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide reliable and precise information in 
accordance with the ethics of journalism.’315 The Court described a number of factors to be 
examined, which are mirrored in Reynolds.316 They included the nature and degree of the 
defamation, the reliability of sources, the words and context of the report as a whole, and 
whether the journalists acted in good faith in attempting to verify.317 In this case, a relatively 
minor and limited defamation which had resulted in a damages award was nonetheless an 
excessive and disproportionate burden on a regional newspaper. The Tonsberg Blad had 
published an article alleging that the name of the head of one of Norway’s largest industrial 
companies appeared on an official list of persons considered to have breached permanent 
residency requirements. In finding the newspaper’s behaviour to be responsible, the Court 
noted although the matter was one of public interest, the allegation itself was not serious and 
had been presented in a qualified form. Further, the report was balanced and it was not for the 
Court to dictate reporting techniques. Finally, although the source was anonymous and thus, 
greater care was required, the evidence available to the journalist at the time supported the 
allegation, which meant verification was adequate and in good faith. The disproportionate 
burden borne by the newspaper of fighting the action was capable of having a chilling effect 
on press freedom in Norway.318  
 
Significantly, like the House of Lords in the Derbyshire case,319 the European Court accords 
great weight to political context when assessing whether there is public interest in a 
publication. Permissible criticism is wider in relation to governmental behaviour and 
politicians in contrast to that of private citizens. Thus, politicians, national or local, 
…inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their words and deeds by 
journalists and the public at large, and they must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance.320 
 
It is therefore much harder to justify restricting political debate.321 In Lombardo and Others v 
Malta,322 for instance, an article which suggested Fgura Local Council had not consulted the 
public about roading and was ignoring public opinion was held to have been part of a lively 
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political debate at a local level, in which elected officials and journalists should have had 
broader opportunity to criticise the local authority, even though the allegations might not have 
a clear factual basis. 
 
European jurisprudence has taken an expansive view of the nature of media itself, a position 
which has great relevance to the development of new media. In Steel and Morris v the United 
Kingdom323 the Court demonstrated very clearly its own idea of media responsibility. This 
case was an application against the United Kingdom government by Steel and Morris, two 
impecunious pamphleteers who had partially unsuccessfully defended defamation 
proceedings brought against them by corporate giant McDonald’s in relation to the 
distribution of a six page document by the pair at McDonald’s outlets. The defamation trial 
was the longest civil and defamation trial in English legal history and the applicants had to 
defend themselves because they possessed few assets and legal aid was not available for 
defamation trials in the United Kingdom. Steel and Morris argued that English defamation 
law and the lack of legal aid gave rise to violations of their rights to a fair trial and freedom of 
expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the applicants were 
not journalists, the Court considered that in a democratic society even small and informal 
campaign groups had a legitimate and important role in stimulating public discussion.324 
Nonetheless, like journalists, the applicants had to act in good faith in order to provide 
accurate and reliable information, and while a certain degree of hyperbole and exaggeration 
would be tolerated in a campaigning leaflet, it was right that serious allegations presented as 
fact could become the subject of defamation proceedings.325 However, in weighing the 
apparent inequalities of the parties to those proceedings, the Court thought that the correct 
balance was not struck between the need to protect the applicants' rights to freedom of 
expression and the need to protect McDonald's rights and reputation.326 Here, a potential 
chilling effect played a part in the balancing process, which in the end favoured the 
applicants: 
 The more general interest in promoting the free circulation of information and ideas about the activities 
of powerful commercial entities, and the possible “chilling” effect on others are also important factors 
to be considered in this context, bearing in mind the legitimate and important role that campaign groups 
can play in stimulating public discussion…327 
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The decision suggests that small sectors of the media and even unconventional non-media 
parties play important roles in freedom of expression. 
 
Overall, then, it appears the ECHR has given some primacy to freedom of expression. A 
recent development in the jurisprudence may impact on this, however. The Court has begun to 
accord the protection of reputation equal status with freedom of expression under the privacy 
rubric. Article 8(1) of the Convention. provides that ‘Everyone has the right for respect for his 
private…life’, and the Court has accepted arguments that the Article has been breached by the 
failure of state courts to provide due protection of name and reputation.328 This development 
has been outlined in a passionate defence of the right to reputation stated in the concurring 
opinion of Judge Loucaides in Lindon, Otchakovsky and July v France,329 where the judge 
also expressed disquiet about the apparent tendency to give primacy to political speech even 
where statements are untrue.  
 
In Lindon, the Court clearly struggled with applications made by a writer and publisher of a 
novel called ‘Jean-Marie Le Pen on Trial’ based on real events surrounding a murder carried 
out by skinheads in 1995, which contained passages defamatory of the National Front Leader, 
Mr Le Pen. A third applicant was the publisher of a newspaper which published an article by 
97 contemporary writers in the form of a petition denying the book was defamatory and 
repeating the statements. The applicants were convicted of criminal defamation under French 
law. A majority of the Court330 surprisingly found that convictions and fines imposed on the 
applicants did not breach Article 10 of the Convention. The finding appears to be based in the 
main on the perceived extreme virulence of the allegations (Le Pen was likened to a chief of a 
gang of killers, and described as a vampire) and the moderate nature of the fines imposed.331 
Judge Loucaides commented that the Court had on occasion shown excessive sensitivity and 
over-protected freedom of expression in contrast to protection of reputation, and concluded 
with a strong indictment of the tendencies of the modern mass media to behave in an 
uncontrolled and self-interested manner. His judgment clearly endorses benign chilling effects 
of defamation law on irresponsible journalism.332 However, the speech in this case does not 
appear to be particularly irresponsible or virulent, and criminal libel laws are, by their very 
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nature, objectionable, because the state has no legitimate place in the protection of private 
reputation, and the risk of abuse is high.333  
 
The minority took a similar position, and attached considerable weight to the nature of the 
work as a piece of fiction, pointing out the role of artistic creation in political debate.334 
Further, these judges believed that Mr Le Pen, as a politician holding extremist views, should 
accept a higher degree of tolerance.335 These judges would not have imposed high verification 
standards on the applicants,336 did not find the publications themselves incited violence or 
hate speech,337 and questioned the validity of criminal defamation provisions in the 21st 
century.338 
 
The European decisions probably favour the media overall, and it is to be hoped that the result 
in the Le Pen case is an aberration. The approach to the chilling effect itself in these cases is 
varied, as in the domestic common law jurisdictions. In many of the cases, the chilling effect 
is implicit in the decision, but not acknowledged. In others, such as Tonsbergs Blad,339 the 
doctrine is simply referred to like a mantra, without any in-depth investigation or critical 
analysis. In yet others, the doctrine is discussed in more detail. In Lombardo and Others v 
Malta,340 for instance, the effect was described generally as arising from ‘fear of sanction’, 
and in that case, it was accepted as discouraging the applicants from criticising the local 
council in the future.341  In these cases, a potential effect is assumed. However, sometimes, 
the Court goes further, and states specifically that no evidence is required to support chilling 
effects arguments at all.342 The European dicta demonstrate how a predictive assertion of the 
chilling effect has become a doctrine with substantive, though variable, effects on the law of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  
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2.4 Australia 
The chilling effect doctrine has also had substantive effects on defamation law in Australia. 
After some skirmishing in Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times343 and Stephens and 
others v West Australian Newspapers Ltd,344 the High Court held in Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation345 that the Australian constitution had implied in it a freedom of 
communication. However, the High Court was concerned only about excessive effects and 
sought to mediate those arising from defamation laws, and thus to adapt those laws. 
Therefore, protecting personal reputation was seen as legitimate as long as it did not 
unnecessarily or unreasonably impair freedom of communication about government and 
political matters.346  However, the public interest in the law of defamation was acknowledged, 
because it was accepted by the Court as also protecting those taking part in government and 
political life and therefore conducive to the public good. The result was an extension of the 
defence of qualified privilege which was only available on the basis of reasonableness of the 
defendant’s behaviour. The decision, like Reynolds, recognised a chilling effect, relaxed 
defamation laws (in NSW and now elsewhere) in favour of defendants, but tempered this with 
a requirement of media responsibility.  
 
Although the defence looks to be turning into one of public interest in Australia,347  as in the 
United Kingdom, an apparently rigid approach by courts to responsibility requirements has 
been criticised as obstructive to press freedom. The defence has rarely been successfully used. 
A recent example is Obeid v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd,348where the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales found the defence was not available where two journalists had published 
serious allegations of corruption and bribery against a State Minister without verifying the 
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words of an unreliable source. The more flexible and media-friendly approach of the House of 
Lords in Jameel has not been judicially endorsed in Australia, but is seen as desirable there.349  
 
Dow Jones v Gutnick350appears less media friendly. In that case, the High Court refused to 
accept arguments that freedom of expression would be chilled if the ordinary principles of 
publication in defamation were applied to the Internet. An article in an on-line magazine 
uploaded in the US contained several allegedly defamatory references to Mr Joseph Gutnick. 
He was held entitled to bring an action in the Supreme Court of Victoria in Australia against 
Dow Jones, although the latter argued that the claim should have been brought in the US, 
where the company could have  taken advantage of the greater constitutional protections for 
defendants. The article could be downloaded in Victoria, which was where Mr Gutnick lived 
and had his business headquarters. The High Court confirmed that a defamation is to be 
located at the place where the damage to reputation occurs. But because material on the 
Internet is not available in comprehensible form until downloaded on to the computer of a 
party using a web browser to pull the material from the web server, the place of download is 
where the damage to reputation may be done, and the place where the tort of defamation is 
committed. Callinan J stated:  
Quite deliberately, and in my opinion rightly so, Australian law places real value on reputation, and 
views with scepticism claims that it unduly inhibits freedom of discourse. In my opinion the law with 
respect to privilege in this country, now and historically, provides an appropriate balance which does 
justice to both a publisher and the subject of a publication.351 
 
However, even more recently, chilling effects have been implicitly recognised in the context 
of federal law reform in Australia. New uniform defamation laws finally came into force in 
that jurisdiction in 2006.352 These reforms can certainly be described as limiting or relaxing 
defamation laws, thereby arguably also limiting real or perceived chilling effects. In Australia 
now, large non-charitable corporations cannot sue in defamation, the defence of truth no 
longer has a requirement of public interest, death puts an end to a plaintiff’s claim, there is a 
cap on damages at $250,000 unless there is special aggravation, punitive damages have been 
abolished, and there is a widened contextual truth defence. The Australian Press Council has 
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reported an apparent significant decrease in new defamation actions since the passage of the 
harmonised legislation.353   
 
2.5 New Zealand  
In the New Zealand leading case, Lange v Atkinson354 Justice Elias (as she then was) in the 
High Court gave unusually close but also wide-ranging attention to the development of the 
chilling effect doctrine. In that case, as is well known, former Prime Minister and former 
leader of the Labour Party, David Lange claimed general and punitive damages for 
defamation arising from a North and South article, which he claimed suggested that he was 
irresponsible, dishonest, insincere, manipulative and lazy. Essentially the case was about 
whether the appropriate balance was properly struck by the common law between the two 
principles of reputation and free speech in the context of political speech355 in New Zealand.  
Of the ‘chilling effect’ Elias J said:  
… The basis of the concern is a recognised "chilling effect" which inhibits dissemination of information 
and comment on matters of public interest because of the risk of liability in damages or exposure to 
costly litigation. Because of the uncertainties of outcome in litigation, the difficulties of proof in a 
manner acceptable in Court, and the costliness of the process, defamation laws are feared to inhibit not 
only false speech made in good faith but true speech as well.356  
 
Although inclined to take a position which was sympathetic to the media, in the end, she too 
tempered her approach with caution. While prepared to adjust the balance between freedom of 
speech and protection of reputation as a value judgment, informed by local circumstances and 
guided by principle,357 Elias J acknowledged that whether there is a need to provide additional 
protection for the media turned in part on a sociological assessment of the vulnerability or 
power of the news media and that a Court may not be sufficiently informed about that.358 For 
this reason, she was not prepared to go as far as changing the law to reflect the American 
position, and instead held that the common law defence of qualified privilege could apply to 
‘discussion which bears upon the function of electors in a representative democracy by 
developing and encouraging views upon government’.359 The defence would be available to 
all, including media. No more than honest belief would be required as a condition of the 
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defence. This was because the judge accepted the US ‘actual malice’ approach has itself- 
arguably created a chilling effect because it requires an investigation into media methods.360 
 
Furthermore, in Lange, foreshadowing the Loutchansky decision,361 Elias J held that the 
defence applied to claims for damages but the matter of declarations was left for another 
court. The potential chilling effect was recognised by the judge again in this context, because 
the question as to availability of a declaration was seen to turn on whether the costs of 
litigation and the exposure to solicitor and client costs would have an unacceptable chilling 
effect on political discussion.362 This specific remedial issue has not been finally determined 
in New Zealand.363  
 
The Lange case went to the Court of Appeal twice.364  In Lange No 1 it was held that the 
defence of qualified privilege applied to generally-published statements made about the 
actions and qualities of those currently or formerly elected to Parliament and those with 
immediate aspirations to be members, so far as those actions and qualities directly affected 
their capacity (including their personal ability and willingness) to meet their public 
responsibilities. The determination of the matters that bore on that capacity depended on a 
consideration of what was properly a matter of public concern rather than of private 
concern365. There was no requirement of reasonable care for the defence of qualified privilege 
to be invoked, but (per Tipping J) reasonableness could be relevant to the question whether 
the defendant had taken improper advantage of the occasion of publication.366 
 
In the majority judgment delivered by Blanchard J (for himself, Richardson, Henry and Keith 
JJ) the chilling effect is mentioned a number of times. First, the Court discusses the judgment 
of Brennan J in NY Times v Sullivan, where he recognised the effect to justify the eventual 
defendant malice rule developed in that case.367  Later, the judgment of Lord Keith of Kinkel 
delivered for the House of Lords in Derbyshire is cited, where he referred to the NY Times 
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case and to the chilling effect of the threat of civil actions for libel.368 Tipping J, in a separate 
judgment, thought that chilling effects should be borne in mind, but that they should not 
always be seen as a bad thing, and may serve a useful purpose in certain circumstances.369 
 
This decision of the Court of Appeal, with its emphasis on the public having a proper interest 
in statements made about the actions and qualities of past, present or future MPs, and the 
extension of the defence of qualified privilege to cover statements about such matters 
published generally, is implicitly based on an acceptance that defamation laws may otherwise 
chill such statements. However, although political statements were given primacy, the 
decision is also conditional. Although no requirement for reasonable care was imposed in 
order to claim the defence, the loss of the defence where there is ill will or taking improper 
advantage of the occasion of publication was emphasised.370 Tipping J, taking what Elias J 
would probably see as a conservative approach, focused on the role of a responsible press in 
particular. For this judge, rights go with responsibilities and he is sceptical about the exercise 
of those responsibilities.371 Although Tipping J indicated he would like to impose a 
reasonableness requirement on the defence and was worried the balance might be wrong 
without it, he did not do so in the end, because he thought creating a whole new defence 
rather than extending an existing one would usurp the role of Parliament.372 He hoped that the 
provision in s 19 of the Act that the defence is lost where there is ill will or taking advantage 
of the ability to publish would allow some examination of the issue of reasonable care.373 He 
concluded by expressing general concern about the media, reflecting a belief in its 
considerable power:  
It could be seen as rather ironical that whereas almost all sectors of society, and all other occupations 
and professions have duties to take reasonable care, and are accountable in one form or another if they 
are careless, the news media whose power and capacity to cause harm and distress are considerable if 
that power is not responsibly used, are not liable in negligence, and what is more, can claim qualified 
privilege even if they are negligent. It may be asked whether the public interest in freedom of 
expression is so great that the accountability which society requires of others, should not also to this 
extent be required of the news media.374 
 
The same Court reconsidered the matter about two years later on remission from the Privy 
Council, and held that the defence of qualified privilege it had recognised in 1998 would not 
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be struck out.375 The privilege was a generic one attaching to subject-matter coming within 
the category of political information and did not require an examination of the circumstances 
of publication in each case before determining whether the occasion is to be treated as one of 
qualified privilege (as had been decided by the House of Lords in Reynolds in the United 
Kingdom.).376 Section 19 of the Defamation Act would provide protection against press 
irresponsibility not available in England. The Court of Appeal noted also that the position of 
the press in the two countries was different. 
 
The Court of Appeal considered the chilling effect again. It referred to the ‘careful research’ 
in the Barendt study of English defamation law in  practice,377 and accepted the finding in that 
research of negative chilling effects378 was relevant to North and South magazine.379 
However, the Court then rejected the English approach of considering first whether an 
occasion is privileged by looking at the circumstances (using the Reynolds checklist of media 
methods), because it considered this would add significantly to the chilling effect.380  
 
The Court also made subtle distinctions to support its decision not to follow the Reynolds 
approach. One suggestion it made was that the New Zealand media is a vulnerable one,381 and 
different from that in the UK, in that we have not experienced the worst excesses and 
irresponsibilities of the English national daily tabloids.382 This was said to arise from the 
smallness of the market, less competition, low circulation figures and lack of close association 
with political parties.383 The implication in the judgment is that the well-behaved New 
Zealand media can be trusted to behave responsibly, thus removing the need to impose any 
conditions on an extended qualified privilege defence. However, the court was still concerned 
to emphasise that the defence must be used with care:  
If the privilege is not responsibly used, its purpose is abused and improper advantage is taken of the 
occasion. If a false and defamatory statement which qualifies for protection is made, and is 
disseminated to a wide audience, the motives of the publisher and whether the publisher had a genuine 
belief in the truth of the statement, will warrant close scrutiny. If the publisher is unable or unwilling to 
disclose any responsible basis for asserting a genuine belief in truth, the jury may well be entitled to 
draw the inference that no such belief existed. ... Furthermore, a publisher who is reckless or indifferent 
to the truth of what is published, cannot assert a genuine belief that it was true.384  
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The language of responsibility was used repeatedly: ‘Responsible journalists in whatever 
medium ought not to have any concerns about such an approach…qualified privilege is not a 
licence to be irresponsible.’385 This approach means that a publisher who has not checked 
sources, or perhaps not obtained the other side of the story, will find it hard to assert a genuine 
belief in the material, and the issue of recklessness or carelessness can be raised. So media 
methods may still be investigated in New Zealand, but at the stage after the occasion is said to 
be privileged, where the plaintiff wants to suggest s 19 should apply to deprive the media 
defendant of the defence because of ill will. However, just why this is less uncertain, and 
hence less chilling, for the media than the Reynolds approach is not made clear in the 
judgment.  
 
In Lange, it was Elias J in the High Court who was most receptive to the chilling effect 
doctrine, and it may be said that the almost unconditional form her version of the 
constitutional privilege defence took and her reservation as to remedial application, owed 
much to her assumption that fear of the uncertainties associated with fighting a defamation 
action (outcome, cost, difficulties of proof, levels of damages) actually causes the New 
Zealand media to censor not only untrue stories, but also true ones. Yet even Elias J was not 
prepared to go so far as to adopt the American approach to defamation, because she did not 
wish to guess as to the actual power or vulnerability of the New Zealand media. While the 
Court of Appeal appeared to accept the notion of a possible chilling effect indirectly, it seems 
that Tipping J’s concept of media responsibility rendered the more media-friendly defence 
conditional, and it will only be available when a certain standard of behaviour is met. This 
implies that irresponsible media will in general get no relief from any potential chilling effect, 
and perhaps that any effects it may have on such media are appropriate. Thus, for the Lange 
Court of Appeal, the chilling effects doctrine was defined so that the term ‘media’ refers in 
fact to ‘responsible media’. 
 
3. The chilling effect of damages awards 
A distinct argument made about the chilling effect arises in connection with the remedy of 
damages. Here a defendant argues that levels of damages awarded in defamation cases 
generally are too high, and/or that the level of an award made in the particular case was so 
high that it was disproportionate to any need to protect the right of reputation, chilling not 
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only the defendant but also others, from exercising their freedom of expression in the future. 
There are cases going both ways. 
 
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto,386 the leading Canadian case, did not involve a 
media defendant, but rather the Church of Scientology, which made serious malicious 
statements about Mr Hill in a press conference called for the purpose. The Supreme Court 
took a conservative approach to a chilling effects argument and to arguments that damages 
should be subject to more judicial control. The Court held that an award of punitive damages 
served an entirely rational purpose in the case and was not excessive. Scientology alleged that 
the size of the award of punitive damages had a chilling effect on its right to freedom of 
expression. The Court was not prepared to accept this argument without evidence.387 Whether 
this had to relate to actual effects or potential effects is not made clear in the judgment, but in 
any event, Scientology did not produce any evidence which would satisfy the Court. 
However, the Court did note that different factors might have to be taken into consideration 
where evidence was put forward and where a member of the media was a party to the 
action.388 The case was therefore a poor one to test the viability of the chilling effects doctrine 
in relation to damages. Clearly, such arguments are seen as more persuasive when made by 
the media or parties akin to media, as in Steel and Morris v the United Kingdom.389 
 
However, at about the same time, the New Zealand Court of Appeal did reject similar 
arguments made against a media defendant. TVNZ v Quinn390 concerned the amount of 
damages in two extraordinary defamation awards made against the Holmes television current 
affairs show, for broadcasting two programmes suggesting Mr Quinn was involved in illegal 
activities related to the horse racing industry. TVNZ wanted judgment set aside and a new 
trial on the issue of damages in relation to an award of $400,000. Mr Quinn cross-appealed an 
order made to set aside a second award of $1.1m and ordering a new trial. Both appeals were 
lost in the Court of Appeal. The judgment indicates a cautious approach to arguments that 
high defamation awards have a chilling effect on free speech, based in part on a ‘rights come 
with responsibilities’ approach, and on a view that levels of damages awards in New Zealand 
were not out of control.  
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In Quinn, Cooke P (as he then was) referred to a report of the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission391 which  placed great weight on having standards that will not chill freedom of 
speech,392 but would not lay down any specific requirements on judges when summing up on 
the issue of damages. He thought there was insufficient evidence of a trend to excessive 
damages in New Zealand.393 McKay J and Cooke P referred to an argument raised for TVNZ 
that excessive awards can have a chilling effect on the media, inhibiting both investigative 
journalism and the wider dissemination of information.394 They rejected this argument, using 
the careless and damaging reporting by the Holmes show as evidence of lack of any effect on 
investigative journalism in this case. The broadcaster had failed to check its facts, had 
embellished the programmes and had not been deterred by the threat of legal action after the 
first show from broadcasting further damaging untrue allegations. Cooke P said: ‘I am not 
persuaded that the Bill of Rights has the result of putting media freedoms above the right to 
one’s reputation, nor that this case has anything to do with the proper freedom of the media, 
as distinct from a licence to be irresponsible.’395 He thought there was no apparent need in NZ 
to change the approach to jury directions in defamation cases and would not impose any 
specific rules on judges.396 
 
TVNZ sought to have standard directions to juries reappraised, because of what it argued was 
a trend towards increased awards of damages. It suggested the perceived increase needed to 
be restrained, before it developed further, imposing a chilling effect on freedom of the 
press.397 McGechan J was not sure there was such a trend in New Zealand. Even if there was, 
he thought a court should not automatically assume it was improper and should be stifled, 
because ‘…defamation awards have a social function, not merely judicial.’398  
 
It is clear that, for different reasons than arose in Hill, the Quinn case was not a good one to 
advance chilling effect arguments. The defamations were particularly serious, a motive in 
publishing appeared to be to enhance ratings, the insinuations in the programmes could not be 
proved to a sufficient standard, TVNZ declined to apologise at the time, the defendant 
published further unprovable implications in response to the plaintiff’s complaint, and 
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persisted at trial in denying clear meanings in the face of the evidence. The case demonstrates 
that chilling effects, both real and potential, tend to be seen as benign and indeed, desirable, 
where the defamation is clear and there are aggravating and exemplary circumstances.  
 
This was also the approach taken in the more recent Privy Council decision The Gleaner Co 
Ltd v Abrahams,399 where Lord Hoffmann strongly endorsed the validity of a chilling effect of 
a large award of damages in the circumstances of the case. Two daily newspapers in Jamaica 
belonging to the Gleaner Company Ltd published defamatory articles about the plaintiff, Mr 
Abrahams, who had been Minister of Tourism for Jamaica between 1980 and 1984. The 
proceedings were extremely protracted, lasting over 16 years, during which time the 
defendants doggedly continued to pursue unsupportable defences of truth and qualified 
privilege. By 1996, the only remaining issue was the amount of damages. The jury awarded 
J$80.7 million, at that time equal to £1.2 million. Although the Court of Appeal set aside the 
award on appeal as excessive and substituted J$35 million, the defendants appealed to the 
Privy Council, arguing in particular that insufficient consideration had been given to the 
inhibiting effect of so large an award on freedom of expression.  
 
This argument was turned against the defendants by their Lordships' Board, which considered 
that damages in defamation cases have both compensatory and deterrence functions. Gleaner 
and Quinn demonstrate that in cases involving serious defamations where an irresponsible or 
even malicious media defendant aggravates the original defamation and unreasonably resists 
all efforts of the plaintiff to clear his or her name, the chilling effect is not regarded as simply 
benign, but is in fact seen as essential when both corrective and distributive justice rationales 
are applied. Deterrence is regarded as effective in the particular case because damages have to 
be paid either by the defendant personally or under an insurance policy the underwriter of 
which would be sensitive to the frequency of claims.400 More broadly, high awards are 
required to chill future irresponsible or malicious publications in a normative sense and ‘may 
also be necessary to deter the media from riding roughshod over the rights of other 
citizens’.401  In Gleaner, the Court of Appeal was held entitled to take the view that if a high 
award had a chilling effect upon the kind of conduct which characterised the case,  that would 
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be no bad thing.402 Furthermore, their Lordships did not believe that the award of so large an 
amount in the special circumstances of the case would inhibit responsible journalism.403  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights requires that an award of damages for 
defamation must be proportionate to the injury suffered to reputation.404 In any event, it seems 
the European court is more accepting of the chilling effects doctrine when determining the 
question of proportionality. In Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers 
Ireland Ltd v Ireland,405 the Court stated that it will accept that unpredictably large damages 
awards have a chilling effect without the need for proof in a particular case. Therefore, such 
awards require close scrutiny.406 But the Court has gone further. In Steel and Morris v the 
United Kingdom, the court compared the amounts awarded against the plaintiffs, which it 
accepted as relatively moderate by contemporary standards in defamation cases in the United 
Kingdom, against the plaintiffs’ much more moderate incomes and resources, and found them 
to be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of McDonald’s. This 
suggests an approach which takes account of the relative economic and civil positions of 
plaintiff and defendant, which in turn assumes that chilling effects can fall more heavily on 
some parties than others.  
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4. Reflection on the chilling effect 
This comparative survey of leading defamation cases dealing with the chilling effect407 shows 
that the doctrine has had substantive effects on the development of the law not only in the US, 
but also in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and that judicial attitudes 
towards the doctrine in these jurisdictions are quite complex. The concept has entered 
ordinary parlance and understanding, and yet the legal approach to it cannot, as yet, be 
described under any unifying principle. However, at the least, it seems clear that the chilling 
effects doctrine is being harnessed and managed by non-US courts in two ways, to perform a 
broad social function of encouraging and advancing media responsibility while still giving 
weight to freedom of expression.408  
 
In the US context, Schauer goes further than this. His thesis is that the chilling effect doctrine 
can be better understood as the logical outcome of two basic propositions – that all litigation 
and legal processes are invested with uncertainty;409 and that determining whether an 
erroneous result in a free speech case will do more harm than good must result in giving 
priority to the first amendment and freedom of speech.410 It is better, posits Schauer, to 
overextend free speech than to erroneously limit it. Schauer develops a model of comparative 
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harm to determine whether a chilling effect should be recognised or not.411 He concludes that 
the harm caused by the chilling of free speech is comparatively greater than the harms 
resulting from allowing free speech to prevail.412 In the result, he argues that legal rules must 
be adopted which lessen uncertainty attached to behaviours which are forms of expression or 
speech, thereby reducing or eliminating the chilling effect.413  
 
Schauer demonstrates his thesis by applying it to defamation.414  He cites New York Times v 
Sullivan415 as a clear example of the US Supreme court mediating the chilling effect of legal 
rules which protect reputation, by requiring a plaintiff who is a public official to prove with 
convincing clarity416 that a false statement made about official conduct was made with ‘actual 
malice’.417 Using a set of diagrams, Schauer shows convincingly that in the US, even though 
they have no social value, false factual statements about public officials are protected, as long 
as they are uttered without actual malice.418 This buffer, or over-protection zone, argues 
Schauer, is created to ensure that legal mistakes about material that is deserving of protection 
(correct factual information and opinion) are not made, and that any chilling effect is 
eliminated or mitigated.419 To Schauer, the case demonstrates that an ‘erroneous penalization 
of a publisher is more harmful than a mistaken denial of a remedy for an injury to 
reputation.420 This is a ‘balancing of competing interests, a balancing performed at the rule-
making level’.421 Schauer then goes on to argue that this is a prior substantive legal rule in 
which the Supreme Court chose to protect freedom of speech.422  
 
Thus Schauer describes the chilling effect not as predictive, but as a real method of looking at 
the first amendment.423 He states that in the absence of convincing evidence, the 
“transcendent value” of free speech means the presumption must be to safeguard it.424 He 
concludes that ‘[b]y comparing rather than measuring, the behavioural imprecision of the 
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chilling effect concept become irrelevant.’425 Schauer’s conclusion is basically that the 
chilling effect idea has become a conceptual doctrine, a rule which in constitutional law, must 
give priority to speech. 
 
The approach taken outside the USA differs from Schauer, but still gives a form of priority to 
speech. In the majority of the non-US cases discussed above, the judges were prepared to 
accept the unproven assumption of the chilling effect doctrine that human beings will be 
deterred from certain activities not just by being forced to defend defamation actions, but 
simply through fear of potential action.426 However, while those same judges were prepared to 
alter or ‘interpret’ the substantive law on the basis of predictive chilling effects, generally they 
only did this for the benefit of a responsible press functioning in the public interest. The cases 
also demonstrate the other purpose of the doctrine which has judicial acceptance in non-US 
jurisdictions, where the courts retain a right to recognise and give effect to benign or ‘valid’ 
chilling effects. The word ‘benign’ does not relate to the effects per se, but to the overall 
acceptability of them. Actual effects can be and are intended to be significant, because 
damages awards, sometimes quite large ones, can encourage responsible media behaviour by 
punishing and deterring irresponsibility. 
 
It is through the development of lists or guidelines containing ethical and normative 
journalistic standards that the non-US courts have begun to outline what a responsible media 
is. However, the question of the public interest element also has to be addressed. As we have 
seen, this issue is inextricably connected to a developing western jurisprudence which 
attempts to address the concept of freedom of expression and its place in democratic political 
systems. The question of what role freedom of expression now plays and should play in 
defamation cases in New Zealand is addressed in detail below.427 Before I address that issue, 
however, it is appropriate to present the results of my 2001 survey of the media in the three 
chapters which follow. These chapters reveal much about just what sort of chilling effect, if 
any, actually exists in contemporary New Zealand. As we have seen, it is this element which 
is often missing in the judicial analysis. 
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Chapter Five – The media survey 
 
1. Introduction 
The media survey was devised to be at the centre of my study, and it produced significant 
data. This was a postal survey carried out in an essentially conventional manner and was 
intended to find out what the media thought and experienced – in other words, to produce 
both qualitative and quantitative data. In the first half of 2001, approximately 800 confidential 
surveys were sent to every identifiable member of the New Zealand media. This included 
newspapers, television and radio broadcasters, magazines, book publishers, independent 
writers and journalists, information service providers and advertising agencies and public 
relations firms. A follow-up letter was sent some time later to encourage the completion and 
return of the surveys. Responses were received from 52 newspapers, 6 television broadcasters 
including the state-broadcaster and its largest private rival, 31 radio broadcasters, 26 
magazines, 9 individual writers and journalists, 24 book publishers, 68 advertising agencies or 
public relations firms, 2 information service providers and 7 multi-media interests.428 The 
response rate overall was just over 28%. However, this figure does not include a response 
from the New Zealand section of the Commonwealth Press Union, which voluntarily 
submitted its views on some of the questions contained in the media survey.429  
 
The media survey was broken down into five parts. The first part sought background 
information such as what form the media respondent took, what sort of enterprise was 
involved, what sort of circulation the respondent had,430 did they have defamation insurance, 
what sort of training they had, and what sort of risks of defamation they faced. The second 
part investigated pre-publication procedures, how they worked and if these were always 
complied with. The third part of the survey asked for information as to actual experience of 
statements of claim (writs) in the years 1996-2001, and the fourth part investigated the 
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experience of threats of action which did not proceed to trial for the same period. The final 
part of the survey sought the views of the respondents on aspects of the law, such as defences, 
delays, technicalities, damages, and injunctions, and invited any general comments or 
suggestions for reform. The results are analysed below. 
 
2. Analysis of media responses 
2.1 Factors  regarded as creating risks associated with defamation 
In this section of the survey, media were asked what the particular risks of defamation in the 
industry were, and could identify more than one category of risk. The question was open, in 
that no list of suggested categories was supplied. 
 
Nearly 75% of all media respondents identified the particular risks of defamation in their area. 
The replies varied as between media. However, significantly, three things appeared in all lists. 
Twenty-three percent of all these respondents identified their media as being subject simply to 
general risks of defamation. Twenty-one percent chose inadvertence or inaccuracy as creating 
risk. The category chosen by the next largest number was commercial or business material, 
which was referred to by 14% of these respondents. (See Fig. 23 below). 
Fig. 23 










The general media responses were broken down to find out which issues associated with risk 
arose most often for each media. Forty percent of newspapers responding identified general 
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risks as being most problematic and two-thirds of television respondents identified news 
stories as risky. By far the strongest trend to emerge from radio respondents was the real risk 
arising from live broadcast, such as live interviews, off-the-cuff remarks by announcers or 
callers responding on talk-back, and comment and opinions broadcast live. Nearly 43% 
identified this category as creating the most concern. Nearly half of magazine respondents 
chose inaccuracy in photos, statements, or technical information. Publishers identified both 
individuals mentioned in books or biographies, and inadvertent mistakes or inaccuracy, 
(28%).  
 
For the advertising agencies which responded, the particular risk identified by the largest 
group was commercial defamation, including comparative advertising, and attacking 
competitors, which was identified by 32% of the advertising agencies which responded to this 
question. Of the public relations firms which responded to these questions, 30% thought the 
problems were only of a general kind. Overall, it seems fair to say that while advertising 
agencies clearly identified the risk of commercial defamation as of concern, and public 
relations firms were more concerned about the risk of making mistakes, half of the advertising 
agencies had no particular concerns, as did two-thirds of the public relations firms. 
 
Forty percent of journalist and writer respondents identified business/professional matters and 
the same figure indicated that inaccuracies were a risky category. The largest number of the 
multi-media respondents (43%) saw material about business matters as risky. Neither of the 
ISP respondents identified any risks of defamation in their area. 
 
It will be apparent that ‘mistakes’ is not, in fact, a category of risky subject matter. Mistakes 
do not cause risk, but rather, constitute a risk. However, the responses clearly identified 
mistakes as being of significant concern.  As a category of actual risk, mistakes breaks down 
into inadvertent mistakes and inaccuracy. It is often said that the media cannot protect itself 
against inadvertent mistakes, thus justifying a defence of innocent mistake.431 This has not 
been accepted, although the law allows mistakes made under the umbrella of qualified 
privilege to be protected because the occasion, not the publisher of the statement, deserves 
protection.432  However, as to simple inaccuracy, the media itself can improve its training and 
work ethics to reduce the incidence of this sort of problem, thus lowering the risk of 
defamation. The question of training is addressed directly below. If reasonable care is taken, 
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but a mistake still occurs, then the extended defence of qualified privilege now offers some 
protection which did not exist before in most common law jurisdictions, at least in relation to 
publication about political matters.433 
 
2.2 Training 
Fifty percent of all media respondents answered questions about training in defamation law. 
Of these, 71% had some kind of training. Therefore, it cannot be said that of those who 
responded to this question that there was a lack of training – in fact, the majority did get it.  
Yet at the same time, a significant proportion (nearly one-third – 29%) had no training at 
all.434 While the figure which did receive training is quite high, it is important to assess how it 
was broken down. Respondents could identify more than one form of training. The largest 
sub-group, nearly half (46%), had attended industry courses or seminars. This group was 
closely followed by 42% who had an actual qualification (legal or in journalism), or who had 
taken professional courses. The same proportion (42%) had had on-the-job training. This was 
a combination of ‘bush lawyering’ after building up years of experience, using books, and 
taking the advice of colleagues. Ten percent had received in-house training. It appears, 
therefore, that there was a fairly even spread between formal and informal training. (See Fig. 
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Looking at the data more closely, it seems that there was a high rate of training within 
broadcasting, particularly television. Eighty percent of television broadcasters who responded 
reported some sort of training within the organization and nearly 86% of the radio 
respondents had some sort of training. The group within print media with the highest rate of 
training was magazines, which reported that 100% of respondents had some form of training. 
Forty-two percent of these had a qualification or had attended professional training courses. 
Of the newspaper respondents, 75% indicated they had received some form of training. The 
group which appeared to have the lowest rate of training was book publishers. Fifty-eight 
percent had training and for 80% of these, it was informal (bush lawyering, on-the-job 
training, books).435   
 
A number of things might be surmised about this data. First, the provision or existence of 
training may reflect the levels of perceived risk within the industry. Therefore, nearly three 
quarters of those responding to this question apparently thought the risk of being sued in 
defamation was worth seeking training to avoid. By doing so, these media also reduced the 
actual risk. 
 
Second, the existence of training might also have an effect on how claims or threats are dealt 
with – lack of training or confidence about legal matters may encourage self-censorship, early 
settlement or capitulation to threats. However, self-censorship effects might in fact be 
cancelled out somewhat, in that lack of awareness of risk could result in artificial over-
confidence as to what is publishable. What might be inferred, then, about the almost a third of 
the media who had no training is that lack of training may not increase any chilling effect to 
any great degree. In any event, lack of training was reported by under a third of media. 
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2.3 Pre-publication procedures 
Eighty-eight percent (198) of all media respondents answered the question whether they had 
pre-publication procedures to prevent defamation arising. Of these, 88% (175) had some sort 
of procedures. (See Fig.  25  below). 
Fig. 25 






 Of those who had a procedure, 89% (156) checked facts, 67% (118) checked  visuals and 
captions, 66% (115) verified sources, 55% (97) consulted a lawyer (sometimes), 47% (83) 
obtained an alternative point of view, 17% (29) had a special agreement conferring liability on 
an independent party, and 1% (2) always consulted a lawyer. Nineteen percent (33) used a 
variety of other methods. (See Fig. 26  below). 
Fig. 26 




















Therefore, high numbers had some sort of pre-publication procedure. The most popular 
procedure was checking facts, followed by checking visuals and captions, and verifying 
sources. While it could be said these results point to the existence of a reasonably high 
consciousness of defamation risks, they also illustrate a simple understanding of the rules of 
good journalism, in which defamation is only one risk which can be countered by such 
procedures. 
 
2.3.1 Was the pre-publication procedure always followed? 
Media who had stated that they had pre-publication procedures were asked whether pre-
publication procedures were always followed. Forty-five percent (22) of newspapers 
answered ‘yes’ and nearly 48% (23) answered ‘no’. Six percent (3) did not answer. Of those 
who answered in the negative, 65% (15) gave lack of resources as a reason, 83% (19) referred 
to time constraints, 61% (14) trusted their employees to get it right, 44% (10) did not follow 
procedures when unable to get the other side of the story, 13% (3) when the material was of a 
kind the public should know about and 30% (7) gave other reasons, such as:  
 
• Subject of story dictates need or otherwise for checking detail. 
• Detailed verification not necessary in the majority of cases involving general 
news reporting. 
• Reporters/subs forget to send copy via an editor. 
• If I’m unable to verify something I tend not to publish it. I err on the side of 
caution. 
• Difficult when story is contributed. Cost of consulting a lawyer for a very small 
business. 
• Cost – legal vetting costs money and time. 
• My judgement. 
 
To the question whether the procedures they had used are always followed, two-thirds (4) of 
television broadcasters indicated ‘yes’, half (3) ‘no’, and one that procedures are not required 
for routine stories. The fact that the answers outnumber the respondents indicates that some 
responded both negatively and affirmatively. Therefore it appears that in the main, procedures 
are not always followed. This conclusion is borne out by the responses to the next question, 
which sought the reasons why a procedure might not be followed. All of the television 
broadcasters responded to this question. Two identified time constraints as relevant, two 
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trusted their employees, and two identified situations where they were unable to get the other 
side of the story. 
 
Seventy percent (14) of radio broadcasters who had them stated that pre-publication 
procedures were always followed, while 30% (6) said that they were not. Respondents were 
then asked to identify the reasons why procedures were not followed. Because some of the 
choices attracted more than six responses, it seems clear that more than 30% do not in fact 
always follow procedures. Sixty percent (12) cited time constraints as causing departure from 
checking procedures, 50% (10) referred to trusting their employees, a quarter (5) mentioned 
lack of resources, 15% (3) cited occasions when the material was such that the public should 
know about it, and the same number referred to being unable to get the other side of the story. 
 
Nearly 43% (9) of magazine respondents who had procedures always followed them, while 
57% (12) did not. Reasons given by the latter for not following procedures were: lack of 
resources (42% or 5), time constraints (75% or 9), employees trusted (41% or 5), the material 
is material that the public should know about (8% or 1), unable to get the other side of the 
story (8%) and misjudgement (8%). Nearly 17% (2) noted uncontroversial material did not 
require checking.   
 
Seventy-four percent (14) of publisher respondents stated that the procedure was always 
followed while 26% (5) said it was not. The reasons given here for not following procedure 
were lack of resources (16% or 3), time constraints (11% or 2), employees trusted (21% or 4), 
the material is material the public should know about (11% or 2), unable to get the other side 
of the story (5% or 1), and the nature of the book was harmless (11% or 2). 
 
To the question, ‘Is the procedure always followed?’, 39 of the ad agency and public relations 
firms answered yes and 16 answered ‘no’.436 Where the procedure was not followed, 31% (5) 
gave lack of resources as a reason, 44% (7) identified time constraints, a further 31% stated 
that their employees were trusted and 12.5% (2) stated that the material was of the sort that 
the public should know about. Nearly 69% (11) identified other reasons, which were 
illustrative of why this group of respondents did not report many difficulties with defamation 
generally: 
                                                          
436
  This number is 6 greater than those indicating they had a pre-publication procedure, which means that 6 
of these respondents who did not have such a procedure did not understand the question and should not have 
answered it. 
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• Defamation seldom (if ever) an issue 
• Reliance on ethics of clients 
•  Most information is technical and/or available as public information. 
We are indemnified under contract. 
• It is very rare in advertising that we do something defamatory 
intentionally or get sued so we don’t check that much. 
• Liability rests principally with client/appro – not agent 
• Our client has authorised publication and accepts liability for their 
claims 
 
To the question whether procedures were always followed, six of the journalist and writer 
respondents indicated ‘yes’, and two ‘no’. When asked for the reasons why a procedure might 
not be followed, one chose lack of resources, the fact that employees were trusted, that the 
material had a high public interest, that they were unable to get the other side of the story and 
that an opinion column did not require alternative points of view. Both respondents also 
identified time constraints as relevant. 
 
To the question whether procedures are always followed, two) multi-media respondents who 
had a procedure indicated ‘yes’, and four ‘no’. When asked for the reasons why a procedure 
might not be followed, one chose time constraints, two chose lack of resources, and all four 
noted that employees were trusted. 
 
One ISP stated the procedure was always followed. 
 
Unfortunately, the inconsistency of responses to this question indicates some confusion by 
respondents about the question. The results are therefore unreliable, and have not been 
summarised, but simply presented as returned by each media. 
 
2.3.2 Who had the final decision about whether material is published? 
All media were asked who had the final decision about whether material will be published or 
not. Some respondents nominated more than one party. Ninety-two percent (48) of 
newspapers answered the question. Of that number, 92% (44) stated that the editor made this 
decision, though 11% (5) of these would heed legal advice. Eight percent (4) stated such 
decisions rested with the manager, the executive director, clients or the owner. 
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All of the television broadcasters identified who had the final decision about whether material 
would be broadcast or not. Five identified the news editor or equivalent as having the last 
word. One respondent referred to the CEO as filling this function. 
 
Seventy-four percent (23) of radio broadcasters identified who has the final decision about 
whether material will be published or not. Twenty-six percent (6) of these identified the 
station manager as the final decision-maker, nearly 22% (5) identified the programme 
director, 17%( 4) identified the managing director or operations manager, nearly 9% (2) chose 
the CEO as the ultimate arbiter, with staff below taking initial decisions, the same number 
identified other categories, such as relevant staff members, and 17% (4) did not give clear 
answers. 
 
Ninety-six percent (25) of magazine respondents answered this question. Of that number, 
36% (9) nominated the editor, 12% (3) the director/manager, 24% (6) the publisher, 16% (4) 
were unclear and 12% (3) nominated the editor and publisher. 
 
Ninety-two percent (22) of publisher respondents answered the question who had the final say 
about whether publication would go ahead or not. Eighty-one percent (18) answered that it 
was the director/publisher, 9% (2) identified the managing editor or editor, 4.5% (1) chose the 
lawyer and the same number (1) chose the publisher/author. 
 
Eighty-eight percent (61) of ad agency and public relations firms respondents answered this 
question.  Forty-eight percent (29) of these respondents were advertising agencies and 52% 
(32) were public relations firms. In both groups, the largest group of respondents identified 
the client as being in control. Thirty-eight percent (11) of advertising agencies and 37% (12) 
public relations firms identified the CEO or boss as having the final say, 62%(18) advertising 
agencies and 47% (15) public relations firms selected the client, 10% (3) of advertising 
agencies and 12% (4) public relations firms named the media to whom the material was sent, 
and 16% (5) public relations firms identified lawyers.  
 
The question as to the final decision was answered by six journalist and writer respondents. 
Three identified themselves as having the final word, while five chose the editor of whatever 
publication they were working for. 
 103
 
The question was answered by six multi-media respondents. However, results were too 
unclear to be of use for this analysis. 
 
The question as to the final decision about publishing material was answered by one of ISP 
respondents. This party chose the Managing Director or the office administrator. 
 
2.3.3 Alteration of material 
Media were asked in what circumstances was material altered prior to publication and what 
sort of alterations were made? This question was asked to determine whether a chill factor 
might exist, and if so, what avoidance mechanisms were employed to deal with it.437 
Respondents could give more than one answer. Three-quarters of all media respondents 
answered this question, although the content of the replies was patchy. It can safely be said 
that the three common reasons given for alteration or deletion of material were factual 
accuracy and fairness (41%), legal advice (14%), and opinion (5%). What is also clear is that 
alterations appeared to be preferred over deletions, although this may not be so for live radio, 
and was less so for magazines and book publishers. 
 
The most interesting aspect of the newspaper responses was that well over half (59%) 
indicated that the general approach is to alter or amend doubtful material rather than delete it 
altogether, in order to preserve the story. The following statements are illustrative: 
 
• Material is frequently deleted or rewritten to minimise the risk. Sometimes this is 
on a lawyer’s recommendation but often it’s our own call. 
• If it is felt the story is important in terms of public interest but alternative comment 
is unable to be sourced or it is unable to be checked, the story would probably be 
toned down to ensure our legal safety (unless we were very sure it was okay to 
print as is) 
• We usually get our facts right. A good lawyer will say something like ‘say it that 
way and you are likely to get sued. Say it this way and you should be safe.’ The 
                                                          
437
  The McKay Committee researchers asked a different but related question: Have you excluded material 
from your [publication] because of the defamation laws which you felt would have been in the public interest to 
publish? Of the 55 members of the media which replied, nearly 80% answered ‘yes’: See above n 4, p 134. 
These results do not determine the prevalence of a practice of deletion, but simply that it occurred. The question 
included in my 2001 survey was intended to be more neutral and to determine the overall practices of the media 
in more detail.  
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object is to present the facts to the public. If there is a safer way to say the same 
thing – and there often is – they will use it 
• Defamatory statements that cannot be defended are edited out. Defamatory 
statements that cannot be held as honest opinion, or are potentially driven by 
malice are often unnecessary anyway. Smart writers can paraphrase and still 
retain impact. 
It appears rare that material will be expunged by newspapers altogether, and the only areas of 
difficulty which were identified were editorials and letters to the editor, which were cited by 
3% as more likely to be ‘dumped’, ‘abridged’ or ‘rejected’. 
 
For television, it was clear from the responses that editing occurs right up until the time of 
broadcast. Forty percent referred to the need for accuracy and fairness. However, one of the 
larger broadcasters also focussed on the need to comply with the standards of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority and identified the need for balance, and the requirements to 
respect privacy and avoid overly graphic material as justifying alteration prior to broadcast.  
 
For radio, the category creating the greatest difficulty was accuracy and fairness, with nearly 
42% making reference to these circumstances. News, police news in particular, was seen as 
problematic, as were commercials or material reflecting on businesses. Comment pieces were 
also seen as problematic. As with newspapers, it again seemed clear that radio broadcasters 
seek to amend rather than expunge material unless they have to. Forty-seven percent referred 
to editing material or amending or toning it down. Further, one response also identified the 
particular problems faced by this media in that considerable material can be broadcast live: 
• Potential defaming comments edited without changing context of program 
(pre-recorded) or delay unit used to dump material.  
 
Some of the radio pre-publication procedures may therefore be the result of a chilling effect 
arising from live radio broadcast. It is reasonable to assume not all of the material which is 
dumped because there is no time for legal ramifications to be tested actually justifies such a 
radical response. 
 
The most common responses as to when and how alterations are made to magazine 
publications prior to publication broke down into two categories, which were where the facts 
are wrong (36%), or opinion is too strong or unbalanced (27%). The responses indicated a 
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number of interesting things about the avoidance behaviour of magazines and whether a chill 
factor can be detected. The following responses are illustrative: 
 
• Sometimes comments were rephrased. Sometimes text was omitted altogether. Very 
careful with personal comments.  Often gave the other party a right of reply in that 
issue  or the next. (A small publication) 
• If the content is obviously a personal attack or upon contacting the other party it is 
obvious the author hasn’t researched properly – chances are we’d pull the story. 
(A small publication) 
• …feedback from sources and those asked to comment on the draft.  This process is 
very valuable as it usually elicits additional information from sources who would 
otherwise be loathe to comment; 2) legal advice. Usually minor changes – a word 
here, a word there. 
• If in doubt, leave it out.  So everything that’s really interesting gets left out. 
• …If the material is thought to be potentially defamatory. Statements such as “I 
believe” and “it is said” and so forth may be added to reiterate that the points 
made are the writer’s opinion. 
• …facts obviously wrong; advertising client very unhappy. It’s a balance between 
maintaining editorial credibility and advertising revenue. 
• If editor, manager believes he could successfully be sued or we are not serving our 
readers well, the offending words may be removed. 
• …  Material would be toned down if highly questionable or identities further 
‘masked.’ Happens rarely however. 
• If risk of consequent legal action is deemed to be high.  If potential legal action is 
not worth the fight due to insignificance of issue.  We edit / cut / amend copy. 
 
Once again, as with other media, the predominant approach appeared to be to ‘tone down’, 
rewrite and edit, before deleting material. However, it seems fair to say that smaller magazine 
publications were more inclined to delete or omit material than larger businesses which can 
afford legal advice as to how to safely re-word material. Furthermore, a particular problem 
identified for magazines generally is the conflict between maintaining the source of funding 
for publication, which is generally advertising, and telling stories which need to be told. 
Advertisers, in fact, have some control over general content in magazines. As noted in 
Chapter Two, this can be described as a commercial chill factor and appeared to be a 
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particular problem for smaller publications and those just entering the market. The magazine 
replies also revealed a strong awareness of the honest opinion defence, indicating it is still 
seen as valuable.  
  
The responses of book publisher respondents revealed that alterations happened quite often 
and especially if there was any doubt. Deletion occurred where facts were wrong and could 
not be checked (31%), and where statements were inflammatory (16%). However, in this 
group, alterations were made even if the material was low risk, if it was considered to be of 
little overall importance to the work. The larger publishers deleted or altered material if 
advised to by the lawyer, and made alterations as required, which ranged from changing or 
removing a single name to partial or total re-write. Sometimes, though more unusually, a 
manuscript might even be rejected and a contract terminated. It appeared that book publishers 
are quite risk averse, which is consistent with the increased financial risk they face from the 
possibility of injunction proceedings to prevent a book being published, or having to remove 
it from shelves if it has already been published. Therefore, risk for book publishers appears to 
be related to the high cost of producing their product. 
 
While 35% of advertising agencies and 23% of public relations firms altered material to 
correct inaccuracies, and 26% of the advertising agencies and 13% of the public relations 
firms advised that material was altered to avoid risk, some of the comments which 
accompanied these results demonstrated that advertising agencies were perhaps more willing 
to follow legal advice than public relations firms, and also illustrated the well-known divide 
between journalists and public relations professionals: 
• PR Firm Alter to satisfy – so done by negotiation. Will not accept dictation by legal 
advisor in most instances as counsel generally do not appreciate objectivity or 
subtlety of item 
• Ad agency Rarely altered. If legal complication inferred, it is not published 
• PR Firm News media put their own spin on material 
• PR Journalists often use press releases as a story idea. They call the subject then write 
their own story and it can be quite different to the press release. This can affect the 
subversive messages and change the story in favour of parties other than our clients 
 
A majority of the journalists and writers who responded to this question identified risky or 
unreliable material as being subject to alterations, while responses of the multi-media group 
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indicated little concern about the process. Four of the latter indicated that the need for 
accuracy was the most common incentive for alterations. However, the complete removal of 
material was seen as rare and a last resort. One ISP indicated that the only changes made prior 
to publication were minor.  
 
The commercial chill factor identified generally in the responses above is a significant reason 
why the media may pull stories of public interest or judge them not to be newsworthy at all. 
The data collected shows that magazines and smaller media businesses were very aware of it. 
Of course, newspapers and broadcasters also rely on advertising clients to fund their product, 
and must suffer similar effects as well. However, newspapers can resist such pressure to a 
degree because the focus of publication is generally on news rather than entertainment, and 
with this go the traditional methods of journalism and associated requirements of codes of 
practice – objectivity, fairness and balance. Broadcasting is subject to the BSA and its codes 
of practice which require objectivity, fairness and balance and it might be expected that 
advertising would not seriously affect programming content. Nonetheless, it is clear in that 
sector that with the increasing tabloidisation of broadcasting, there has been a blurring of the 
distinction between news coverage and advertising which the BSA at least, has found 
troublesome.438 This does not mean necessarily that stories are pulled because advertisers 
desire it, but that real news stories might be elbowed out by advertising posing as news 
stories.  
 
To summarise, these unfortunate effects downgrade the quality of news coverage, but cannot 
be described as a chill factor caused by operation of the law. Commercial chill is not the same 
as chill created by defamation law which is too strict or technical or just plain unjust. Again, 
the former has to be separated out from the latter. When this is done, the data shows that on 
the whole, the media looked to find ways to get the story told, if at all possible. Often, of 
course, this would involve costs associated with getting legal advice. Costs clearly, in 
themselves, create a chill factor, particularly for smaller media enterprises. Book publishers 
stand out as being risk averse because of the nature of their business, and magazines suffer a 
                                                          
438
  See BSA decision Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd (Pharmac) v Television New Zealand Ltd 
2000-082 which involved a complaint that a named drug was promoted on a  current affairs programme of the state 
broadcaster as being the cure for acne. The BSA did not have jurisdiction because the report did not fall into any 
balance category as it was not a political matter, did not report on any new development or elaborate on any current 
news, and did not deal with a question of a controversial nature, but simply provided information about a long-
standing treatment regime which was in most cases effective. Noting this technical obstacle to its jurisdiction, the 
Authority nevertheless signalled its concerns about programmes which deal with therapeutic products. 
 108
commercial chill arising from the juxtaposition of the industry reliance on advertising and the 
possibility of legal action. Radio faces problems associated with live broadcast.439 
 
2.4 Defamation insurance 
Media were asked if they had defamation insurance and if so, what form it took. Eighty-nine 
percent of all media respondents answered the question. A large majority (70%) had no 
defamation insurance, while about a third (30%) did have some sort of cover. Knowledge of 
the nature of cover by those who had it was not extensive.( See Fig. 27 below). 
Fig. 27 






Sixty percent of newspapers answering the question did not have such insurance. The 
majority of the 40% who answered in the affirmative were community newspapers and were, 
on the whole, very vague about the extent and conditions of cover. Half of the television 
broadcasters had defamation insurance and half did not. Fifty-seven percent of the radio 
broadcasters who responded did hold such insurance. Seventy-seven percent of magazine 
respondents did not have defamation insurance, whereas 23% did. Seventy percent of the 
publishers did not have defamation insurance. The 30% who did appeared to have a very good 
understanding of their cover. Seventy-one percent of the journalists and writers had no such 
insurance and 29% did, while 71% of the multi-media respondents had no such insurance and 
29% did. Only 12% of the public relations firms and ad agencies had cover, all but one being 
public relations firms. Neither ISP respondent had defamation insurance. 
 
                                                          
439
  These results are similar to those reported by Barendt et al, Libel and the Media: The Chilling Effect 
(1997), which noted the differential impact of the law on the different media sectors: 182. 
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These results are consistent with previous studies. In the Barendt study on the impact of 
defamation law on the mass media in the United Kingdom, the authors noted that many 
national newspapers did not take out libel insurance, and were therefore not influenced by 
insurance costs or the requirements of cover when deciding whether to settle or fight 
proceedings.440 When the matter was investigated previously in New Zealand in the period 
1970-1975, it was found the number of newspapers carrying defamation insurance dropped 
over the period, and that only a small number of magazines, radio and television stations 
carried such insurance.441 Comments made by the media as part of the current survey support 
this. A number of publisher respondents commented that insurance is too expensive, possibly 
because for most companies, insurance was US based and had ‘colossal premiums.’ One 
newspaper also commented that carrying insurance could threaten editorial autonomy and 
described a case where papers were joined in a defamation action over a syndicated column. 
Several of the editors were confident there was a winnable case and one worth fighting. 
However, two papers that had defamation insurance were pressured by their insurers to cut 
their losses and go for an out-of-court settlement. This was seen as an entirely pragmatic 
decision rather than a principled one, which placed no value on editorial freedom. In this case, 
insurance was seen to wreck the solidarity of the papers and induce the eventual settlement. 
 
Therefore, although it might be said that the media can reduce any chill created by defamation 
laws, if it exists, by holding defamation insurance, the survey revealed not only that such 
cover appears to be rare, but that there are good reasons for media not to carry defamation 
insurance. One reason is financial - premiums are expensive. However, two other reasons are 
themselves tactical responses to how to deal with the risk of defamation claims. Some media 
do not want to be constrained in dealing with threats or claims and therefore do not seek cover 
because insurance companies exercise power through the policy to influence how claims are 
dealt with. Other media wish to deflect claims before they arise, and believe that in openly 
refusing to hold such cover, they may bolster the image of the relevant publication as claims-
resistant and therefore unattractive to sue.442 These latter two approaches therefore mediate 
the lack of insurance and in fact indicate a robust, rather than an offhand, media approach to 
risk. 
 
                                                          
440
  Ibid, 183.  
441
  Recommendations on the Law of Defamation, Report of the Committee on Defamation, December 
1977, 18 and 139, Table P. 
442
  At least one of the business publications in my study in 2001 took this approach, and let it be known 
that no insurance was held and that flimsy claims would be fought or resisted. 
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2.5 Impact of decisions of regulatory bodies 
The final question on pre-publication procedures in the survey sought information on the 
influence of regulatory bodies on media behaviour. The relevant body for the print media is 
the Press Council and for the broadcast media, it is the Broadcasting Standards Authority.443 
The number of responses was disappointing as only just over a third (35%) of all media 
respondents answered this question. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of these said that the decisions 
of the relevant bodies did affect them and they attempted to take them into account. However, 
there were marked differences in these results as between the approach to the BSA and the 
Press Council.  
 
Almost all broadcasters who responded replied that the BSA did have an effect on them and 
their procedures. Answers in the negative only appeared in replies from the print media 
subject to Press Council regulation. Thus, not surprisingly, it appeared that the self-regulatory 
regime of the Press Council was not taken as seriously as the statutory, quasi-judicial code-
based system implemented by the BSA.  Just over a third (36%) (which included no 
broadcasters) thought regulatory bodies had no or little effect on pre-publication 
procedures.444 
 
Sixty-six percent of newspapers which responded indicated they tried to keep abreast of 
decisions of the self-regulatory Press Council, and to incorporate them into procedures where 
possible (although one response noted that staff sometimes have short memories). Twenty-
two percent stated that Press Council decisions had no effect on pre-publication procedures 
(the strongest comment being that: ‘They are so ‘slap on the wrist with a wet bus ticket’ as to 
be non-threatening.’) Twelve percent of responses indicated that Press Council decisions 
rarely or only sometimes affected pre-publication procedures. Therefore a third of newspapers 
which responded to this question thought that the decisions of the Press Council were of no or 
little effect. 
 
Only 19% of magazine respondents indicated that the decisions of the Press Council445 had 
any impact on pre-publication procedures. However, none of these mentioned the Press 
Council directly (though this was referred to in the question) and the replies indicated that it 
                                                          
443
  See the discussion of media regulation above, Chapter Two. 
444
  The responses from advertising agencies were not included in this summary, as these would skew the 
results because of the special regimes for regulation of that sector of the media. 
445
  Which might not have jurisdiction in any event, as its coverage is voluntarily adopted.  
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has no greater relevance than other legal requirements. The following responses are 
illustrative: 
 
• Not directly. But we are aware of debate and legal decisions which influence (and 
hone) our early warning system. 
• Yes but common sense and journalistic experience are considered more relevant.  
• No more than legal considerations. 
 
Six of journalist and writer respondents answered the question and half of these thought the 
decisions of regulatory bodies had little or no effect on them.  One comment is illustrative and 
picks out the Press Council  in particular: 
 
• The Press Council doesn’t affect me much, though I am familiar with the 
statement of principles. They are too vague to be of much use; I think my own 
ethical standards are much more vigorous. 
The other half of these journalist and writer respondents thought there was some impact from 
regulatory bodies, but one of these replies referred to the BSA, not the Press Council: 
 
• The broadcasting codes impact on me much more heavily (when I’m producing 
radio): and in particular the requirements for balance and fairness…. They’re 
inclined to make me go the extra mile to give people a full chance to respond – 
even in the marginal situations where they are not being criticised much or it is 
an opinion piece. 
Overall, the impact of the BSA seemed to weigh more with these respondents than that of the 
Press Council.  
 
A majority of television broadcasters responding to this question, including both of the largest 
television broadcasters, stated that the BSA is taken quite seriously, with one of the large 
broadcasters indicating that the BSA has more effect than defamation law, because its 
standards such as those relating to privacy, good taste, and decency are restrictive. The 
remaining two of these respondents always kept the BSA in mind, or looked at its decisions to 
see the ‘colour of current trends’. Therefore all of the television broadcasters who answered 
this question thought the BSA decisions had some serious effect.  
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While only about a third of radio broadcasters answered the question of the impact of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority on pre-publication procedures, all were aware of the 
regulatory body and took some notice of its decisions, even if only indirectly. Additionally, 
one broadcaster’s answer to the previous question about how and when material is altered 
prior to publication can be included in this category and is quite revealing:  
• Just once about 10 years ago the BSA upheld a complaint about a 
particular programme. For about 6 months we vetted the programme 
scripts and on some occasions altered them.  
 
Together with that response, nearly 40% of radio broadcasters responding took some notice of 
the complaints procedure and the decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority. 
 
Multi-media respondents could be affected by both the BSA and the Press Council. Four 
stated that the Press Council and BSA had little or no effect on their pre-publication 
procedures. (However, one of these respondents thought the BSA was a form of state-
censorship, indicating that while the form of regulation was rejected, it was regarded as too 
effective). One multi-media respondents answered yes, in that the decisions were monitored 
and procedures adjusted accordingly.446 
 
To summarise, it is not surprising that the regulatory bodies are regarded in this way. The 
degree of respect accorded each body appears to correlate to the power of sanction invested in 
each. The Press Council administers light-handed self-regulation and hence has the stated 
purpose of impacting as little as possible on the freedom of expression exercised by the print 
media. Conversely, although the BSA is required to take account of freedom of expression 
because of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, its power to override this where 
appropriate and its significant powers to penalise after broadcast have given it a high, and 
often negative, profile with some broadcasters. 
However, the response to this part of the survey, or rather, lack of response (two-thirds of 
media did not answer the question), is rather intriguing. The most logical reasons which might 
be put forward for this suggest a robust, rather than a cowered media.  It may be that the two-
thirds not responding knew little about the relevant bodies, or cared little about them, or 
                                                          
446
  As most of the publisher respondents were book publishers, who are not subject to special regulatory 
regimes, this question was not relevant to them and they did not answer it. The responses of ad agency and 
public relations firms respondents are not included in this analysis as there are a number of other regulatory 
bodies which have impact in this sector.  
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simply that they had no experience of them at all. These bodies did not appear to create any 
serious chill factor at all. Yet they could, of course, deal with complaints covering the same 




Respondents were asked to estimate how many threats of action (letters, phone calls etc, 
suggesting the media defendant had published defamatory material, or threatening a 
defamation suit, before any court documents have been filed) had been received in the last six 
years (1996 – 2001). This part of the survey also sought views of the media on whether 
threats were increasing, and what proportion of threats were regarded as serious. This part of 
the survey was intended to determine what the media thought happened in relation to threats. 
 
2.6.1 Number of threats 
Nearly half (48%) of all media respondents had received threats in the six year period. (See 
Fig. 28 below).  
Fig. 28 






The number reporting receipt of threats is less than that revealed in previous research by the 
McKay committee.447 That study found that for the four year period 1970-1974, two-thirds of  
the media responding to its survey had received threats during the period. For the separate 
year of 1975, the figure was 62%.  
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Of those reporting threats in the six year period covered by my survey, a large majority of 
over two-thirds (68%) received 1-5 threats. The next group of nearly 13% had received 6-10 
threats, while 8% had received 21-50, 7% had received 11-20, nearly 2% had received 51-
100, and nearly 2% had received greater than 100 threats in the six year period. (See Fig. 29 
below). 
Fig. 29 














2.6.2 Seriousness of threats 
Of those who answered the questions about threats, nearly half (46%) thought that only 1-10 
percent of threats were serious. Nineteen percent thought that no threats were serious. 
Therefore, most (nearly two-thirds) of these respondents thought that none or only up to 10 
percent of threats were serious. Only 10% thought that three-quarters to all threats were 
serious. Overall a large majority did not regard many threats as serious, while only 15% 
thought that half to all of threats were serious. (See Fig. 30 below). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
447
  See Recommendations on the Law of Defamation, Report of the Committee on Defamation, December 























2.6.3 Stability of threat rate 
Over half (52%) of all media respondents which gave information about threats thought the 
number of threats had remained the same over the relevant six year period. Over a quarter 
(28%) thought they had actually decreased. Only 13% thought the number of threats had 
increased. Seven percent did not answer the question or were unclear. It was the predominant 
view within individual media groups also that numbers of threats had remained the same. 
However, the largest group (of radio broadcasters) (44%) thought the numbers of threats had 
decreased, and equal numbers of magazine respondents (41%) thought the numbers had 
stayed the same or decreased. But overall, it appeared the number of threats was seen by 
almost all media responding as remaining consistent in the six year period under review. (See 




















2.6.4 Source of threats 
Nearly two-thirds (63%) of all media respondents who had received threats thought the party 
which made the most treats was ordinary individuals. The next largest group identified 
corporate bodies (28%), followed by the category designated ‘other’ (12%), which included 
iwi, lawyers, government departments and schools. Eight percent chose politicians, while 3% 
each chose celebrities, media or were unclear. (See Fig. 32  below). 
Fig. 32 


















In most cases, individual media respondent groups also identified ordinary individuals as the 
source of the greatest number of complaints (newspapers 74%, television broadcasters 75%, 
radio broadcasters 75%, publishers 60%, multi-media 50%, and ISPs 100%). However, the 
greatest number of magazines and advertising agencies and public relations firm respondents 
chose corporations (magazines 53%, advertising agencies and public relations firms 50%). 
This result reflects the special character of publication in those sectors, which features a 
greater proportion of reviews and discussion of company products and services. 
 
2.6.5 Were threats made through a lawyer? 
Nearly 40% of all media respondents answering questions about threats received stated that 
no threats were made through a lawyer, and the next largest group (19%) stated that only 1-10 
percent came from this formal source. Therefore, over half (59%) of all these respondents 
thought none or a very small proportion of threats were made in such a fashion. However, the 
next largest group (18%) stated that three-quarters to all of threats came via a lawyer. Seven 
percent (8) thought that 11-25 percent of threats came via a lawyer, while 6% stated the 
source of half to three-quarters of threats as being a lawyer. Five percent sourced between a 
quarter and a half of threats as coming from a lawyer. (See Fig. 33  below). 
Fig. 33 
















The picture that can be painted from this data is one where about half the media calculated 
that they received threats, averaging at least one a year. However, the majority who did 
receive threats thought that most of them are not serious and this was born out by the fact that 
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over half of the group stated threats were not made through lawyers. Most threats were 
thought to come from ordinary individuals, followed by corporates.  Most media did not think 
that the number of threats was increasing.448  
 
2.7 Actual experience of threats of action received 1996-2001 
Media respondents who reported receiving some threats were asked to attempt to return 
details of the actual threats of action they had received in the relevant period. This part of the 
survey was intended to determine what actually happened to these media in the context of 
threats. Details of a total of 177 threats were obtained.449  
 
2.7.1 Sources of threats 
The largest group of threats made to all media,  (46%), came from ordinary individuals, while 
26% came from organisations or corporate bodies, the source of 17% was unclear, 8% were 
from politicians (national or local) and 2% came from family groups. However, although 
threats from ordinary individuals dominated the results, it is significant that publishers 
received 35% of threats from corporate bodies, while magazines received an equal number of 
threats from organisations or corporate bodies, and individuals, with a third from each. This 
reflects the special character of magazines and publishers, which feature a significant 
proportion of published material about products and companies. (See Fig. 34 below). These 
reported factual results do bear out the opinion answers given previously by media as to 




                                                          
448
  The McKay Committee research cannot really be used for comparison of these results. That research 
did ask what number of threats were regarded by media solicitors as without merit, and what number of threats 
were regarded as being of a gagging nature.  However, the data was only collected for a period of a year – 1975, 
which is insufficient to disclose any pattern. It found that 51% of threats received were seen as likely to fail, and 
that 37% were regarded as being of a gagging nature. See Recommendations on the Law of Defamation, Report 
of the Committee on Defamation, December 1977, Appendix III, Table B, p 135. 
449
  It is unlikely all threats were detailed. Further, the data received on threats of action actually received 
by television broadcasters in a six year period was limited. The two major television broadcasters, TVNZ and 
TV3 Network, did not keep records of such threats. Details of four threats only were received from other 
television broadcasters, one received in 2000 and the balance in 2001. Because of the small number of such 
examples, the data on threats received relating to television is not significant in any way and is no more than 
interesting. However, the responses of television broadcasters giving views on receipt rates and nature of threats 
is reasonably representative. 
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2.7.2 Who received threats? 
Proportionally, more newspapers appeared to receive threats than other media.  Eighty-three 
percent of newspapers had received threats, while two-thirds of the television broadcasters 
had done so, followed closely by magazines (66%). Fifty-seven percent of the multi-media 
respondents had experienced threats, as had 52% of the radio respondents, and one of the 
ISPs. A little less than half of the publishers (42%), had experienced threats, followed by 18% 
of the advertising agencies and public relations firms, and only one of the journalists and 
writers had experienced threats. (See Fig. 35 below). 
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Fig. 35 
































































2.7.3 Rate of threats received 
Most media respondents reported receiving 1-5 threats (newspapers (63% or 27 received 1-5 
threats), radio (69% or 11), magazines (70% or 12), publishers (70% or 7), multi-media (two-
thirds or 3), ISPs (100% or 1). However, of the television respondents, 25% (1) reported 
receiving over 100 threats in the period, and a further 25% (1) reported receiving 21-50 
threats. This means half of the television respondents who answered the question how many 
threats were received had experienced 21 or more threats in the period, and three-quarters (3) 
had experienced 11 or more. Television therefore reported a higher rate of threats than other 
media, although this is not reflected in the reporting of actual details of threats referred to 
below, where few television respondents contributed. The single journalist and writer who 


























2.7.4 Numbers of threats detailed 
Details of a total of 177 threats were outlined by 108 media respondents. Numerically, 
newspapers detailed most threats (43%), followed by magazines (17%), radio (16%), 
publishers (11%), advertising agencies and public relations firms (5%), multi-media (3%), 
journalists and writers (2.5%), television (2%), and ISPs (.5%).  
2.7.5 Context of detailed threats 
In terms of context, 51% (3) of the newspaper threats arose from news or current affairs 
stories, by far the largest group. Eight percent (6) arose from court reports, the same figure 
arose from letters to the editor, while 3% (2) arose from each of criticism or review, and 
pictures/cartoon. One percent (1) arose from each of an editorial, and an advertisement. For 
24% (1) the context was unidentified. As to subject matter, the largest group (45% or 35) 
arose from material which contained allegations about business practices or professionalism. 
Fourteen percent (10) arose from politics (national or local), 7% (5) arose from inaccuracy, 
and 4% (3) from satire. For 31% (23) the subject matter was unidentified. 
 
The context of half (2) television threats was not disclosed. However, in one case, the alleged 
defamation arose from a chat show, and in the other from a news report. 
 
A significant number of threats (41% or 12 out of 29) made to radio respondents arose from 
news bulletin or current affairs programmes. Nearly a third (9) arose from spontaneous 
comment or live material. Ten percent (3) comprised a mixed category, arising from breach of 
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a suppression order, an advertisement and a fictitious programme. Seventeen percent (5) did 
not give details of the source of complaint.  
 
As to context of the magazine threats, 47% (14) arose from articles dealing with current 
issues, and 3% (1) each from a letter to the editor, and a photo/cartoon. For 40% (12) the 
context was unidentified. As to subject matter, 23%(7) concerned products or business 
matters, 13% (4) arose from inaccuracy, 7%(2) from satire. For 57% (17) the subject matter 
was not identified. 
 
Information detailed about the context of the publisher complaints was limited. Over a third of 
threats (35% or 7) arose from books, while 10% (2) arose from editorial material, and 10% 
from articles. However, the context of 45% (9) threats made to publishers was unclear. As to 
subject matter, 20% (4) threats arose from information about products, and the same figure 
arose from inaccuracy. The subject matter of 60% (12) of the threats was unclear. 
 
Forty-two percent (3) of the advertising agency and public relations firms threats arose from 
promotional or publicity materials. Twenty-nine percent (2) arose from articles and the 
context of 29% were unclear.  
 
As to context, 60% (3) of the threats made to journalists and writers arose from criticism or 
review, 20% (1) from current affairs and 20% from talkback. As to subject matter, 60% (3) 
arose from allegations relating to business or professionalism, and 40% (2) from politics. 
 
Contextual data for multi-media respondents was again somewhat limited. One third (2) of 
threats arose from news or current affairs, and 17% (1) each from a letter, a breach of 
suppression order, and a book. The context of the remaining threat was unclear.  
 
The threat made to the ISP was about a SPAM listing on the ISP website which included the 
complainant’s name and email address. 
 
Although the contextual material is somewhat sketchy, it can be summarised in a limited 
fashion. The largest number of detailed threats for these media (42% or 72) arose in the 
context of general news, current affairs or documentary publication. Six percent (11) arose 
from talkback or live shows, and 5% (8) arose from each of letters to the editor, and books. 
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Three percent (6) arose in the context of each of court reporting, criticism or review, and 
editorial material. Two percent (3) arose in each of pictorial/cartoon, and promotional 
material contexts. One percent (2) arose from advertising material. The context of 34% (61) 
threats was unclear. (See Fig. 37 below). 
Fig. 37 























2.7.6 Impact of legal advice on detailed threats 
Legal advice was sought in relation to 42% of reported threats, and was not sought in relation 
to 43% of threats. Therefore, legal advice was sought almost as often as it was not. It was 
unclear whether legal advice was sought in 15% threats. Although the results were distributed 
almost evenly, two groups of media respondents stand out as not tending to seek legal advice. 
Radio respondents did not seek legal advice in relation to 59% of detailed threats, while 
advertising agencies and public relations firms did not seek such advice in relation to 62% of 
the detailed complaints. This may be because these respondents attempt to deal with threats in 
informal and innovative ways, or because they receive less serious threats, or a combination 
of both. In contrast to radio and advertising agencies and public relations firms, the journalist 
who detailed threats sought legal advice on 80% of the threats received.  
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2.7.7 Desired outcome in detailed threats 
The most common remedy sought in all of the threats was an apology, which was sought in 
over half of threats (58%).451 The next most common remedies sought were damages and 
retraction, which were both sought in a third of all threats. Correction was claimed in 29% of 
all threats, followed by destruction/prevention of publication (13%). Withdrawal of 
publication, right of reply and free advertising was claimed in .6% of all threats. The remedy 
sought fell into a varied ‘other’ category for 8% of threatening letters. (See Fig. 38 below). 
Fig. 38 






















































The fact that an apology was the most common remedy sought is in contrast to the data for 
filed claims which is discussed below. This is explicable, as few claimants would proceed to 
court if the main remedy sought is simply an apology. It appears threatening letters are 
intended to achieve quick, inexpensive outcomes. This may also indicate that threatening 
letters do not have an unacceptable chilling effect, and that few, if any, are intended to be 
gagging letters, but rather, seek genuine and realistic outcomes. 
 
Damages were still sought in a third of threats, however. Levels were identified in only 18% 
of these, five cases being claims against news media, in this case, newspapers.  See Table 1.    
below. 
                                                          
451




Levels of damages sought in threatening letters 
1996-2001 
Figure claimed Defendant 
1.$ 600 Newspaper 
2. $5,000 Newspaper 
3-4. $10,000 Newspaper, Magazine 
5. $20,000 Magazine 
6. $30,000 Magazine 
7. 50,000 Newspaper 
8.-9. $100,000 Publisher, Multi-media 
10. $300,000 Magazine 
11. $2 million Newspaper 
 
In about 45% of the threats represented on the table above, the damages sought appear to be 
unrealistically high. However, more importantly, in most cases (82%) where damages were 
claimed, the amount was unspecified. This in itself could have a chilling effect. However, the 
general comments attaching to these responses did not indicate greater concern where 
damages were not specified – in some cases, they indicated the threat was taken less seriously, 
because it was seen, for example, as unfocussed and vague. Furthermore, the data detailed 
below indicates that damages were actually paid in few cases in response to threats. 
 
2.7.8 Outcome of detailed threats 
The outcome of threats against newspapers was distributed remarkably evenly between 
outcomes in which the newspaper settled or made a concession, and where the newspaper 
resisted or ignored the complaint and heard no more. Forty-nine percent (36) of complaints 
resulted in a settlement or some other concession by the newspaper, but the same number 
were ignored or resisted and went away. Two percent (2) had unclear outcomes. Thus 
newspapers appear to successfully resist threats of legal action about half of the time. 
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Of the 36 newspaper threats which resulted in a settlement or concession by the newspaper, 
half (18) resulted in an apology, while 28% (10) resulted in a correction, 19% (7) resulted in a 
retraction, 11% (4) resulted in damages and the same number in right of reply or a 
clarification, 3% (1) resulted in an article being censored and 3% in a settlement.(A number of 
threats resulted in more than one of these concessions being made).  
 
Newspaper editors were asked why threats were met by concessions (and could identify more 
than one answer). Thirty-eight percent (14) replied that the other party was correct, 28%(10) 
stated that they were advised to settle by a lawyer, 8% (3) noted that they could not afford to 
fight the matter because they were a small enterprise, and nearly 6% (2) stated that although 
they knew they were right, they could not prove it. Eight and a half percent (3) gave other 
reasons, including that the remedy was an opportunity to make the complainant look stupid!  
 
The newspaper figures point to a practice of ignoring or rejecting what are seen as idle threats 
in the first instance, and a strategy of resisting more serious matters as long as practicalities 
will allow. Only smaller media enterprises seem to be in a weak and vulnerable position, 
consistent with other risk factors faced by such businesses.  
 
In the case of television, three-quarters of the threats (3) were not pursued and the television 
broadcaster heard no more. The other threat resulted in a correction and retraction being 
given. However, the broadcaster in this case noted that it settled the matter because although it 
knew it was right, it could not prove it. 
 
As to outcome for radio respondents, 52% (15) resulted in some sort of settlement or 
concession, nearly 45% (13 out of 29), were ignored or resisted by the radio station and not 
pursued and 3% (1) was still pending. Of the threats which resulted in a concession, 87% (13) 
resulted in an apology, 47% (7) resulted in a correction, 20% (3) resulted in a letter of 
explanation, and 7% (1) produced a retraction. The BSA featured in nearly a quarter (7) of the 
radio threat case histories. The complaint was upheld in nearly 29% (2) of these, and rejected 
in nearly 43% (3). In one further case, a party was advised of their rights in relation to the 
BSA, and in the other, wanted to hold open their right to complain to the BSA but this was 
rejected by the radio broadcaster. 
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Half of the total magazine complaints (15) resulted in some sort of concession by the 
magazine, while the other half did not proceed. The settlements or concessions resulted in an 
apology (47% or 7), a letter of explanation ( 20% or 3), damages (13% or 2), correction (27% 
or 4), reply or retraction (each 13% or 2), free advertising (20% or 3) and holding the 
publication for a time (7% or 1).  It appears that the provision of free advertising as a remedy 
is not uncommon. This emphasises and confirms the point made by some respondents that 
magazines, in particular small magazines, are dependant on advertising for revenue. It is 
reasonable to conclude therefore, that advertisers potentially have a chilling effect on the 
content of magazines. 
 
Three-quarters (75%) of the publisher threats did not proceed following either rejection or 
lack of acknowledgment. Fifteen percent (3) resulted in an alteration or correction, 5% (1) in 
an apology and in 5% the outcome was unclear. This high rate of abandonment of complaints 
is in contrast to the high rate of successful plaintiffs who issued statements of claim against 
publishers, detailed below. It implies that the complaints were not in fact serious, and that 
serious complaints perhaps begin life as statements of claim where publishers are concerned. 
 
Sixty-two percent (5) of the threats to advertising agencies and public relations consultants 
were ignored or resisted and the firm heard no more. Of the thirty-seven percent (3) in which 
concessions were made, all of the threats (3) resulted in an apology, and the same figure 
resulted in a letter of explanation being sent. One-third (1) threat resulted in withdrawal and 
destruction of the publication. It is significant that although more threats were received by 
public relations firms, only one-fifth of these resulted in any sort of remedy, an explanation 
and apology, which was not the correction and retraction sought. Yet two-thirds of the threats 
made to advertising agencies resulted in remedies which were close to those sought. 
 
As to outcomes for the journalist who received threats, of the five threats, the majority (3) 
came to nothing, one resulted in a mild compromise by the journalist’s employer and the other 
resulted in free advertising and an apology by the publisher of the journalist’s comments. 
Thus, the journalist resisted the threats in the majority of cases.  
 
For multi-media, of the six threats, the majority (4) came to nothing, one resulted in a right of 
reply being printed, and one resulted in an apology and destruction of a particular page. Thus, 
the multi-media respondents defied the threats in the majority of cases.  
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The ISP did give an apology and sent a letter of explanation in relation to the single threat 
detailed. The ISP settled the matter in this way because it could not afford to fight the matter 
in court, could not prove it was right and could not afford lawyer’s fees. 
 
When the reported outcomes are analysed, it is apparent that of the total 177 threats reported 
by all media in the period 1996-2001, over half (53%) were ignored or resisted and nothing 
more was heard. Forty-five percent resulted in a settlement or concession of some kind by the 
media. Two percent of the threats had an unclear outcome or were still pending.  Therefore, 












For the 79 threats which were settled or which resulted in some sort of concession, the most 
common outcome was an apology, which was made in relation to 57% of these threats. The 
next most common concession was a correction, which was a remedy in 32% of these threats, 
followed by retraction, conceded in 14% threats. Reply or clarification was allowed in 9% 
threats and the same proportion resulted in a letter of explanation, while damages were paid in 
response to only 8% of threats. Free advertising was given in relation to 5% of threats, 
withdrawal or destruction of the publication resulted from 3% of threats and material was 
censored in relation to 1% of threats. Three percent of responses to threats fell in a unique 
‘other’ category. (See Fig. 40 below). 
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Fig. 40 

























































Levels of damages paid were detailed in relation to 5 threats only and on the whole were very 
low when compared to the levels sought as detailed above. In only two cases did the amount 
claimed and the amount paid coincide.452 (See Table 2. below).  
Table 2. 
 
Levels of damages paid in response to threats,  
1996 - 2001 
 
Figure Media 
1. $600* Newspaper 
 2. $2,000 Magazine 
 3. $5,000* Newspaper 
 4. $7,500 Newspaper 
  5. $10,000 Newspaper 
 
 
It seems, therefore, that the most common remedy both sought and granted in relation to 
threats was the apology. However, while damages were sought in a third of threatening letters, 
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and were in fact, the second most sought-after remedy, they were part of the actual outcome 
in only 8% of the threats. Generally, outcomes show a low-level and creative response to 
threats, and treatment of them as part of the daily routine of the newspaper or whatever media 
was involved.  
 
Some details about costs associated with threats were returned in relation to a small number 
(nearly 6%) of all threats. Sixty percent of these were newspapers and 40% were magazines. 
The levels detailed are presented in the table below. (See Table 3).453 While this data is sparse 
and of interest only, it shows that costs in relation to threats do not appear to be high. This is 
consistent with the data presented above.  
Table 3. 
Nature and levels of costs – all threats 1996-2001 
 
Media defendant Costs paid –Plaintiffs Costs paid - 
Defendants 
Unclear 
1. Magazine  $3,500  
2. Magazine   X 
3. Magazine $450   
4. Magazine $2,000   
5. Newspaper $500   
6. Newspaper $750 $750  
7. Newspaper $5,000 $2,000  
8. Newspaper $500   
9. Newspaper $3,000 $1600  
10. Newspaper $2,500   
 
2.8 Actual experience of defamation statements of claim (writs) 1996 – 2001 
This part of the survey sought detailed information about actual experience of statements of 
claims (previously called writs) filed against media defendants in the years 1996-2001. The 
section which follows details and analyses the responses received.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
452
  These are shown by an asterisk on the table. 
453
  This Table does not include free advertising, included on p. 129 above, which could be seen as a cost. 
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2.8.1 Incidence of claims 
Ninety percent (47) newspapers answered the question seeking information about the 
incidence of claims. Twenty-one percent (10) of these newspapers reported having a 
defamation action filed against the editor or organisation in a court in New Zealand in the six 
year period. Seventy-nine percent (37) had not. Ten percent (5) did not answer the question. 
Of those which reported actions filed,  20% (2) indicated that one writ had been issued, and 
70% (7) had had 2-5 writs issued. One newspaper did not answer this question. 
 
All of the television broadcasters answered this question. Half (3) indicated they had had a 
defamation action filed against the organisation in a court in New Zealand in the last six 
years. These three were the larger players in this market. Of these, one-third (1) reported one 
writ issued in that period, and two-thirds (2) had had 10 to 20 writs issued. 
 
Nearly 68% (20) of the radio broadcasters answered the question whether they had had a 
defamation writ filed against them in the last six years. Nearly 85% of this number (17) had 
not. Of the 15% (3) who had had a writ filed against them, one indicated one writ had been 
filed, one had received 2 to 5 writs, and one had had 5-10 writs issued in the relevant time 
period.  
 
All of the magazine respondents answered the question. Seventy-seven percent (20) had not 
had a defamation writ filed against them in the period 1996-2001, while 23% (6) had. Two-
thirds (4) of the latter had had 1 writ filed during that period, and one-third (2) had had 2 to 5 
writs filed against them. 
 
All of the book publishers answered the question. Twelve and a half percent (3) had had a 
defamation writ filed against them in the last six years while 87.5% (21) had not. Two-thirds 
(2) of those who answered in the affirmative indicated that only one writ had been filed. The 
remaining third (1) stated that 2-5 writs had been filed in that time.  
 
Ninety-seven percent (66) of ad agency and public relations firms respondents answered the 
question whether they had had a defamation writ filed against them in a court in New Zealand 
in the six years between 1996 and 2001. However, none had had such a writ filed against 
them, bearing out the general picture revealed in the previous data that defamation is not a 
major concern to either group. 
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Eight of journalist and writer respondents answered the question seeking information on their 
actual experience of defamation writs or claims. The majority (7) of these had not had a claim 
filed against them, but one had. This individual indicated that one writ had been filed in the 
relevant six year period.  
 
None of the multi-media respondents had had a claim filed against them. Neither of the ISP 
respondents had had a claim filed against them.  
 
Therefore, 12% (26) of all the media respondents had actual experience of a claim or claims 
being filed against them in the six-year period. (See Fig.41 below). 
Fig. 41 






2.8.2 Source of filed claims 
Of the total claims filed against newspapers, 79% (15) were filed by individuals, and 21% (4) 
by corporates. In 80% (12) of the reported actions filed against television broadcasters, the 
plaintiff was an individual. Two cases (12.5%) involved corporate plaintiffs and one report 
did not give details of the plaintiff. Over half (4) of the claims against radio broadcasters 
involved individual plaintiffs who were public figures or celebrities. Nearly 29% (2) involved 
plaintiffs who were ordinary individuals, and 14% (1) claim was filed by a corporate. Three-
quarters of the claims against magazines (3) were filed by individuals, while for the remaining 
action this was unclear. Three of the claims against book publishers came from individuals 
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and one was filed by both an individual and a corporate. The one claim against the writer was 
from an individual. 
Therefore, of the total number of 50 claims filed against all media, by far the largest majority, 
(74% or 37) were filed by ordinary individuals. The next most common plaintiff was 
corporates (16% or 8), followed by celebrities or public figures (8% or 4). Four percent (2) of 
plaintiffs were unclear.454  (See Fig. 42 below). 
Fig. 42       



















2.8.3 Defendants in filed claims  
Fifty claims in all were detailed by a total group of 12% (26) media respondents. Thirty-eight 
percent (19) of these were detailed by newspapers, 30% (15) by television respondents, 14% 
(7) by radio, 8% (4) by each of magazines and publishers, and 2% (1) by a journalist and 
writer. (See Fig. 43 below). 
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Therefore, numerically overall more claims were actually detailed by newspapers (38% or 
19). However, as with threats,455 the situation is more complex than this for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is unlikely media respondents actually detailed all the claims they experienced. 
Secondly, when asked general questions about receiving claims without requiring detail of 
those claims,  more television broadcasters reported experiencing claims because half (3) of 
them reported experiencing claims of some sort, while 23% (6) magazines did so, 19% (10) 
newspapers, 15% (3) radio respondents, one journalist and writer and 12.5% (3) publishers. 








                                                          
455
 See pp 119-120 above. 
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Fig. 44 
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2.8.4 Rate of claims 
As to number of writs, one journalist and writer said they received one writ, followed by two-
thirds of magazines and book publishers. One-third of each of radio and television 
broadcasters reported receiving one writ and so did 20% of newspapers. Most of the 
newspapers (70%) experienced 2-5 writs and two-thirds of each of radio broadcasters, 
magazines and book publishers experienced the same number of writs. One third of radio 
respondents experienced 5-10 writs in the period. However, a majority of television 
respondents (two-thirds) experienced the largest number of writs, 10-20.  This means it 
appears television reported the largest incidence of claims, although numerically, newspapers 








Fig.  45 











































Ten percent (2) of the 19 actions against newspapers involved politics - two actions were 
brought by local body councillors. A further 9% (2) were actions brought by a lawyer and a 
law firm respectively. These are both categories of plaintiff which have been noted as 
prominent in defamation actions. Ten percent (2) of the 19 actions were applications for 
injunctions to prevent publication of court documents, and of a disciplinary report. Ninety-
four percent (18) involved written material, one being a television review, one being a letter to 
the editor, and the balance being general news articles.  Four percent, or one action was based 
on a cartoon, a rare category, but one which can be successfully pursued if any satire defence 
is overcome. Seventy-four percent (14) of the alleged defamatory statements went to matters 
which affected business or professional reputation. This reflects the fact that defamation is an 
expensive tort to pursue, in which damage to the pocket or ability to fill the pocket in the 
future features strongly as an incentive to plaintiffs. In 15% (3) of the actions, the alleged 
defamation arose from allegations of criminal behaviour. In these cases, the defendant 
newspaper would have a higher burden of proof in establishing truth. Ten percent (2) of the 
actions arose from breach of suppression orders.  
 
Thirteen percent (2) of the 15 actions against television broadcasters involved national politics 
as the plaintiff was a Member of Parliament. The other cases involving individuals (83% or 
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10) concerned their professional capacity. One-third of the television actions (5) related to 
allegations of criminal behaviour. One third of the actions (5) arose from news stories, nearly 
27% (4) arose from consumer programmes, and 40% (6) from current affairs programmes or 
documentaries. 
 
The context of the 7 filed claims against radio broadcasters bears out the categories identified 
by radio broadcasters as risky.456 Seventy-one percent (5) of the writs arose out of news 
reports, or current affairs. One writ (14%) arose from talkback, and one had an unidentified 
context. Over half of these writs (4) had an element of live broadcast. 
 
Three-quarters (3) of the magazine actions arose from an editorial or opinion piece, and one-
quarter (1) arose from inaccuracy. One claim of the four claims against publishers arose 
because the plaintiff’s professional integrity was allegedly damaged, one individual alleged a 
biography contained defamatory material, one individual alleged his or her actions were 
misrepresented and the final matter arose from a book with was said to defame a company 
and an individual. The context of the claim against the writer was unclear. 
 
The majority of all the claims (64% or 32) therefore arose in the context of general news, 
current affairs or documentaries. Eight percent (4) arose from consumer articles or items, 6% 
(3) from an editorial context, 4% (2) from court reporting, each of 2% (1) from letters to the 
editor, criticism or review, pictorial/cartoon, and talkback. Ten percent (5) were unidentified. 
(See Fig. 46 below.) 
                                                          
456
  See p 95 above. 
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Fig.46 


















The subject matter of the allegation was identified in half of the claims. Thirty percent (15) of 
the claims arose from allegations affecting business or professional status, while 8% (4) each 
arose from politics and inaccuracy. Four percent (2) of claims arose from discussion of the 
law. In the other half of the claims, the subject matter was not specifically identified. 
 
2.8.6 Remedies sought in detailed court claims 
Damages were claimed in 63 % (12) of the newspaper claims, an apology in 16% (3), 
declaration and retraction in 5% (1) of the claims each, an injunction in nearly 11%(2) and 
summary judgment (on the basis of a statement of error and costs) in 5%(1). Sixteen percent 
(3) did not detail what remedies were claimed. 
 
Two-thirds of the actions against television broadcasters (10) sought damages. One writ 
sought a declaration, and in the remaining four cases, no details of the remedy sought were 
given. In six (60%) of the actions seeking damages, the amount was unspecified, but in one of 
those cases, an apology was also sought. In the four cases (40%) where damages were 
specified, these ranged from $1million, $800,000, $475,000 to $250,000. 
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In only one claim filed against radio broadcasters were details of the remedies claimed given 
– in this case, damages of $100,000, an apology and a correction. The matter was actually 
settled by payment of the plaintiff’s costs, although costs to the broadcaster were not 
insignificant. 
 
Damages were the most commonly claimed remedy, being sought in 100% (4) of the claims 
made against magazines, in one quarter (1) of cases alone, in 1 together with an apology, in 1 
together with a retraction and in another together with costs, a correction and an apology. 
Levels of damages claimed were known in half of these cases (2) and were very high, being 
$7.5 million and $300,000.  
 
Remedies sought against book publishers were significant. Damages were sought in all 4 
cases, in three cases together with an apology. Damages sought were also significant, being 
$50,000, $250,000, $450,000 and $700,000. In two cases, injunctive remedies were also 
sought, being withdrawal of a book in one case and a permanent injunction in another. Two 
claims also sought costs, one of these also sought interest. The claim against the writer sought 
damages of $130,000. 
 
Therefore, the most common remedy sought in the total of 50 claims was damages, which 
were sought in 74% (32) claims. The next remedy most commonly sought was an apology, 
which was sought in 20% (10) claims, then injunction (8% or 4), followed by declaration 
(nearly 6% or 3), correction (4% or 2) and retraction (4% or 2). In 20% (10) cases, the remedy 
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Seventy-two percent (23) of the claims where damages were sought were filed against news 
media defendants. Section 43 of the Defamation Act 1992 requires that the amount of 
damages claimed not be specified on the statement of claim where the defendant is a news 
media defendant. It would be reasonable to expect that the level of damages would therefore 
be unknown by the defendant in these claims. However, in over half of the claims against 
news media defendants, (57% or 13), the level of damages claimed was somehow known in 
spite of the legislative provision. It is possible that the information was disclosed through 
prior correspondence or negotiations, or by mistake (one lawyer who took part in the lawyer 
survey457 identified a claim against a news media defendant in which the level of damages 
sought was detailed because the plaintiff was unrepresented and had disclosed the figure 
claimed when filing the papers.)  
These results suggest that clear breaches of s 43 have occurred. What might follow from this? 
The primary mischief addressed by s 43 has received judicial attention since the media survey 
was carried out. It is clear that breach may not result in an automatic stay of proceedings or 
indeed any serious sanction, unless the breach was deliberate. In Hubbard v Fourth Estate 
                                                          
457
   See Chapter Seven, below. 
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Holdings Ltd,458 the High Court confirmed that the rationale for the provision is to ensure that 
unrealistically large sums of damages are not specified for purposes of intimidation of a 
media defendant – in other words, to prevent gagging writs.459 In Hubbard, the plaintiff was a 
public figure engaged in campaigning for the Mayoralty of Auckland, when a business 
magazine attacked his integrity in a robust article. The court accepted that the plaintiff issued 
genuine proceedings, but had breached s 43 by filing a statement of claim which specified the 
level of damages at $1.5million. The plaintiff went on to refer to the level of damages claimed 
in later public statements and to the merits of his claim. The court accepted that the figure was 
detailed in the claim due to an error rather than by way of deliberate breach. Further, 
immediately the matter was drawn to the attention of the plaintiff and his advisers the error 
was acknowledged and an amended claim was filed within a matter of days. The breach of s 
43 and the plaintiff's public comments were therefore found to be due to inadvertence and 
lack of appreciation of the law. Mr Hubbard also apologised and his counsel apologised to the 
court. Because of this and because there was no evidence the defendant was actually 
intimidated by the specified claim, the Court refused to stay proceedings. However, costs lay 
where they fell because the plaintiff’s behaviour had invited the application.460 
Not only may inadvertent breach of s 43 be excused, but the effectiveness of the section 
generally is limited because there is nothing to prevent counsel or any party referring to the 
amount pursued orally during the hearing itself.461 Further, in Hubbard, the Court pointed out 
that a plaintiff might create future tactical difficulties by referring to the amount of damages 
claimed.462 It is likely, then, that the effectiveness of s 43 in preventing a form of chill known 
as the gagging writ is limited, and further, that the courts do not consider inadvertent breach 
of the provision to be particularly serious. It will also be seen below that the limited 
information collected from defamation lawyers suggests the incidence of gagging writs is not 
high in any event.463 
Levels of damages were detailed in 62% (29) of the claims in which damages were sought. 
The lowest figure claimed was $2,000, sought from a newspaper. The highest claim was 
$7.5million, made against a magazine defendant. The table below shows clearly that the 
                                                          
458
  Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CIV-2004-404-5152, 16 February 2005, Venning J. 
459
  Ibid, [32]-[33]. 
460
  Ibid, [56]. The possibility of alternative contempt proceedings was not ruled out: [57]. 
461
  Ibid, [[37]. See also J Burrows and U Cheer, Media Law in New Zealand (2005, 5th ed), 73.  
462
  Hubbard v Fourth Estate Holdings Ltd, Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CIV-2004-404-5152, 16 
February 2005, [37]. 
463
  See Chapter Seven below. 
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larger figures were claimed against television broadcasters, publishers and magazines. (See 
Table 4 below).     
Table 4. 
Levels of damages claimed – all media 1996-2001 
Claims Defendant Claims Defendant 
1. $2,000 Newspaper 11-12. $250,000 TV, Publisher 
2. $40,000 Newspaper 13. $300,000 Magazine 
3. $50,000 Publisher 14. $450,000 Publisher 
4. $80,000 Newspaper 15. $475,000 TV 
5-7. $100,000 Newspaper x2  
Radio 
16. $700,000 Publisher 
8. $120,000 Newspaper 17. $800,000 TV 
9. $130,000 Writer 18-19. $1million TV, Newspaper 
10. $200,000 Newspaper 20. $7.5million Magazine 
 
2.8.7 Outcomes in detailed court claims 
In 16% (3) newspaper cases, the newspaper fought the matter to a full hearing and won. In 
one of these cases the reason given for fighting the matter to trial was that due care was taken 
and the case was winnable. In the other two such cases, no reasons were given. In nearly 11% 
(2) cases, the newspaper fought the matter to a full hearing and lost. In one of these cases, the 
reason for fighting the matter was that the story was true. No reason was given in the other 
such case. These two cases thus lost resulted in an interim injunction in one action and an 
apology, correction and damages orders in the other. In nearly 16% (3) of cases the matter 
was settled prior to a final hearing. In 16% (3) of cases, the matter was abandoned, in one case 
after an apology, in one case the parties bore their own costs and in one case, the newspaper 
appeared to have been dropped from the proceedings. Forty-two percent (8) of actions were 
still pending.  
 
Forms of settlement varied for newspapers. Two cases were settled with an apology, damages 
and costs, one with costs and a ‘clarification’ (correction), one with an apology and costs, and 
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one was a mediated settlement in which the newspaper agreed to publish an article in response 
and to pay the costs of the mediation. The following reasons were given for settling or 
agreeing to abandon: 
• Legal advice was to settle. The settlement occurred three years after the claim. 
• Because the government would pay legal bills – we couldn’t compete against the New 
Zealand treasury. 
• It was costing too much at interlocutory stage. The truth wasn’t important enough to 
justify cost. 
• Expedient. 
• Strong defences in this instance but the newspaper will not generally incur costs of trial 
most of which will not be recoverable, if settlement can be reached without admission of 
liability. 
• To avoid court proceedings we were not confident of winning. 
• Legal advice was that the case was unwinnable. The [person] had been defamed. There 
was no defence. 
• Legal advice. 
The pattern of settlement or abandonment for newspaper claims demonstrates a pragmatic 
concern to avoid costs, perhaps even more than damages. Secondly, there appears to be a 
desire to admit no more liability than is absolutely necessary. Further, there appears to be 
openness to forms of negotiation which will facilitate settlement. 
 
In nearly 47% (7) of claims against television broadcasters, the matter was not yet resolved 
and interlocutory proceedings were taking place. Of the balance, four actions (half) were 
abandoned, while three resulted in summary judgment in favour of the defendant based on a 
statutory qualified privilege defence, and a further action was struck out. The results show 
that the television broadcasters had not lost any of the actions which had been completed. 
This would place the focus for such broadcasters on liability for costs rather than damages. 
Little information was forthcoming about overall costs. However, in two of the outstanding 
cases, the television broadcaster noted that costs of $60,000 and $150,000 respectively had so 
far been incurred, not insignificant amounts. 
 
In 71% (5) of the claims against radio broadcasters, the matter was settled. The remaining two 
cases were unresolved at the time the survey was completed, and therefore were still being 
fought.  In 80% (4) of the cases settled, an apology was also given, in one case together with a 
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correction. In two of the cases (40%), costs given were as well as damages. Damages 
identified as being paid were $28,000 and $4,000. Costs were detailed in two cases, being 
$33,000 and $4,000 in plaintiff costs, and $15,000 and $18,000 in defendant costs 
respectively. In at least one case, the costs to the radio broadcaster were over four times 
greater than the damages paid. 
 
Three-quarters (3) of the actions against magazines resulted in some sort of settlement or 
concession by the magazine. One case resulted in a correction, and half (2) were settled for 
damages and costs and in one case, an apology also. Levels of damages were identified in one 
case only, being $10,000. Costs were identified in another of the settled cases, totalling 
$7,000. The remaining case was abandoned by the plaintiff after a pre-hearing before a 
Master of the High Court indicated little chance of winning. When asked why a matter was 
settled, in 1 case (25%) magazine respondents accepted they were in the wrong or could not 
win. In half of these cases (2), the replies indicated tactical reasons for settling – to get rid of 
the case and save legal fees, and the lawyer said the magazine could win but the insurance 
company did not want to fight. Although the magazine data is limited, it is clear damages are 
the most sought-after remedy, and where levels were identified, they were very high. This 
may be because magazines are seen as having deep pockets. However, large damages claims 
can also indicate an intention to chill and although most of the writs produced negative results 
for the magazine, damages expectations proved to be unrealistic. The action claiming an 
award of $7.5 million resulted in costs of $7,000. The other writ seeking an award of 
$300,000 resulted only in a correction.  This may also illustrate that the large claims were 
intended to frighten, rather than result in the payment of real money. 
 
Three-quarters of the claims against publishers resulted in significant settlements. One was 
settled by payment of the plaintiff’s costs of $15,000, and apology, correction, withdrawal of 
the book and redistribution of it in an altered form. A second was settled for $100,000 
damages which included costs, and an apology. The third was settled for $10,000 costs and an 
apology. The final claim was ongoing and therefore no outcome was recorded. Two-thirds of 
the settled claims (2) were settled for commercial reasons – the publisher wished to still be in 
a position to distribute some form of the work and achieve some financial return. In the other 
case, the publisher settled for pragmatic reasons – it was clear at a judicial conference that the 
judge favoured the plaintiff. The claims detailed illustrate clearly the significant risks faced by 
publishers and that claims may have serious financial effects on their enterprises. There 
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appear to be high rates of success by plaintiffs and correspondingly high commercial 
incentives for publishers to settle. It might be arguable, therefore, that publishers are more at 
risk than other media, of being excessively chilled at all stages of the publication process. In 
this situation, size of the publishing enterprise would not offset any excessive chill to any 
great degree. 
 
The single claim against the writer was settled for $130,000 and was said to be a company 
decision. 
 
These results show that of the total 50 claims detailed for all media, 30% (15) were settled 
prior to a full hearing. A further 4% (2) went to a full hearing and were lost by the media 
defendant. Therefore, 34% (17) or over a third of cases, were lost by the media defendant or 
resulted in a concession of some sort.  
 
Sixteen percent (8) claims were abandoned, and 6% (3) each went to full hearing and were 
won by the media defendant or summary judgment was given in favour of the media 
defendant. A further 2% (1) were struck out, and the same figure was withdrawn. Therefore, 
31% (16) claims were won by the media defendant or were not pursued. Thirty-four percent 
(17) claims were still pending. 
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Of the 33 claims where the outcome was resolved, in just under half (48% or 16) the outcome 
was favourable to the media.464  (See Fig. 48  below). 
Fig. 48 
Outcome for all media-detailed court claims (N=33)
Defendant w on
Plaintif f  w on
 
Of the 34% (17) claims in which the outcome was unfavourable for the media defendant, 71% 
(12) resulted in an apology, 47% (8) resulted in damages being paid, and 29% (5) resulted in a 
correction. Nearly 6% (1) resulted in each of an injunction, or withdrawal of publication and 
re-issue in another form. It is clear that, in contrast to the most common remedy sought, which 
was damages, the most common remedy actually achieved was an apology.  (See Fig. 49  
below).    Fig. 49 
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  This information is compared below to the subgroup information for the period 1998-2001 for which 
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Levels of damages paid were detailed in 87% (7) of the cases where they were awarded. 
Levels awarded were much more modest than those sought. The figures are too small to 
detect any pattern in relation to media defendant groups.465  (See Table 5 below). 
Table 5. 
Levels of Damages Awarded – All Media 1996-2001 
Figure Defendant 
1.  $4,000 Radio 
2-3. $10,000 Magazine, Newspaper 
4.  $28,000 Radio 
5.  $65,000 Newspaper 
6. $100,000 Book Publisher 
7.   $130,000 Writer 
 
 
Some information about costs was provided in relation to 40% (20) claims. Forty percent (8) 
of these were claims against newspapers, 15% (3) were claims against television, 20% (4) 
were claims against radio, and 15% (3) were claims against each of magazines and publishers. 
Five percent (1) was a claim against a writer and journalist.  
 
The highest set of costs paid were by a magazine ($20,000 and $250,000), and the lowest 
were paid by a newspaper ($750 and $250). It is clear costs can be significant, but levels can 
vary a great deal. The levels and incidence of costs are shown in the Table below. In 30% (18) 
of all claims filed, the defendant indicated some form of costs for the plaintiff were paid as 
well as their own. These were all the claims which were settled. Therefore, settlements 
appeared to invariably involve payment of costs for both parties.  Furthermore, the five other 
cases where costs were detailed show that significant front-end costs can build up in pending 
cases, and defendants can face procedural costs, such as mediation. (See Table 6 below).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
court files were searched. See Fig. 57 below. 
465
 This data is compared below to the subgroup data for levels of damages awarded against media defendants in 
the court file data for the period 1998-2001. See p 161 below. 
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Table 6. 








Costs to date 
Other Forms of 
Costs Paid 
Level Unclear 
But Both Paid 
1.Nwspaper $5,000 $12,000    
2.Nwspaper $3,000 $3,000    
3.Nwspaper $750 $250    
4.Magazine $6,000 $1,000    
5.Radio $33,000 $15,000    
6. Radio $4,000 $18,000    
7. Publisher $15,000     
8. Publisher $10,000     
9.Nwspaper   $30,000   
10.TV   $150,000   
11. TV   $60,000   
12.Nwspper    Mediation  




    
X 
15. TV     X 
16. Journ &  
Writer 
    
X 
17.Radio     ×2 
18.Nwspper 
    
X 
19.Publishr     X 
 
3.  Conclusion on media survey results 
The data presented above appears to paint a picture of a lively, generally robust New Zealand 
media which accepts and is aware of the effects of defamation law to a degree. While all 
media sectors consider they face general risk of defamation claims, and are worried about 
mistakes, both inadvertent and careless, the specific area of concern common to all was the 
reporting of commercial and business matters. For newspapers, general risks stood out, while 
for television, news stories were the most risky. For radio, live broadcast was the most 
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problematic, for magazines inaccuracy, and for publishers, the subjects of books published, 
and mistakes, caused most concern. However, as noted, mistakes can be alleviated to a degree 
by the media taking steps to avoid carelessness where possible, while the Lange v Atkinson 
defence also offers some relief where care is taken in reporting on political matters but 
mistakes occur in spite of this. 
 
About a third of the media had no training in defamation law, while two-thirds had some, with 
an even spread between those who received formal and informal training. Television had a 
high rate of training, as had magazine journalists, with newspapers not far behind. Book 
publishers appeared to have the lowest rate of training, which was informal when it was 
received, which is surprising, given the apparently high risks acknowledged in this sector. It 
has been surmised that training reduces risk, and adds to the robustness with which media can 
deal with defamation claims. Therefore, a majority of the media appeared to place themselves 
in a position to prevent claims occurring and to deal with them realistically when they arose. 
 
As to alteration or deletion of material in stories to be published, it appeared the media alters 
material rather than delete it if possible, and will amend to maintain accuracy and fairness, if 
required by legal advisers or to tone down opinion pieces. Newspapers identified editorials 
and letters to the editor as most likely not to be published at all if problematic. Television 
broadcasters amended material right up to broadcast rather than delete. Radio also sought to 
amend rather than expunge but found live broadcast problematic. Magazines were more 
inclined to ‘pull’ material completely if subject to pressure from client advertisers. Book 
publishers were more risk averse because of the greater financial loss they faced if a 
publication was injuncted and had to be removed from shelves or destroyed.  This data again 
confirms a generally robust and assertive media which works hard to get stories told. 
Magazines suffer the effects of a form of commercial ‘chill’ from advertisers, while book 
publishers can be said to also face a commercial chill arising from the nature of the business 
they are in. 
 
A large majority of media did not hold defamation insurance. Television and radio appeared 
to have the highest rate of uptake, at about 50%. The reasons for not holding insurance appear 
to be the high cost of premiums, and tactical reasons, such as a desire to maintain autonomy 
when dealing with claims, and to present a tough image to potential claimants. Once again, 
this data reaffirms an image of a generally robust media. 
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As to regulatory bodies, the broadcast media appeared to take more notice of, and pay more 
regard to, the Broadcasting Standards Authority, than did the print media of its self-regulatory 
body, the Press Council. One of the large television broadcasters was in fact more concerned 
about the BSA than the risk of defamation.  For at least the broadcast media, then, it seemed 
sources of potential chill other than defamation law might be of greater current concern. 
 
Not quite half of all media had received threats of defamation actions over a six year period, 
and most had received 1-5 threats. However, two-thirds regarded most of the threats as not 
serious and three-quarters thought the numbers of threats had stayed the same or had actually 
decreased. Newspapers received the most treats, probably followed by television, then 
magazines, radio and publishers. Over half of the threats (54%) came to nothing. Where the 
media capitulated, which was in 45% of the threats, the most common outcome sought and 
obtained was an apology. Damages were sought in a third of threats but were only paid in 
relation to 8%. Threats were dealt with at a low level and creatively in some cases. The data 
indicates that threats are regarded as part of the daily routine of the media and that they are 
generally not seen as serious, fall by the wayside over half of the time, and are resolved at a 
low level the rest of the time. Any chilling effect must then arise from the time and cost 
involved in dealing with these matters. The data on costs received was patchy, but revealed 
that costs associated with threats did not appear to be high. 
 
As to media experience of actual claims which went to court, 12% of all media respondents 
reported that claims had been filed against them. Details of 50 claims were collected, the 
majority of which were filed by ordinary individuals (74%), with corporates being the second 
most common plaintiff (16%). Newspapers reported details of the most claims, however, it 
appeared that television broadcasters experienced the greatest rate of filed claims (two-thirds 
reported experiencing 10-20 writs in the relevant time period, although they did not detail this 
many comparative to newspapers). This data largely mimicked that collected in relation to 
threats. 
 
The majority of filed claims arose from general news stories, current affairs or documentaries 
(64%). The most common remedy sought was damages (74%), while an apology was sought 
in 20% of the claims. The lowest figure claimed was $2,000 and the highest was $7.5 million. 




Just over a third of the total 50 claims resulted in a loss or concession by media. Just under a 
third of the claims resulted in a win for media or the claim fell away. This means that just 
under half of the resolved cases resulted in a favourable outcome for media. Where the 
outcome was unfavourable to media, it was clear that although damages were the most 
common remedy sought, an apology was the most common remedy actually achieved. Levels 
of damages awarded were much more modest than those sought, with most awards being 
below $100,000 and half of them below $50,000. It appeared that costs associated with 
actions could be high but varied a great deal, and nevertheless tended to be under $20,000. 
Settlement appeared to invariably involve payment of costs for both parties.  
 
It is clear that the media success rate in relation to threats was higher than for court claims – 
however, not by much. Media still successfully resisted just under a half of the latter. While 
damages and costs were also higher for successful court claims than for threats, nonetheless 
the levels of damages awarded were not outlandish, and apology was the most common 
remedy achieved rather than damages.  Not unexpectedly, then, court claims were more 
serious for media, though not as serious as might be predicted to support a pervasive chilling 
effect. The overall impression arising from this data was still, I believed at this point in the 
study, of a dynamic, healthy media, coping well with the restrictions imposed by the law. It 
was with great anticipation, then, that I turned to consider the results of the court file search, 
to determine whether my conclusions from the first part of the media survey were more than 




Chapter Six – the court file search 
  
In this chapter, I present the results of extensive civil claim file searches carried out in the 
most important New Zealand High Court registries. This data proved most significant because 
it was not collected from media, and therefore could be used as independent control data 
against which to test the results of the media survey outlined in the previous chapters. Further, 
the court file search disclosed a more accurate picture of numbers of filed claims than that 
reported by media.  In the event, the court file data tended to corroborate and endorse the 
media survey data referred to. 
 
1. Methodology 
As discussed previously, the media surveys were augmented by a separate study based on the 
collection of information about defamation statements of claim (writs) involving media 
defendants filed in a significant sample of High Court registries in New Zealand, for the four-
year period 1998-2001. This part of the study involved collecting statistical information about 
the proportion of defamation statements of claim filed in the High Court and what proportion 
of those claims were filed against media defendants. Information was also recorded on the 
context of the claim, who the defendant was, the remedies sought (including levels of 
damages), and how the matter was resolved. The data collected proved to be very rich indeed. 
 
Throughout 2001 and at the beginning of 2002, searches were carried out by research 
teams466in the largest New Zealand High Court Registries, being Christchurch, Wellington, 
Hamilton and Auckland.467 The researchers examined all files for civil claims for the years 
1998-2001. This part of the survey sought statistical information as to what proportion of 
writs filed were defamation writs, and what proportion of the defamation writs were filed 
against the media. The researchers also recorded descriptive information about the class of 
plaintiff and of media defendant, the remedies claimed, the outcome of the claim if recorded, 
whether the matter was tried by judge alone or judge and jury, whether any other claims were 
                                                          
466
  The teams were made up of various combinations of me, and my research assistants, Ms Moka Ritchie, 
Ms Kim Rigby and Ms Rosemary Kennedy. This part of the research was carried out with the valuable assistance 
of the Department of Justice. I would also like to thank the Registrars of the four High Court registries, and their 
staff, who provided patient and invaluable assistance. 
467
  The High Court registries in Dunedin and Invercargill were not searched because , following discussion 
with the Justice Department, they were judged not to receive a significant number of defamation claims. No 
District Court files were examined because few defamation cases were then filed there and because of the limited 
resources available to carry out the research.  
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filed to protect reputation, whether there were any summary judgment applications and any 
other special features of the claim.  
 
2. Results of the court file search 
2.1 Overall numbers of defamation claims 
In the four year period 1998-2001, a total of 4183 civil claims were filed in the High Courts at 
Christchurch, Wellington, Hamilton and Auckland.  Approximately 2% of those claims were 
defamation claims. Of the defamation claims, 59% were filed against media defendants, the 
majority being filed in Auckland. These figures are broken down in the table below. (See 
Table 7). 
Table 7. 
Numbers of defamation claims filed 1998-2001 
 
Year Civil Claims Defamation Claims Claims against 
Media (and as a % 
of defamation 
claims) 
1998 1322 27 16 (59%) 
1999 1175 27 13 (48%)  
2000 1105 31 19 (61%) 
2001 1081 15 11 (73%) 
Total 4183 100 59 (59%) 
 
The number of claims against media defendants does not appear to be very high and is less 
than reported in earlier surveys. Palmer, augmenting the period covered by the McKay 
Committee research, looked at reported defamation judgments from Australia and New 
Zealand for the period 1969-1978, and reported that 79% of defendants in these cases were 
media defendants.468 Newcity examined 435 defamation suits which came before the Sydney 
Supreme Court in the period February 1979 to June 1981, and reported that just over two-
thirds were brought against media defendants.469 Neither cohort is reliably representative or 
directly comparable to that used in the present study. However, a generalised conclusion 
                                                          
468
  See Palmer G, ‘Defamation and Privacy Down Under’ 64 Iowa Law Review 1209 1978-1979, 1216. 
469
  See Newcity M,  ‘The Sociology of Defamation in Australia and the United States’ (1991) 26 Tex. Int’l 
L.J. 1, 31. 
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which could be reached is that claims against the media consistently make up the majority of 
all defamation claims. 
 
The table above does not show any overall increase in the number of claims filed in the period 
examined. Nineteen ninety-eight and 2000 were years in which numbers were higher, but the 
lowest number recorded for the sample is for the latest year, 2001. Civil claims generally 
reduced over the four year period and defamation claims halved in 2001 compared to previous 
years. However, defamation claims against the media might be said to have increased 
proportionally over the period. In 1998, the number of claims against the media was 59% of 
all defamation claims. By 2001, it was 73% of all defamation claims.  
 
However, if the data for each registry is analysed as well, it appears to confirm there is no 
discernible trend downwards or otherwise. In the largest registry, Auckland, a reduction of 
claims against the media in 1999 may have been reversed, Hamilton remained consistent, and 
Wellington and Christchurch each appeared inconsistent. (See Table 8 below). 
Table  8.    
Defamation claims against the media 1998-2001 – by registry 
 
Year Christchurch Wellington Hamilton Auckland 
1998 4 1 1 10 
1999 5 1 1 6  
2000 2 8 2 7 
2001 1 1 1 8 
Total 12 11 5 31 
 
Another way of looking at the matter is to ask what proportion of the media face claims. It 
will be recalled that responses to the media survey from the media itself indicated that 12% of 
all the media respondents had actual experience of a claim or claims being filed against them 
in the six-year period covered by that survey (the court file data discussed in this section 
covered the most recent four years of that six year period). Again, as part of an overall 
picture, this figure does not appear to be very high. 
 
By way of further comparison, the United Kingdom Law Commission has noted that the 
number of claims issued in defamation in that country (London often being referred to as the 
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defamation capital of the world) was 220 in 2001.470 This had halved from a figure of 452 in 
1997.471 The figures indicate that the number of New Zealand defamation claims appear to be 
about 6-7% of the number filed in the United Kingdom, and that New Zealand may have 
suffered a similar reduction in numbers. An increase in court fees, a change in procedure (in 
the United Kingdom) and the general cost of civil litigation may be reasons for this. The 
ongoing change in style of the media may be another, in that more intrusive and dramatic 
methods of gathering and reporting the news and current affairs may have produced greater 
tolerance of media content than existed previously. 
 
2.2 Who made the claims? 
The most common plaintiff in the claims against the media in the years 1998-2001 was the 
ordinary individual, while the second most likely plaintiff was a corporation. Nearly two 
thirds of the defamation claims made against the media in that period were made by ordinary 
individuals. Nearly 19% of the claims were filed by corporates. Eight percent of claims were 
made by celebrities and 5% were made by a politician (national or local). Three percent of 
claims were made by a government entity or employee and nearly 2%  were made by a judge. 
(See Fig. 50 below). When this is compared to the parties who made threats to media, and 
filed claims against them,  the results are very similar, with the source of the majority of 
threats and claims being the same in the first two largest categories.  
                                                          
470
  The Law Commission (UK), ‘Aspects of Defamation Procedure: A scoping study’, May 2002, 4. 
471
  The Commission was then of the view that procedural changes and an increase in court fees had 
contributed to the reduction in numbers of claims filed. It should be noted, however, that more recent concerns 
have been expressed from some sources about the character and effects of UK defamation law, and the numbers 
of claims. In July 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Committee published its concluding observations on 
the United Kingdom government’s sixth report on human rights in that jurisdiction. It raised concerns about 
increasing use of UK libel laws by foreign residents (libel tourism) and the use of Conditional Fee 
Arrangements: Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 
Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee, Ninety-third session, 
Geneva, 7-25 July 2008, GE.08-43342, at para 25. The matter of costs and CFAs is being investigated 
empirically: see ‘Comparative study of cost in defamation claims’, Programme in Comparative Media Law and 
Policy, Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, www.csls,ox.ac.uk/pcmlp.php  
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However, the court file data also revealed additional plaintiffs in thirteen percent of the 
defamation claims, with a total of 10 additional plaintiffs. Half of the additional plaintiffs 
were corporates, 30% were ordinary individuals and 20% were in the ‘other’ category, being a 
trust board, and corporation trustees. (See Fig. 51 below). 
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The results shown in Fig. 50 are in contrast to the finding by Newcity that elected public 
officials (ie: politicians) were the single most litigious group of defamation plaintiffs, 
accounting for  approximately 12% of all defamation suits filed in Sydney in 1979-1981.472 
Palmer, looking at both Australian and New Zealand reported defamation cases for the period 
1969-1978 found that the largest group of 16% of plaintiffs were politicians and aspirants to 
elected office.473 Care should be taken when comparing these results to my 2001 study of 
court files in New Zealand. Both the Palmer and Newcity studies used a much more detailed 
breakdown of occupational groups, and none of the cohorts used are directly comparable. If 
anything, my own study is closest to that carried out by Newcity, in that he also searched a 
selection of court files and used the occupational category of ‘elected public officials’  which 
is quite similar to that used by my researchers, of ‘politician, (national or local)’. However, 
because of the reservations I have outlined above, the most that may be suggested is simply 
that Australian politicians sue more often than their counterparts in New Zealand. This may 
say something about the nature of politics and the cultures in each country, and it is 
impossible to draw any useful legal conclusions from the apparent disparity. 
 
2.3 Who were the media defendants? 
The largest group of media defendants on the receiving end of defamation claims in New 
Zealand for the period 1998-2000 was newspapers, followed by television broadcasters. 
Forty-four percent of claims were made against newspapers, while 27% were against 
television broadcasters. A further 12% of claims were against magazines, and 8% were 
against radio broadcasters. Seven percent of claims were against publishers and 2% 
represented a claim against an Internet entity. (See Fig. 52 below).  All relevant studies seem 
to confirm the predominance of newspapers as defendants in defamation.474  
                                                          
472
  See Newcity, above, n. 469, 17. The figures are not directly comparable, in that Newcity dealt only with 
claims filed in Sydney, and his figures apply to all defamation claims, not the subset of claims made against the 
media. 
473
  Palmer, n. 468 above, 1215. 
474
  See Newcity, above, n. 469, 36; Recommendations on the Law of Defamation, Report of the Committee 
on Defamation, December 1977, Appendix III, Tables C and D, 136, Barendt et al, Libel and the Media: The 
Chilling Effect (1997), 38-41. 
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Fig. 52    
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Once again, when compared to the data on threats and court claims, the most common 
defendants are mirrored. I have noted previously, however, an ambiguity in my results in that 
television broadcasters appeared to report a higher rate of claims than newspapers, though 
they did not detail a higher number of actual examples.475 Given the data revealed by the court 
survey, it may be that television broadcasters exaggerated their response to the general 
question about rates of threats or claims.  
 
To complete the picture on defendants in the court files, the court file data also revealed 13 
additional defendants in nearly 17% of the claims. Of this group, individual journalists or 
authors were most likely to be pursued as additional defendants while editors were the next 
most popular additional defendant. Forty-six percent were individual journalists or authors, 
23% were editors, and nearly 8% were each of a production company, an individual radio 
announcer, a publisher and a distributor. (See Fig. 53 below). 
 
                                                          
475
  See Figs 36, 44 and 45 above. 
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2.4 Context of claims 
A majority of 68% of court claims arose in the context of news, current affairs or 
documentaries, while 7% arose in the context of consumer publications 2% in the context of 
editorial material, 5% in the context of letters to the editor, 3% in the context of talkback or 
live material, 5% from a book, 2% from a website, and the context of 8% court claims was 
unclear. (See Fig. 54 below). 
Fig. 54 




















2.5 Remedies sought 
The most common type of remedy claimed was general damages, which were claimed by 
85% of claimants. Seven percent plaintiffs additionally claimed aggravated damages, while 
32% also claimed punitive damages. (The proportion of those who claimed aggravated 
damages does not mean much because typically counsel will plead aggravating circumstances 
but what these are worth will be undifferentiated from the general figure claimed).  Fourteen 
percent of all claimants sought an injunction and 7% sought a statutory declaration.476 Three 
percent sought a correction order, while 1.7% of claimants each sought an apology, a 
retraction or an account of profits. (See Fig. 55 below). 
Fig. 55 


















Levels of damages sought were recorded in 20% of cases where damages were claimed. Forty 
percent of these were claims against magazines, and 30% were claims against book 
publishers. Thirty percent were against news media defendants, which means the specifying 
of the amount of damages on the statement of claim was in breach of s 43 of the Defamation 
Act 1992.477 Two-thirds of these news media cases were against television broadcasters and 
one-third was against a newspaper defendant. (See Fig. 56 below). 
                                                          
476
  Section 24 of the Defamation Act 1992. 
477
  See the discussion at 2.8.6 above. 
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Fig. 56 











The discussion of s 43 in the previous chapter revealed that the media reported knowing the 
level of damages claimed in breach of the provision in over half of the claims reported, and 
suggested that this might arise from the court papers or communications between the parties 
outside of the court process. The court file search suggests that the occasions when levels of 
damages are revealed in court papers are not high. The Hubbard case, discussed previously, is 
also likely to have reduced the occasions when this will happen by giving publicity to the 
nature of breach, if not the sanction.478    Nonetheless, it is clear the provision is of limited 
effect in keeping the level of damages from the media. This might be of concern, if the overall 
results of my study did not suggest that the New Zealand media does not feel particularly 
gagged to begin with, nor is it gagged in fact. 
 
To return to the claims which detailed levels of damages, the ten claims sought the following 
levels of general damages479 (there are twelve figures as one action involved three different 
claims): $50,000 (book), $80,000 (book), $100,000 (newspaper and magazine), $150,000 
(book), $200,000 (book and magazine), $300,000 (magazine), $450,000 (magazine and book), 
$550,000 (television), $800,000 (television). These are shown in Table 9 below. The results 
are rather inconclusive but it might fairly be said that the levels sought from television 
defendants featured at the higher end of the scale, while magazine defendants did not feature 
in the lower end of the scale.  
                                                          
478
  See p. 140 above. 
479
  The type of defendant in the relevant claim is noted in brackets. 
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Table 9. 
Levels of damages claimed – all court claims 1998-2001 
 
Claims Defendant 
1. $50,000 Book publisher 
2. $80,000 Book publisher 
3-4. $100,000 Newspaper, magazine 
5. $150,000 Book publisher 
6-7. $200,000 Book publisher, magazine 
8. $300,000 Magazine 
9-10. $450,000 Book publisher, magazine 
11. $550,000 Television 
12. $800,000 Television 
 
The ten claims revealed the following levels of punitive damages: $10,000 (book), $15,000 
(book), $30,000 (book), $50,000 (book and television), $60,000 (magazine), $100,000 
(magazine), $200,000 (magazine) and $500,000 (newspaper). (See Table 10 below). Levels of 
punitive damages over $100,000 are optimistic.480  
Table 10. 
Levels of punitive  damages sought – court claims  1998-2001 
 
Claims  Defendants 
1. $10,000 Book publisher 
2. $15,000 Book publisher 
3. $30,000 Book publisher 
4-5. $50,000 Book publisher, television 
6. $60,000 Magazine 
7. $100,000 Magazine 
8. $200,000 Magazine 
9. $500,000 Newspaper 
 
                                                          
480
  See  TVNZ v Quinn [1996] 3 NZLR 24. 
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2.6 Outcomes 
Outcomes were final in over half (56%), of the recorded cases over the four year period. 
Forty-one percent of cases were still pending or appeared to be pending. The outcome in 3% 
of cases was unclear.  Only 6% of the cases with final outcomes came to full trial. (One of 
those trials resulted in a finding in favour of the defendant and one resulted in a very large 
damages award against the defendant newspaper).481  
 
Overall it appears that of the 33 cases which had final outcomes in the four year period, the 
media were successful defendants (in that there was a court decision in the defendant’s favour 
or the matter was abandoned or withdrawn) just over half (54%) of the time.482 (See Fig. 57 
below). 
Fig. 57 







Twenty-one percent of the finalised claims resulted in a court directed resolution in the 
defendant’s favour. One third were abandoned or withdrawn.  
 
                                                          
481
  The McKay Committee research found that for the period 1970-74, 32% of filed claims were settled out 
of court, 12% went on to trial, 38% appeared to have been abandoned and 18% were still pending: see 
‘Recommendations on the Law of Defamation,’ Report of the Committee on Defamation, December 1977 
Appendix III, Table C, 136. 
482
  Trials favoured the media 50% of the time, although these figures are based on a very small sample and 
cannot be seen as truly representative. The figure may in reality be a little less than this. Newcity found that 
media defendants prevailed at trial 40.5% of the time: see n. 481 above, 55. The McKay committee research 
found that for the period 1970-74, New Zealand media won 43% of cases which went to trial (all trials involved 
claims against newspapers): see above n. 4, Appendix III, Table G, 137. Barendt et al found looking at a sample 
of writs set down in the Royal Courts of Justice for the period 1990-1994 that twice as many cases resulted in 
judgment for the plaintiff as for the defendant. The outcome at trial of 2% of writs favoured the defendant, while 
4% favoured the plaintiff, 68% of writs were settled or withdrawn and for 26%, no action was recorded: see 
Barendt, n. 474 above, 39, Table 3. 
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As to the outcome where the defendant was unsuccessful, 27% were settled and discontinued 
or withdrawn, in one case as directed by the court. Approximately 3% of the claims resulted 
in a statement being read in open court and an apology. Ten percent of these cases resulted in 
the granting of an injunction. Six percent resulted in damages. This means of the 15 claims 
where the defendant lost, 60% were settled, 7% resulted in a statement and apology, 20% 
resulted in an injunction, and 13% resulted in damages. (See Fig. 58 below). 
Fig.  58  
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Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the most common remedy, as 
settlement could include any combination of damages, payment of costs, apology, or other 
remedy. However, to recap, when the media were asked in the postal survey to detail claims 
for the period 1996-2001, of the 34% of claims in which it was reported the outcome was 
unfavourable for the media defendant, 71% resulted in an apology, 47% resulted in damages 
being paid, and 29% resulted in a correction. Nearly 6% resulted in each of an injunction, or 
withdrawal of publication and re-issue in another form. It is clear that, in contrast to the most 
common remedy sought, which was damages, the most common remedy actually achieved 
was an apology.   
 
To return to the court file data, it revealed the defendants were more successful in defending 
injunction applications than plaintiffs were in getting them. Of the 8 applications in the four 
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year period for injunctions, 7 had been heard. Media defendants successfully resisted just over 
57% of such applications.  
 
2.7 Summary judgment applications 
Little information was collected from court files as to summary judgment applications. Of the 
59 filed claims in the years 1998-2001, 5% (3) involved summary judgment applications. 
One-third (1) of these was made by the plaintiff against the defendant on the grounds that no 
defence could be made out, and had not been heard yet. Two-thirds (2) were made by 
defendants against plaintiffs on the grounds of unassailable defences. In half of these (1) the 
defendant was successful, while in the other half not, the defendant having to go to full trial. 
Thus, all that might be said is that what little data is available indicates summary judgment 
applications are rare, but are perhaps more popular with defendants than plaintiffs. 
 
2.8 Other claims used to protect reputation 
Some data was collected as to other claims used by plaintiffs to protect reputation. Of the 59 
claims filed in the period 1998-2001, nearly 7% (4) included other forms of claim. One-half 
(2) of the claims included actions under the Fair Trading Act. One-quarter (1) included a 
claim for contempt of court, one-quarter included a claim for breach of contract, one-quarter 
included a claim for breach of economic freedom, and one quarter also claimed for breach of 
a duty in negligence. In half of these claims (2) the plaintiff successfully obtained an 
injunction against a television defendant. In the claim involving the additional action for 
breach of contract the court ordered the parties to settle, and in the final claim, the three 
additional actions (breach of economic freedom, breach of the Fair Trading Act and breach of 
negligence) were struck out. These results appear to indicate that additional forms of action 
are pleaded in the weaker cases in an attempt to make them look more substantial. 
 
2.9 Non-media claims which could have been filed against the media 
Non-media claims were examined to determine how often plaintiffs had chosen not to pursue 
the media as defendant.483 Of the 33 files examined, nearly 40% (13) were claims where the 
alleged defamatory statement had been published in the media, but which had only been filed 
against non-media defendants. This is a not-insignificant proportion and it implies that a 
reasonable number of plaintiffs bring claims against non-media defendants for personal 
satisfaction rather than seek out the defendant with deep pockets. However, a closer 
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examination of the defendants in these claims reveals a more complex situation. Thirty 
percent (4) of these claims were against MPs, 30% (4) were against corporates or 
associations, 23% (3) were against individuals and 30% (4) had unidentified defendants (some 
claims were brought against more than one defendant). Therefore, 60% of these claims were 
in fact brought against defendants who would be seen to have at least adequate, if not deep, 
pockets. However, the fact that the competing deep pockets of the media were not preferred 
does appear to suggest some level of personal satisfaction is reflected in the choice of 
defendant. 
 
The other interesting statistic here is the significant group of non-media claims against 
politicians (nearly a third). Although the media had also published in these cases, the fact that 
only the politicians were sued implies that plaintiffs seek to sheet home responsibility to their 
elected representatives and get personal satisfaction from that. It is unlikely that MPs are seen 
as easy targets, as they may be state-funded and have the defences of absolute or qualified 
privilege available to them. This data suggests that media are not automatically at a 
disadvantage when plaintiffs are determining who they will sue. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The data on court claims over the four year period showed that the number of claims filed in 
New Zealand stood at about 6% of the number in the United Kingdom and that the number 
could then have been decreasing. There was certainly no apparent increasing trend. As with 
threats and court claims reported by media in Chapter Five, newspapers experienced the most 
claims, followed by television, magazines, radio and publishers. Just over half of the time, the 
outcome of the case favoured the media, either because the case was abandoned or 
withdrawn, or the court gave a decision which favoured the media. The most common remedy 
sought was damages, while the most common remedy obtained was an apology. Media 
successfully resisted injunction applications just over 57% of the time. Levels of damages 
sought appeared much higher than for threats, but not excessive, ranging from $50,000 to 
$800,000. Therefore, it may be said that the media faced a stable or decreasing risk of 
defamation claims, with newspapers and television experiencing the greatest likelihood. The 
media was likely to successfully defend or force abandonment or withdrawal of just over half 
these claims. Where it lost, it might have to pay damages about half the time. It successfully 
defended injunction applications just over half the time.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
483
  Christchurch files were not included in this cohort as the decision to seek this information was made 
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Although the data for the court survey related to a shorter time period than that relevant to the 
media survey, the results are clear. This chapter confirms the picture painted by the media in 
relation to actual court claims detailed in Chapter Five, but it is also actually reveals a slightly 
better success rate for media defendants. Furthermore, it very clearly establishes a low rate of 
claims overall,  and a better success rate for New Zealand media as opposed to the United 
Kingdom and Australia. This is good news for media in this country. When the figures from 
the court file survey were first made public, one commentator concluded after looking at the 
results that ‘it’s hard to put the chill factor above…drafty’.484 Hence, I felt confident in 
concluding after analysing this data that it appeared to crystalise the impression hitherto 
recorded, that New Zealand’s media is a tough, lively one which does not feel excessively 
chilled by our defamation laws. More than this, however, it did not appear to be chilled in 
fact. Furthermore, the difference in success rates between jurisdictions suggests that there is 
some credence in the view that New Zealand media did not, at least in the period up to 2001, 
manifest the worst excesses of its overseas counterparts.  
 
The court file data proved to be most significant. But further data from the study remained 
untouched, and it could bolster or challenge the conclusions reached so far. Chapter Seven, 
which follows, addresses the experience of defamation lawyers, to determine whether the 
responses are consistent with those in the media survey and the court file search. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
after those files were examined. 
484
  Steven Price on ‘Mediawatch’, National Radio, 4 December 2005. 
 168
Chapter Seven – the experience of defamation lawyers 
 
In this Chapter, I present and analyse the results of interviews and surveys completed by 
media lawyers. The data presented here is largely of qualitative value only.485 Nonetheless, it 
does tend to confirm the results presented in previous chapters.  
 
1. Methodology 
As part of the study, separate adapted surveys were sent out to lawyers listed in the then 
current Law Register as carrying out defamation work.486 Because the response was poor, the 
postal survey was followed up by targeted requests for interviews with 3 of the most 
prominent defamation lawyers. Those interviews were carried out at the end of 2001 and the 
beginning of 2002.  
 
Ultimately, responses were obtained from 10 leading defamation lawyers, some of whom 
acted for both plaintiffs and defendants. The content of these responses varied, as those who 
were interviewed were only able to give their views on aspects of the law, and did not supply 
details of any cases except anecdotally. Therefore, some of the statistical data arising from 
this part of the study is weak and cannot be regarded as necessarily being representative of 
what is happening in practice.487 Nonetheless, in this part of the paper, I have summarised 
information provided by leading lawyers arising from their practice in defamation matters, 
and also extracted some of the views offered on aspects of the law. These summaries do give 
a ‘feel’ for the attitudes and experience of this group. They therefore have qualitative value. 
 
Of the group of 10 lawyers, 4 responded to both the plaintiff and the defendant lawyer 
surveys. However, all 10 had experience of both plaintiff and defence work, although half 
acted for defendants in over 80% of their defamation practice, four-fifths of these in over 
90%.  Arguably, the shared experience of working on both sides of the fence gives a 
reasonable balance to the views which were offered. 
 
                                                          
485
  For that reason, no graphs have been compiled from the data. 
486
  Forty-four surveys were dispatched. However, not all those written to were still practising in the area. 
487
  There is also the possibility that the outcome in the cases reported by both plaintiff and defendant 
lawyers tended to favour the practitioner – in other words, that the lawyers’ success rate in defamation cases was 
higher than normal, because of the lawyers’ expertise. 
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2. Defendant lawyers’ general experience of defamation claims 
2.1 Introduction 
Eight defence lawyers were surveyed or interviewed. All had acted also for plaintiffs, 
although half of them were currently defence lawyers over 90% of the time. One acted for 
defendants 80% of the time, one 60% of the time and two 50% of the time. 
 
All but one of these lawyers answered a question asking them how long they had been 
carrying out defamation defence work. One quarter had been practising in the area for 5-10 
years, nearly 40% answered 10-20 years and one quarter had been defending defamation 
claims for longer than 20 years. This group therefore appeared to have a wealth of experience.  
 
2.2 Vetting pre-publication 
The defence lawyer group was asked a series of important questions not asked of plaintiff 
lawyers, and this was intended to gain a picture of the practice of legal vetting on order to 
make a comparison with the responses received from the media about pre-publication 
procedures.488 Three-quarters of this group vetted for clients, although two of these only 
vetted on an occasional basis. The group who vetted regularly gave some information about 
vetting for eight clients, four of which were newspapers, two were book publishers, one was a 
broadcaster and one was a magazine.  
 
Vetting for the broadcaster appeared the most stressful, with the time for vetting ranging from 
as little as 30 seconds to a month before publication, and the comment was made that the 
judgment call was increasingly difficult to make the less time there was to complete the task. 
For newspapers, the time could also be small, ranging from 6/12 minutes, to an hour, or 
possibly weeks before publication. Magazine vetting allowed 24 hours. Book publishing 
allowed the longest time to vet, being weeks or months, however, the task was greater, 
involving perusal and examination of the whole book.  
 
Advice for the broadcaster was usually given orally by reference to a script. For newspapers, 
articles usually arrived by fax and advice was given on the phone or perhaps by faxing back 
an altered document. Advice about a book manuscript was usually given by letter. These 
methods clearly reflect the time available for the vetting process.  
                                                          
488
  See Chapter Five, 2.3 above.   In that Chapter, I concluded that the media survey revealed a generally 
robust and assertive media, working with or without legal advice, to get stories told rather than deleted  
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These lawyers gave various reasons for asking for changes to material. The responses 
demonstrate that the vetting brief is wide and included not just the risk of defamation, but also 
contempt, privacy, human rights issues, press council complaints, statutory prohibition and 
court orders against publication, and where a lawyer considered there was no proof for facts 
stated, poor journalism, or was simply responding to instinct.  
 
The same defence lawyers were asked how often they had to ask for changes. It appeared to 
be standard practice to request changes. The lawyer vetting for the broadcaster stated that 
changes were requested frequently. One of the four lawyers vetting for newspapers stated that 
changes were asked for in half, and another put this figure at 90%, of the copy looked at, 
although the lawyer acting for the latter newspaper emphasised that some changes are minor. 
One other newspaper lawyer stated that changes were almost always made, but that this 
reflected the reason for sending the material for vetting in the first place. The other newspaper 
lawyer stated that changes were not requested too often.  One of the two lawyers who vetted 
for book publishers said they frequently asked for changes, while the other reported that 
usually 4 or 5 passages would be altered in a book which is topical or controversial. Magazine 
articles were also reported as generating changes about 90% of the time. 
 
In contrast, the answers to the question whether these lawyers asked for material to be 
withdrawn altogether indicate that this is rare. The lawyer vetting for the broadcaster had 
never done this, while half of the newspaper lawyers answered ‘never’, and half answered 
only in 1% of cases. The two lawyers advising book publishers answered ‘never’, while the 
lawyer vetting magazine articles also answered infrequently or in 1% of cases. One of the 
newspaper lawyers commented that usually the story can be changed (albeit an interesting 
part may have been deleted). However, this lawyer added that he might not always know if a 
story had become so interesting that in the end it was not published. Generally, these 
responses mirror almost exactly those of the media when asked if they were forced to remove 
material altogether.489 It remains clear that both media and media lawyers work together to get 
stories told somehow or other. 
 
In all cases except that of the lawyer doing broadcasting vetting, the final decision about 
whether material would be published or not lay away from the lawyer, with the editor or 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
altogether. Magazines did suffer a form of  ‘commercial chill’ arising from dependence on advertising, and book 
publishers also faced a form of ‘commercial chill’ arising from the high costs associated within the sector. 
489
   See Chapter Five, 2.3.3 above. 
 171
publisher of the particular publication. In the case of broadcasting, however, the decision was 
a joint one between the lawyer and the editor/executive director. This possibly reflects a 
greater reliance on the lawyer arising from the time pressures associated with breaking stories 
in broadcasting. 
 
The lawyer advising the broadcaster also gave advice about Broadcasting Standards Authority 
requirements, while all of the newspapers except one also received advice from their lawyers 
about the Press Council guidelines. In relation to the latter, one lawyer mentioned that this 
involved giving advice about lack of taste, rather than legal advice. 
 
2.3 Threats 
2.3.1 Number of threats 
Some limited material on actual threats was extracted from some defence lawyers. Six 
estimated how many threats they dealt with annually. Two of these dealt with 3-5, one dealt 
with 6-8 and three dealt with greater than 20. Five of these six commented on whether 
numbers of threats they had dealt with had changed in the last six years. Two thought 
numbers had increased although one of these indicated this was because he had increased his 
practice in this area. One thought the number of threats dealt with had decreased, and two 
thought numbers had stayed the same. When asked why such a change had occurred, one 
defence lawyer who reported an increase suggested that members of the public have a wrong 
perception that successful defamation actions result in telephone number damages, beginning 
a case only to let it go when they find out just what it takes. This lawyer also suggested that 
there is greater awareness of defamation as a cause of action due to publicity. The lawyer who 
reported a decrease in the number of threats dealt with thought it might be due to the fact that 
editors and reporters are better educated about defamation and know how to minimize or 
reduce risk and when to send an article for vetting.  
 
These responses are varied and unrepresentative, but it can at least be suggested that there is 
nothing to indicate a dominant view in the defence lawyer group that threats of defamation 
action are increasing. 
 
2.3.2 Experience of threats 
Five of the defence lawyers supplied information as to how they dealt with a total of 18 
threats. One threat was from 1998, two from 2000, twelve from 2001 and for three, the year of 
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the threat was unspecified (however, respondents were asked to detail the most recent threats 
they dealt with).  
 
Two-thirds of the threats arose from the written word. One-sixth arose from pictorial 
representations, 5% arose from spoken words and pictorial representation, 5% from the 
spoken word and 5% from the written word and pictorial representation. 
 
Sixty-one percent of the threats reported were made against newspapers, while nearly 28% 
were made against television broadcasters. One threat arose from an industry newsletter and 
one from a written stock exchange announcement. 
 
The defence lawyers were asked to detail what remedies were sought in relation to the threats. 
Most threats sought more than one remedy. The most common remedy sought was an 
apology, which arose in nearly 78% of threats. It was closely followed by damages and 
corrections, which were both sought in two-thirds of the threats. Retractions were sought in 
nearly 39% threats. The least common remedies sought were prevention of repeat publication, 
and a threat to complain to the Press Council. In one case, the remedy was unspecified. In one 
case only, damages were the only remedy sought, and although apology was not sought in any 
case on its own, in two cases, it was sought together with a correction. The most common 
combination of remedies sought was made up of an apology, correction, retraction and 
damages (nearly 28% of cases). 
 
As to level of damages sought, little information was forthcoming on this. In two-thirds of the 
12 letters seeking damages, the level was noted as being unspecified. In two of the letters, 
damages of $5,000 were sought, and in one letter, the damages sought were specified as being 
between $3,000 and $6,000. 
 
This group of lawyers was asked what initial advice they gave in relation to the threats. The 
most common advice was to send a letter rejecting the claim and outlining the legal elements 
and issues, which arose in relation to 28% of threats. Similarly, a common response was to 
send a letter simply rejecting the claim (nearly 17% of threats). In 22% of threats, a letter was 
sent rejecting the claim but offering a limited concession of some sort, being a correction, a 
statement in reply, an explanatory note, and an offer of a letter to the editor. In one case, the 
advice was to ignore the threat, and in another, a letter of explanation and apology was 
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dispatched. In four cases, the initial advice was not detailed. Of the 14 threats where the 
response was detailed, over half (57%) rejected the threat. The other responses showed strong 
resistance and a desire to limit the effect of the threat and concede as little as possible. 
 
The defence lawyers were asked what sort of negotiations were involved in dealing with the 
threats. The most common response was that the matter involved either straightforward 
(39%), or little, correspondence (nearly 28%). Five percent involved only one telephone call.  
A majority of these threats, therefore, required little from the lawyer. Only 11% of threats 
involved protracted correspondence and difficult negotiations. In three cases, the nature of 
lawyer involvement was not detailed.  
 
As to ultimate outcome of these detailed threats, in two-thirds of cases, the complaint 
appeared to have been abandoned, in that the lawyer had heard no more (in one of these cases, 
the police had attempted to arrest the complainant for the behaviour outlined in the 
publication, and the latter had become a fugitive!). In 28% of the threats, the defendant had 
made some concession, ranging from publication of an apology, a retraction and a correction, 
publication of a correction and retraction, publication of a correction, to publication of an 
explanatory note. The outcome of one threat had not yet been determined. Damages were not 
paid in relation to any threat. 
 
These responses suggest that most threats were made against newspapers and arose from the 
written word.490  Apology was the most common remedy sought, although damages, together 
with corrections, followed close behind as the second most popular remedy. However, 
damages were not conceded in relation to any threat, and in fact, the majority of threats 
appeared to be abandoned. The few concessions made were limited and robust. Most threats 
dealt with by the lawyers were low level and straightforward, and a reasonable supposition to 
make from the data is that the cost of legal involvement in resolving them would not have 
been high.  
 
While not quantitatively robust, the defence lawyer responses are of value as qualitative data, 
because they reveal clear patterns of behaviour from the experience of leading defamation 
defence lawyers in relation to threats received against media clients. The results also mirror 
                                                          
490
  It should be noted, however, that this result could be due, in part, to the nature of the clientele seeking 
legal advice from the lawyer, in other words, to the sort of defamation defence practice operated by the lawyer. 
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and reinforce, to a remarkable extent, the responses of the media in the media survey to 
similar questions about threats.491  
 
2.4 Experience of defamation statements of claim which did not come to a full hearing 
Five defence lawyers supplied information detailing the experience of dealing with a total of 
18 claims which did not come to a full hearing. One lawyer had detailed 7 cases, one detailed 
4, two detailed 3 and one defence lawyer detailed 1 such case. The lawyers were defending 
media defendants in most, but not all, of these cases.  
 
It will be recalled that the court file search revealed that 100 defamation claims were filed in 
the main registries over a four year period.492 Over the four year period, defamation claims 
averaged 25 a year. Extrapolating this, it is reasonable to estimate that 150 defamation cases 
would have been filed over the longer six year period. The defence lawyers detailed cases 
from the same period but also from a period two years earlier (1996 and 1997).Therefore, the 
18 cases detailed by the defence lawyers arguably represent approximately 12% of a likely 
total for the period 1996-2001. However, because almost all of the cases detailed by the 
defence lawyers involved a media defendant as defined in this survey,493 it is likely that the 
subset is more representative of cases involving media defendants.494 In the court file survey, 
media defendant cases arose 59% of the time.495 Fifty-nine percent of the projected 150 
defamation cases occurring in the six year period would be 88 media defendant cases. 
Therefore, arguably, the 18 cases reported below represent close to 21% of the likely total of 
88 media defendant cases filed in the six year period.496 
 
2.4.1 Nature of the claims 
Four cases detailed were from 2001, five were from 2000, four from 1999, one from 1998, 
two from 1997, one from 1996 and the date of one case was not detailed. In two-thirds of the 
18 cases, legal advice had been sought prior to the statement of claim being issued. In 22% of 
cases, no such advice had been sought. In two cases, this information was not supplied. In 
                                                          
491
  See Chapter Five, 2.7 above. 
492
  See Chapter Six, 2.1 above. 
493
  See Chapter One, 2. above. 
494
  Only one defendant in these reported cases was perhaps not a media defendant – the case involved a 
defamation which arose from a brochure. 
495
  See Chapter Six, Table 7. above. 
496
  In fact, defence lawyers detailed a further 4 claims which went to a full hearing for determination, and 
these are analysed in the next section (see p. 174 below). Only two of these occurred in the six year period under 
review, one of which may not have involved a media defendant. If the remaining case is added to the 18 detailed 
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61% of the cases, the defamation arose from the written word, while in nearly 17%, it arose 
from written words together with photos/cartoon/illustration. In 22% of cases, the defamation 
arose from the spoken word together with pictures. Two-thirds of the claims were filed 
against newspaper defendants, while 22% were filed against television broadcasters. Five 
percent of the claims were brought against each of a magazine, the publisher of a brochure 
and an Internet provider.497 
 
2.4.2 Remedies sought 
As to remedies sought, the results were starkly drawn. Damages were by far the most popular 
remedy sought in these formal claims, being claimed in almost all cases (95%). Apology was 
sought in nearly 17% of cases, while a correction was sought in one-ninth and a retraction in 
5%.  
 
The levels of damages sought were undisclosed in over half (56%) of the 18 cases, as the 
defendants were news media defendants and disclosure of a figure in the statement of claim 
was prohibited under s 43(1) of the Defamation Act.  
 
Of the seven cases where levels of damages claimed were detailed, two were claims for $1-
$5,000, one was a claim in the range of $30,000 - $50,000, one was a claim for $50,000-
$100,000, one was for $100,000-$500,000 and two were claims for over $500,000. One claim 
at the latter end of the scale involved a newspaper in a South Pacific jurisdiction and the claim 
was believed by the lawyer to be political and therefore intended to chill. The other claim for 
over $500,000 was against an ISP defendant as well as a newspaper defendant and the figure 
may have been a total claimed for both publications. The next largest claim ($100,000 - 
$500,000) was against a brochure, a non-media defendant, and the claim below that in the 
range of $50,000 - $100,000 was against a magazine. This information is presented in Table 
11 below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
above, the total of 19 claims detailed by the defence lawyers therefore represents nearly 22% of possible media 
defendant defamation claims in the period 1996-2001. 
497
  The percentages add up to more than 100 because one claim was against both a newspaper and an ISP. 
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Table 11.     
Levels of damages claimed in court cases which did not come to a hearing – 




1-2. $1,000 - $5,000 Newspaper x 2 
3. $30,000-$50,000 Newspaper 
4. $50,001-$100,000 Magazine 
5. $100,000- $500,000 Brochure 
6-7. Over $500,000 Newspaper, newspaper and Internet 
9-18. Undisclosed Newsmedia (TV x 4, newspaper x 6) 
 
 
Of the seven cases where the damages figure claimed was known, four cases involved news 
media defendants. In two of these cases, that situation was explicable – one involved a claim 
also against an ISP as well as a newspaper and the figure would have been disclosed in 
relation to the non-news media defendant. The other involved a claim arising in a South 
Pacific jurisdiction which had no such controls on disclosure. However, for two of the cases 
filed against news media defendants, in both cases a newspaper, the disclosure appeared to be 
in breach of s 43(1) of the Defamation Act.498 This was confirmed in one case, where the 
defence lawyer noted that the plaintiff was unrepresented and had breached the provision. The 
reason for the other apparent breach was not disclosed.  
 
2.4.3 Complexity of proceedings 
The defence lawyers were asked what defences they pleaded or defensive arguments they 
made, and most had put forward a robust collection of these. The most popular pleadings were 
truth, honest opinion and that the words were not defamatory. Two-thirds pleaded truth, while 
the same figure pleaded honest opinion. Sixty-one percent pleaded that the words were not 
defamatory. Twenty-two percent pleaded the plaintiff’s bad reputation, one-sixth used 
                                                          
498
  See the discussion at Chapters Five, 2.8.6, and Six, 2.5 above. 
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qualified privilege based on Adam v Ward499, and 5% each pleaded qualified privilege based 
on Lange,500 statutory qualified privilege,501 and that the plaintiff could not be identified. 
Twenty-two percent did not identify the defence arguments raised. 
 
Defence lawyers were asked if the cases involved interlocutory proceedings, in an effort to 
determine how protracted and difficult the cases were to defend. The most common 
interlocutory procedure was discovery, which occurred in one-third of the cases. Five percent 
each involved payment into court, joinder and publication of the same matter in different 
media. One-sixth of cases did not answer this question. It seemed that 22% of cases involved 
difficult and protracted proceedings (one was described as ‘protracted,’ one involved ‘lots of 




Details were given as to outcome for nearly all cases (89%). Nearly a third of these cases 
(31%) were successful for the media defendant, in that they resulted in a summary judgment, 
or the actions were abandoned, abated or dropped. These claims involved two television 
broadcasters and two newspapers.  
 
Sixty-nine percent of the cases resulted in a settlement prior to a full hearing. The settlement 
data is quite revealing, as more information was disclosed by lawyers than could be retrieved 
from the court file search,502 in particular about the incidence and levels of costs associated 
with settlements. Eighteen percent of the settlements resulted in an apology (together with 
monetary payments), and the same proportion resulted in a retraction (again, together with a 
monetary payment). One settlement resulted in a correction, together with a monetary 
payment. 
 
                                                          
499
  Here it is argued the defendant has made a communication on an occasion where they have a legal, 
social or moral duty to make it to the party to whom it is published, and that party has a corresponding interest or 
duty to receive it: Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309. See J F Burrows, The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2005, 4th 
ed; Gen ed,  Stephen Todd), 706. 
500
   See Chapter Nine, 1.1 below. See J F Burrows, The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2005, 4th ed; Gen ed,  
Stephen Todd), 709. 
501
  Based on the operation of the Defamation Act, ss16-18 and the 1st Schedule to the Act. See J F 
Burrows, The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2005, 4th ed; Gen ed,  Stephen Todd), 716. 
502
  See Chapter Six, 2.6 above. 
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Nearly 64% of the settlements involved a payment of damages, the majority of these (71%) 
being $15,000 or under. The largest payment, $250,000 - $500,000, was against a newspaper, 
but did not involve any payment for costs. The next largest payment, $50,000 - $100,000, was 
against a television broadcaster, but was a payment which was inclusive of costs. 
 
Plaintiff costs were paid in relation to 45% of the settlements, although two of these payments 
were inclusive of damages. Of the three exclusive costs payments, none were over $5,000 and 
two-thirds appeared to be nominal only. These results are shown in Table 12 below. 
Table  12. 














1.Newspaper  X  X $5,000  
2.Magazine X      
3.Brochure X      
4.Television   X  $50,000 –  $100,000 
Inclusive 
5.Television     $0-$5,000 Small 
6. Newspaper  X    $500 
7. Newspaper     $5,000-
$15,000 
 
8. Newspaper     $250,000-
$500,000 
 
9.Newspaper      $0-
$5,000 
10.Newspaper    X $5,000-
$15,000 
 
11. Newspaper     $5,000-$15,000 
Inclusive 
 
The defence lawyers were also asked for reasons for the settlement outcome and gave some 
information in relation to nearly 82% of the settled claims. In relation to nearly 78% of these 
claims, a reason given was that the litigation risk did not favour the defendant, usually 
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because settling would be cheaper than fighting. For 54% of the claims, one explanation given 
was that the claim had some merit and so the litigation risk was too high. In one case, one 
detailed reason was that there were many defendants, which would prolong proceedings. In 
another case, the sole reason was that each party had agreed to walk away, and in a further 
case, the reasons given were that publication was negligent, indirectly identifying the plaintiff, 
the slur was serious, and the litigation risk very high even though the plaintiff was 
sympathetic. The problem in this case was clearly identified as poor journalistic practice. This 
claim was settled for the highest award of damages ($250,000 - $500,000) detailed above. The 
data suggests that two-thirds of the settled cases involved claims with some merit or great 
merit. Arguably in these cases, settlement arose not predominantly because of any chilling 
effect of the law, but for sensible tactical reasons. 
 
2.5 Experience of defamation statements of claim which came to a full hearing 
Three defence lawyers detailed a total of four claims which came to a full hearing. These 
appeared to be quite rare in that two of the claims arose before the six year period for which 
data was sought (one arose in 1992 and one in 1993). One case arose in 1996 and one in 1997. 
In two of these cases, legal advice had been sought prior to the statement of claim being filed, 
and in the other two, it had not. Three of the claims arose from written words, while one arose 
from spoken words and pictures. The defendants in two of the cases were newspapers, in one 
case a television broadcaster and in the other case, the publisher of a newsletter. 
 
In all cases, damages were sought, and in three of the cases, the levels of damages were high. 
Two of the cases involved claims in the range of $100,001-$500,000, and one case involved a 
claim of over $500,000. One claim was undisclosed. 
 
Two cases involved news media defendants, but in only one of these was the claim 
undisclosed, as the other case arose before the 1992 Act when the s 43 requirement of non-
disclosure came into force. Therefore, the undisclosed claim was made against the television 
defendant, the two claims of $100,001-$500,000 were made against a newspaper and the 




2.5.1 Complexity of proceedings 
Once again, the defendant lawyers pleaded a robust collection of defences. In all the cases, the 
lawyers pleaded truth, and in three they also pleaded honest opinion. In two of the cases, 
Adam v Ward qualified privilege was pleaded, and in the same number of cases, the lawyer 
pleaded that the words were not defamatory. In one case, the lawyer pleaded that limited 
publication should mitigate damages and in another, the plaintiff’s bad reputation was 
pleaded. 
 
As would be expected in cases that went to trial, these examples involved numerous 
procedural issues. All four of the cases had involved discovery, while half involved joinder, 
half involved publication of same matter in different media, and payment into court and 
interrogatories also arose in half of the cases. One case involved an issue as to mode of trial 
which had to be resolved. However, in only one case was there an indication that proceedings 
were deliberately prolonged by a plaintiff for tactical reasons, and in another case, the lawyer 
specifically noted that all the procedural points raised by the other side were relevant. 
 
2.5.2 Outcomes of trials 
The outcome of these trials clearly favoured the defendants. Three of the trials resulted in 
wins for the defendant. In the other case, damages were awarded to the plaintiff, but were 
only in the range of $1,000-$5,000. Furthermore, in this case, the lawyer had made a well-
judged payment into court, and because the damages awarded were less than the payment in, 
costs were awarded to the defendant. An appeal by the plaintiff was abandoned. 
 
2.5.3 Mode of trial 
Three of the cases were heard by judge alone, in one case, a District court judge.503 The 
remaining case was heard by a judge and jury at the plaintiff’s request. 
 
2.5.4 Reasons for defending to trial 
Reasons for defending the matter to a full trial varied. More than one reason could be given. 
In one case, the lawyer stated bluntly there was no defamation. In another, commercial 
considerations determined the defence. In two cases, the defendant’s character drove the 
defence in that a client refused to publish an apology and stuck to a ‘businessman’s principle,’ 
or had ‘very strong views’. In the third case, (where small damages eventually had to be paid) 
                                                          
503
  There are no District court juries for civil matters: s. 58 District Courts Act 1947. 
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the lawyer exercised quite subtle judgment. That lawyer considered there were reasonable 
defences, had judged correctly that the claim was high but the award was likely to be low, and 
clearly perceived the plaintiff as unreasonable. Once again, the data does not indicate the 
presence of an excessive chilling factor in these cases. Although the cases involved high 
damages claims, the claims were fought to trial and the majority were won. In those cases, in 
all likelihood, at least some of the defendant’s costs would be paid by the plaintiff. The only 
damages award was very small compared to the claim and no costs were paid in that case. 
Such results would be encouraging to the media. 
 
2.5.5 Length of proceedings 
The defence lawyers who had taken matters to full trial were asked how long it took to 
determine each proceeding. This question was answered in relation to three cases. In one of 
these cases the matter had taken 2-3 years from beginning to end. In two of the cases, the 
matter had taken 3-5 years. There was no indication that this was seen as unusual or 
unacceptable. 
 
2.6 Defence lawyers’ general experience of remedies 
This part of the investigation sought experiences and views relating to damages, to other 




Seven of the eight defence lawyers answered the question asking in their experience, what 
percentage of plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs did not seek damages. Four thought only 1-
10% did not do so, one thought that 11-25% did not, and two thought that 26-50% did not. 
Therefore, seeking damages appeared to be a preference for a majority of plaintiffs. The 
majority of the seven respondents also thought, however, that more plaintiffs are seeking 
remedies other than damages than in the past, although one noted that the increase was not by 
much. Two did not think there had been any change. 
 
Five of the defence lawyers answered the question whether they thought levels of damages 
claimed were rising. Four of these did think levels were rising, but three attributed the rise to 
inflation and half of them offered other reasons, such as the publication of awards in other 
jurisdictions, the level to which the media was seen to be invasive, and higher defence costs 
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attributable to more complex civil litigation  and longer trials. (The latter reason can only 
apply to actual damages awarded, not to claims made). One defence lawyer did not think 
levels of damages claimed had risen overall. The majority of the defence lawyers, then, did 
not think levels of damages claimed were rising other than to take account of inflation. 
 
Defence lawyers were asked what proportion of writs they suspected were gagging writs and 
five of the eight lawyers offered views on this issue. All those respondents thought that 
gagging writs do exist. However, the majority (60%) put the figure at between 10% and 20%. 
One indicated that only 1%-5% of writs had a gagging element, while another simply 
indicated that some writs have this function. Therefore, the incidence of gagging writs was 
not seen as high. 
 
The defence lawyers were asked if the requirement that there be no reference to a figure of 
damages claimed in statements of claim where the media is involved504 had made any 
difference to the incidence of gagging writs. Four of the lawyers responded, and three of these 
replied in the negative. The remaining respondent replied ‘yes’, but thought that the gagging 
writ has been replaced by attempts to obtain interim injunctions. 
 
2.6.2 Injunctions 
The defence lawyers were asked about the incidence of actions seeking interim injunctions. 
Seven expressed views on this issue, and all thought that such claims were rare, although one 
of these thought that such applications had replaced gagging writs. Reasons for this were the 
costs involved, and the high threshold test which makes successful applications very 
difficult.505 Applications for permanent injunctions were seen as even rarer than claims for 
interim orders because the effluxion of time renders permanent orders pointless. 
 
Ex parte injunctions506 were also considered by these seven respondents and none saw them 
as a problem. Four thought such orders were difficult for plaintiffs to obtain, while nearly two 
thought this was impossible, and the remaining respondent referred to the task as ‘not very 
easy’. Two of the lawyers commented that a media defendant could always be served with the 
papers somehow, and a further defence lawyer thought that ex parte applications should not 
be successful. It appeared then, that the defence lawyers did not regard the injunction 
                                                          
504
  Section 43 of the Defamation Act 1992. See Chapters Five, 2.8.6, and Six, 2.5 above. 
505
  TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey [1999] 2 NZLR 129. 
506
  Applications for prevention of publication made without notice to the defendant. 
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Five of the defence lawyers commented on the sort of circumstances in which plaintiffs 
sought declarations. Examples given were where a plaintiff was a partnership or a company 
principally motivated to avoid proving loss, where a speedy correction was the desired 
outcome, where the plaintiff was a politician in a claim funded by Government and under 
Cabinet rules, any damages would go to the Crown, where damages would be low but costs 
high, and where an ordinary individual was suing an ordinary individual.   
 
2.6.4 Retraction or reply  
The defence lawyers were asked in what circumstances they would recommend a defendant 
client agree to make a retraction or reply. Six of this group indicated they would make such a 
recommendation if the defendant got it wrong and after weighing up the relative costs versus 
possible damages and the risk of the litigation. However, two of these commented that they 
would negotiate this remedy as part of a settlement in the usual way rather than use the 
procedure in the Defamation Act, because the defendant is at risk as to costs and expenses.507 
 
2.6.5 Corrections 
When asked about corrections, seven of the defence lawyers indicated that it was not unusual 
for these to be sought, but that it was also not unusual for defendants to make corrections 
without prompting. The remedy was seen as valuable to set the record straight and was often 
sought by public figures. However, once again, there was reluctance from two of the lawyers 
to use the procedures set out in the Defamation Act, as these put the defendant at risk of costs 
or increased damages.508 The lawyers preferred to recommend negotiated corrections where 
there was a clear error. This course of action was seen as ‘the best possible defence available’ 
as (together with an apology) it halted any further action, or mitigated damages, helped 
defend any subsequent case, or avoided a Press Council complaint. 
 
                                                          
507
  See s 25(2) of the Defamation Act 1992.  
508
  See s 26(3) of the Defamation Act 1992. 
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2.7 Judicial Conferences 
Six defence lawyers commented on their experience of judicial conferences. All saw these as 
valuable but the level of success depended on the willingness of the parties seek resolution, 
the comparative strengths of the parties and on who was presiding. 
 
2.8  Judge and jury 
One of the most experienced defence lawyers offered views on when trial by judge alone 
would be sought. Reasons given included where there is a difficult, unattractive plaintiff, 
there are technical legal issues or a difficult case, such as one involving corporate issues or 
complicated accounts, and where the defendant is legally right. 
 
2.9 Conclusion on defendant lawyer data 
The data collected from the defence lawyers appears to mirror and reinforce that collected 
from the media and the court survey data.509 It does not suggest the presence of an excessive 
chill factor arising from New Zealand’s defamation laws.  
 
The defence lawyers who pre-vetted material indicated that the process involved a joint effort 
between legal adviser and the media defendant to ensure that stories could be told rather than 
expunged. Although amendments and changes were made to the content of publications, 
defence lawyers said it was extremely rare for material to be deleted altogether.  
 
The views and experiences collated about threats of legal action reveal no indication that the 
number of threats is increasing or unmanageable. It is apparent that most threats were low 
level, and were dealt with on that basis. Apology was the most common remedy sought, 
although damages and corrections were not far behind. But in any event, over half the threats 
received by the defence lawyers were rejected and the others strongly resisted. Ultimately, 
two-thirds of the threats went away or were abandoned and a limited concession only was 
made in under a third. No damages were paid in relation to any threat dealt with by these 
lawyers. 
 
The cases reported which involved filed proceedings that did not come to a full hearing also 
point to lack of excessive chill. Only a quarter of the total were difficult or protracted 
proceedings. Nearly a third of the cases were dropped. Of the two-thirds of cases which 
                                                          
509
  See Chapter Five, 3. Conclusion, and Chapter Six, 3. Conclusion, above. 
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settled, 64% resulted in a payment of damages. However, most of those payments were under 
$15,000. Plaintiff costs were paid in less than half of the settlements and appeared to be low. 
Although the cost of litigation was one reason for settling in most of the claims, in two-thirds 
of them, the reason for this litigation risk being regarded as too high was that the claim had 
some merit or great merit. In short, the defendant was being told, ‘it is not worth you fighting 
on because the plaintiff has a realistic chance of winning on the merits.’ These were not 
baseless or speculative claims, intended to chill. 
 
Most of the cases going to full trial which were detailed were successfully defended. Even the 
case that was not could be seen as a tactical victory for the defendant because it resulted in 
low damages and no costs being paid.510 In the outright win cases, significant costs of the 
defendant could be recovered from the plaintiff. 
 
Generally, it seems the defence lawyers did not think damages claims were rising and were 
not concerned about the incidence of gagging writs. Furthermore, attempts to pre-censor 
publication by applying for injunctions, ex parte or otherwise, were seen as rare and difficult 
to achieve.  
 
3. Plaintiff lawyers’ experience  
Six lawyers acting for plaintiffs in defamation matters were surveyed or interviewed about 
their experience of defamation claims. Four members of this group gave information about 
their level of experience in defamation practice. Half of these had been carrying out such 
work for 5-10 years, one had been practising in the area for 10-20 years and one had longer 




Five of the plaintiff lawyers supplied details of a total of 11 letters before action they had sent 
on behalf of clients. Three of the letters were sent in 2001, while the year the others were sent 
was not identified (although respondents were asked to detail the most recent letter they had 
sent). The 11 threatening letters were sent on behalf of more than 11 clients. The largest 
category of client was that of the individual, the complainant in relation to 72% of these 
                                                          
510
  The lawyers may have tended to report successes rather than failures. However, the reporting of 
settlements does not suggest this, and lawyers were asked simply to detail the most recent claims they dealt with 
in order. 
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claims. In over a third of the letters, the client was a private company, while in 18% they were 
a celebrity. One letter before action was sent on behalf of a politician.  
 
Nearly 55% of the letters before action complained about defamation arising from the written 
word, while 27% arose from 2 separate incidents involving written and spoken words. One 
letter arose from a combination of spoken words and a pictorial combination, and one arose 
from spoken words only. The letters were sent to more than 11 potential defendants because 
there were some incidences of publication of the same words in different media. Nearly 64% 
of the publications arose in newspapers, while over a third involved a broadcaster.  Eighteen 
percent of the publications arose from Internet providers, the same number arose in a book, 
and one in a magazine. Two publications arose from other non-media individuals. Most of 
these threatening letters were therefore sent to media defendants as defined in this survey. 
 
In all cases, more than one remedy was sought in the letter before action. An apology and 
damages were the most popular remedy sought, arising in relation to nearly 82% letters each 
(not necessarily always together). The next most popular remedy sought was a correction, 
which arose in nearly 73% letters. Retractions were almost as popular, being sought in nearly 
64% of the letters. Prevention of publication was sought in 9% of the letters. In no case was 
an apology or damages sought as the only remedy.  
 
Levels of damages sought were identified in relation to five claims, although one of these 
involved two potential defendants, so six different levels were identified. One case involved a 
claim greater than $500,000, two involved claims between $100,001 - $500,000, two involved 
claims between $50,001 - $100,000 and one specified a claim between $30,001-$50,000.511 
These results are shown in Table 13 below. 
                                                          
511
  Section 43 of the Defamation Act 1992 does not prevent a letter before action specifying the level of 
damages claimed. See pp. 140 above. 
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Table 13. 




1. $30,000-$50,000 Newspaper 
2-3. $50,001-$100,000 Broadcaster. Newspaper 
4-5. $100,000 - $500,000 Newspaper, broadcaster, book (one claim 
appears to be a total against all three 
defendants). Newspaper 
 
Plaintiff lawyers were asked whether the work involved in dealing with the letters before 
action was complex or otherwise, in an attempt to determine how this might have affected the 
defendants. The majority of cases appeared not to be complex. Over a third (36%) of letters 
involved straightforward correspondence, while half that figure again involved little 
correspondence and a further letter involved straightforward negotiations. Only 18% involved 
difficult negotiations. The complexity of the dealings was not identified in relation to 18%  
cases. 
 
As to outcome, this data was inconclusive, as in just over half of the claims, matters were still 
proceeding, and in one further case, the outcome was not recorded. In the four cases 
remaining, all resulted in some sort of concession to the plaintiff. One letter resulted in an 
apology, retraction, correction and settlement, one in a retraction, a correction and a 
settlement, one in a settlement and a decision not to publish further, and one in a correction. 
Therefore, three cases had known outcomes which involved a settlement of some kind. No 
details of settlement were captured. 
 
3.2 Experience of defamation statements of claim which did not come to a full hearing 
Three plaintiff lawyers supplied details relating to a total of five claims which went to court, 
but did not result in a full hearing. One of these claims was from 1998, two were from 1999 
and for two, the date of the claim was unknown, although the respondents were asked to detail 
the most recent claims they had dealt with. 
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The majority of claims were made by individuals (three), while one was made by a private 
sector company, one was made by a celebrity and in one case, the plaintiff was 
unidentified.512 The majority of claims arose from the written word (four), while one claim 
arose from spoken words. The defendants reflected this breakdown, in that four claims were 
filed against newspapers and one against a broadcaster (television). 
 
One of the claims sought damages in the range of $15,001 - $30,000, and the same number 
sought damages in the range of $250,000 - $500,000. The majority (three) sought damages in 
the range of $50,001 - $100,000. The highest claim was against a newspaper and the lowest 
against the television broadcaster. No other remedies were specified as being claimed. 
 
3.2.1 Defences 
The defendants pleaded a mixed bag of defences, none on their own. In all cases, truth was 
pleaded, and that the words were not defamatory. Honest opinion was the next most popular 
defence, arising in four of the five proceedings. The plaintiff’s bad reputation was pleaded in 
relation to two of the claims, (although strictly speaking this is a mitigating factor, not a 
defence), as was the Lange form of qualified privilege. The Adam v Ward form of qualified 
privilege was pleaded in relation to one of the claims.513 
 
3.2.2 Complexity of proceedings 
Little information was forthcoming as to the complexity of these proceedings. Discovery had 
arisen in two of the cases, and publication of the same matter in different media had occurred 
in one. In three of the cases, no information was given or the proceedings were too young to 
have given rise to interlocutories as yet. 
 
3.2.3 Outcome 
One case was still continuing (this was the largest damages claim). All of the remaining  cases 
had resulted in a settlement. However, half of these involved no damages, but rather a 
correction and retraction. In these cases, damages claimed had been in the medium range, of 
$50,001 - $100,000. In the two settlements where damages were paid, these were not 
particularly high. One payment was in the $5,001 - $15,000 range and the other was in the 
$30,001-$50,000 range. In both these cases, the amount settled for was in a range about half 
that which had been claimed. In all of the settlements, no costs were paid. 
                                                          
512
  The figures add up to more than 100% because one claim was made by two plaintiffs. 
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3.2.4 Reasons for settling 
In the two cases where the settlement involved a correction and retraction, it was the 
satisfactory nature of these remedies which made the settlements acceptable. In one of the 
cases where damages were paid, the client’s desire to settle was the reason given. In the final 
case where the smallest award of damages was accepted, the lawyer had weighed up the likely 
costs of fighting on against the maximum damages which were likely to result.  
 
3.3 Experience of defamation statements of claim which came to a full hearing 
Four of the plaintiff lawyers were able to supply details of a total of six cases which were 
resolved by a full court hearing. One of these cases arose in 1996, two in 1998, one in 1999 
and in two of the cases, the date the statement of claim was filed was not identified. 
 
The six cases were filed by a total of 9 plaintiffs. All of the cases involved a plaintiff who was 
an individual, and one third involved celebrity plaintiffs. One case also had a plaintiff which 
was a private sector company. All of the claims arose from written words, and one claim also 
involved the spoken word as well. The defendants once again reflected this breakdown, being 
a newspaper in all of the cases, and additionally in one case, a broadcaster. 
 
3.3.1 Remedies sought 
In all cases, damages were sought, in half of them, without other specified remedies. In two of 
the cases, the level of damages were unspecified. In one case, the level of damages claimed 
was in the $30,001 - $50,000 range, while in one other claim, the range was $50,001 - 
$100,000. In two of the cases, the level of damages claimed was in the $100,001 - $500,000 
range. In two cases, an apology, correction and retraction were sought as well as damages. In 
one other case, a declaration was sought together with damages. 
 
3.3.2 Defences 
In two of the cases, defences pleaded were not specified. In the remaining four cases, an 
extensive collection of defences was filed. In all, truth, honest opinion, and an argument that 
the words were not defamatory, were raised. In three of them, Lange qualified privilege and 
the plaintiff’s bad reputation were pleaded. In half of these cases, statutory qualified privilege 
based on the Defamation Act 1992 Schedule was raised. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
513
  See Chapter Two, 1.9.1 above. 
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3.3.3 Complexity of proceedings. 
Once again, plaintiff lawyers were asked to identify the interlocutory proceedings involved. In 
two cases, these were not identified. Of the remaining four cases, all had involved discovery. 
 
3.3.4 Outcome 
In one case, the outcome was not detailed. In the remaining five, all outcomes appeared to 
favour the plaintiff. In one case, a correction and retraction was agreed after the full hearing 
but prior to a damages hearing. (Damages claimed in this case had been in the $50,001 - 
$100,000 range and a declaration had also been sought.)  
 
In the other four cases, damages had been paid. Levels of damages paid varied. In one of the 
cases where damages were paid, the amount was specified as $50,000. In one case, the level 
paid was in the range $50,001-$100,000, in another it was over $100,000 and in the final case, 
the level was unspecified. In most of the cases, it appeared the level of damages paid was in a 
range which was about half that claimed. However, one of these cases was unusual in that the 
plaintiff appeared to have been awarded more at trial than originally claimed (this case against 
a newspaper resulting in an award in the $50,001 - $100,000 range had involved a claim in the 
$30,001-$50,000 range. The plaintiff’s lawyer did note that the matter was fought to trial 
because of the defendant’s stupidity). 
 
In two of the cases where damages were awarded, plaintiff costs were paid by the defendant, 
but they were not more than the damages. In the case settled before the damages hearing with 
a correction and retraction, no plaintiff costs were paid. No information on the matter of costs 
was given in relation to the other half of the cases. 
 
3.3.5 Mode of trial 
Insufficient information was given of the mode of trial for these cases. 
 
3.3.6 Length of proceedings 
In half of the six cases detailed, no information was given as to length of proceedings from 
beginning to end. The other three had apparently not taken too long. One case was finished 




3.4 Plaintiff lawyers’ general experience of remedies 
The six plaintiff lawyers were also asked about their general experiences and views relating to 
damages, to other remedies and about procedural matters such as judicial conferences and 
trial before judge and jury.  
 
3.4.1 Damages 
Four of the plaintiff lawyers responded to a question asking what percentage of clients do not 
wish to seek damages initially. Two of these thought only a small group (1-10%) did not seek 
damages at the outset, while one chose 26-50% and one thought 51-75% did not. One 
practitioner who thought the seeking of damages was common additionally commented that 
there was a perception that damages will gag the defendant. 
 
When asked if they always advised plaintiffs to seek damages, two said ‘no’, one noting that 
trial can be as damaging as the initial publication, while another stated they might seek a 
declaration or correction. One was of the view that damages were the traditional remedy, 
implying that advice to this effect was given. 
 
This group of plaintiff lawyers was asked how they went about selecting the figure of 
damages to be pursued as a remedy. Four responded, some nominating more than one reason. 
Three took into account the severity of the words used, half stated that they took into account 
extent of publication, and half also investigated the behaviour of the defendant to see if the 
damage had been aggravated, or if there was ill will involved. One used the schedule of 
awards of the last 20 years, and one used financial quantification if relevant. One simply 
stated that case experience determined the figure. 
 
When asked if they had any special approach to remedies where the defendant is a media 
defendant, three of the plaintiff lawyers replied. Two said no, however, one of these stated a 
belief that media should correct when wrong and defend otherwise. Corrections also featured 
for the remaining plaintiff lawyer, who stated that a correction would be sought first, followed 
by court action. This indicated that corrections are seen as valuable. 
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These lawyers were asked whether they thought levels of damages were rising. Four answered 
the question. Three of these answered yes, but suggested that the rise might simply be due to 
inflation. One plaintiff lawyer did not think levels of damages were rising.  
 
To the question whether claiming a large award persuaded defendants to settle, the replies 
were generally negative. Of the four who answered the question, one stated settlement of a 
large award might occur earlier if the defendant was insured, one stated that both private 
plaintiffs and defendants faced funding dilemmas, one stated that the strength, not the size of 
the claim was determinative, and one simply answered in the negative. 
 
3.4.2 Injunction 
This group was asked how easy they thought it was to obtain an ex parte injunction. Four 
responded and all stated that this was difficult to impossible, or very rare.  
 
3.4.3 Declaration 
Plaintiff lawyers were asked in what circumstances they would seek a declaration as a 
remedy. Four responded to this question and some offered more than one suggestion. Three 
would seek the remedy where the plaintiff did not want money because the declaration was 
more valuable, for example, as a speedy correction. Other individual reasons given were 
where a company could not prove it had suffered damage, but could show it was likely, where 
the defendant was impecunious or a public entity, or where there was a point of principle. One 
respondent thought declarations could achieve a gagging outcome because the defendant 
would bear the costs under the Defamation Act if they failed to resist the remedy. 
 
3.4.4 Retraction or reply 
The lawyers were asked how often and in what circumstances they sought a retraction and 
reply for plaintiff clients. Five responded, although one had never tried this. One stated they 
rarely sought anything associated with a reply because it connoted a continuing argument, 
while a retraction and apology connoted acceptance of a wrongful statement by a defendant. 
Three said they often or regularly sought this remedy, one of these stated that it was found 




When asked how often and in what circumstances they sought a correction, four plaintiff 
lawyers responded. Two stated they did so very often or almost always, while one noted they 
do so increasingly, about 30% of the time where the desire is to set the record straight, for 
example, where the plaintiff was a public figure. 
 
3.5 Judicial conferences 
The lawyers were asked about their experience of judicial conferences and whether they 
thought the process had assisted the resolution of the matter. Only three responded, and all of 
these appeared to think that the potential of such conferences to assist resolution was limited. 
One thought conferences might come too late in the process, one thought that there had to be 
willingness of the parties to resolve, which was absent 50% of the time, and one thought that 
the presiding judge had to be experienced in defamation matters. 
 
3.6 Judge and jury 
Four of the plaintiff lawyers gave reasons why they would seek a trial before judge alone as 
opposed to a judge and jury, and offered more than one suggestion. The reasons given were 
where the matter is very technical, where the plaintiff has a bad reputation, for example from 
previous convictions, where the plaintiff cannot afford a jury trial, where the issue may be 
populist, and where some other feature suggests it,  such as  the relevant city is parochial. 
 
3.7 Conclusion on plaintiff lawyer data 
The plaintiff lawyer data is of less assistance in ‘getting a feel’ for what happens in practice 
than that collected from defendant lawyers, in part because fewer lawyers representing 
plaintiffs were surveyed or interviewed, fewer cases were detailed by them and more of the 
outcomes in the claims they detailed were incomplete. Furthermore, the plaintiff lawyer 
detailed cases could not be added to those of the defence lawyers to establish some percentage 
of possible defamation claims against the media, because there might have been an overlap in 
the data – in other words, the plaintiff lawyers might have been reporting some cases which 
were the same as those detailed by the defendant lawyers, but from a plaintiff point of view. 
Nonetheless, an attempt to summarise the data is made below. 
 
The most popular remedies sought in threatening letters by plaintiff lawyers were apology and 
damages. Where damages were sought, they tended to be either in the $50,000-$100,000 or 
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$100,000 - $500,000 range. In the few claims for which outcomes were known, plaintiffs 
succeeded in obtaining some concession, three-quarters of which involved a settlement of 
some kind. Whether these involved damages and what levels were paid was unknown. In the 
majority of cases, the process of dealing with the claim was apparently not complex. 
 
For the small number of claims which did not come to a full hearing detailed by plaintiff 
lawyers, all appeared to involve claims for damages, but the majority were in the $50,000 - 
$100,000 range. Although the majority of the claims had resulted in a settlement, only half of 
these involved payment of damages and levels were about half that claimed, in no case being 
over $50,000. No costs were paid as part of these settlements. 
 
The majority of the six cases detailed which involved full court hearing had outcomes which 
favoured the plaintiff, two-thirds of the six involving a payment of damages. Levels paid were 
about half that claimed in these cases, and the largest award was over $100,000. One of these 
cases appeared to have considerable merit in that it resulted in an award which was greater 
than that claimed, although it is possible that the defendant’s behaviour during the trial 
aggravated the damage and hence increased the award. Little useful information on costs in 
the cases which went to a full hearing was obtained. 
 
When views on general aspects of remedies were sought, the plaintiff lawyers shared the view 
of defendant lawyers that levels of damages were not rising, except due to inflation. It 
appeared that while damages were popular as a remedy among plaintiff lawyers, clients were 
not automatically advised to seek them, and seeking a larger award was also not automatic. 
The majority of these lawyers also thought that ex parte injunctions were difficult to 
impossible to obtain. It seemed clear that these plaintiff lawyers saw the value of other 
remedies such as declarations, retractions and corrections  in appropriate circumstances. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Although I have noted that the data obtained from lawyers is of limited value, there are 
compelling reasons to take proper account of the results of this part of the study, particularly 
those relating to the experience of defendant lawyers. Finding out how these experienced 
defamation lawyers set about defending the media, and asking them to detail actual threats 
and claims they dealt with did produce significant findings. In particular, the defendant lawyer 
data on the breakdown of settlements did provide detail previously missing from the media 
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survey and the court file study. But perhaps the strongest feature of these results is the degree 
to which they did, in fact, replicate or coincide with those of the media in the media survey 
and the data from court files I have discussed in the previous chapters.514  
 
The lawyer data demonstrates like the media survey data that pre-vetting allows stories to be 
told, and that threats are dealt with at a low level and creatively in some cases. Threats are 
regarded as part of the daily routine of the media and are generally not seen as serious, fall by 
the wayside over half of the time, and are resolved at a low level the rest of the time, even 
where lawyers are involved. Costs associated with threats do not appear to be high.  
 
The history of court cases detailed by these lawyers appears to suggest that gagging writs are 
rare, settlements are realistic and generally made where the claim has some merit, and 
damages are not excessive when they are paid out or awarded. This is in line with the court 
file search data. 
 
Once again, it can be said that on the whole, the data in this chapter mirrors and reinforces 
that set out previously, and the picture of a largely unchilled New Zealand media persists and 
inures. Only one aspect of the empirical data remains unaddressed at this stage. In Chapter 
Eight, I examine the views of both media and lawyers on New Zealand’s defamation laws. 
 
                                                          
514
  See Chapters Five and Six above. 
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Chapter Eight – Views on the law 
 
The final part of the study sought opinion data from media and defamation lawyer 
respondents on various aspects of New Zealand’s defamation laws.515  Particular topics were 
raised specifically in the first three questions. In the next question, a list of topics was 
suggested although no specific question was asked about them. The final question was 
completely open, and allowed space for respondents to raise or comment on any other 
defamation topic they wished.516 This part analyses views arising from questions about the 
defence called constitutional qualified privilege, and whether a special media defence is 
necessary, and discusses responses which raised the matter of costs in defamation actions. It 
also deals with unsolicited responses expressing the view that the balance of the law is 
currently about right.  The response rate to this part of the survey was not as high as for the 
previous sections. It is therefore acknowledged that these responses are of value in a 
qualitative sense only. Where appropriate and useful, actual quotes have been extracted and 
isolated in the analysis. 
 
1. Views of the media on the law 
1.1  The defence of Constitutional Qualified Privilege 
As outlined previously, in 1998 and 2000 the New Zealand Court of Appeal outlined a form 
of qualified privilege defence available in defamation where the actions of politicians (past, 
present, or future) are being discussed.517  The defence is available where the occasion 
justifies privilege for political speech, where there is no ill will by the publisher, and where 
the publisher has not taken advantage of the opportunity to publish. Media respondents were 
asked to comment on the defence, which allows the media more access to a qualified privilege 
defence than in the past. Respondents offered comments on both advantages and 
disadvantages they perceived. 
 
                                                          
515
  In this Chapter, results from both the media survey and from the lawyer survey and interviews are 
presented, though in separate sections. 
516
  The media responses include those of the Press Freedom Committee of the Commonwealth Press Union 
(the Committee). 
517
  See Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424, [2000] 1 NZLR 257,  [2000] 3 NZLR 385, otherwise known 
as ‘the Lange defence’. Cf Reynolds v Times Newspapers [1999] 3 WLR 1010 in the United Kingdom and Lange 
v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 71 ALJR 818 in Australia. See Chapter Two, 1.9.1. above. 
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Forty-four percent of all 225 media respondents commented on the Lange defence. A majority 
of 59% (133) of these welcomed the defence. However, 34% (76) also expressed reservations 
about it.518 These were variations of the following:  
• The defence should be extended to all holding public office; 
• The uncertainties associated with the defence give rise to extra costs and have a 
chilling effect; 
• The defence imposes requirements on the media to establish responsible 
behaviour; 
• The defence is too difficult for juries to deal with; 
• The defence could be abused by the media. 
1. 2 A special media defence 
In the light of the developing constitutional qualified privilege, respondents were asked whether 
they still thought there should be a special media defence.  Thirty-eight percent (85) of all 225 
media respondents commented on the suggestion that a special defence be created for the 
media. Forty percent of these answered ‘yes’ while nearly half (45%) answered in the negative. 
Fifteen percent were unclear. The reasons of those who did answer in the affirmative tended to 
be rather simplistic: 
• Media are chilled by defamation laws; 
• The public has a right to be informed. 
Those who answered in the negative offered a greater variety of reasons for rejecting such a 
defence: 
• The media is professional and should be responsible; 
• The laws are adequate; 
• Free speech should be available to all; 
• The media has a greater duty of care than ordinary people. 
 
1.3. General views on the advantages and disadvantages of the laws of defamation in New 
Zealand. 
Media respondents were asked to express brief views on the advantages or disadvantages of 
New Zealand’s defamation laws, and to include suggestions for reform where appropriate. A 
significant number, 37% (84), of all media, responded. Thirty-two percent of newspapers 
commented on aspects of the law, while half of the television respondents participated in this 
                                                          
518
  Twenty-two percent made comments which indicated they were unclear about the defence. 
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section of the survey. Thirty-five percent of the radio respondents offered their views, as did 
forty-two percent of magazine respondents. One third of publisher respondents offered their 
general views on specific aspects of New Zealand’s defamation laws, as did 50% of ad 
agency and public relations firm respondents, six of the journalist and writer respondents, and 
four of the multi-media respondents. No Internet Service Provider commented on the 
defamation laws generally. Representative comments have been included in this part, as they 
give the real flavour of these qualitative responses. 
 
1.3.1 Costs 
Fifty-three percent of newspapers responding to this part of the survey commented on the cost 
of defamation proceedings. Responses indicated that costs encourage or force settlement but 
also that small publications in particular feel disadvantaged. The following comments are 
illustrative: 
• Exorbitant for a small publication like us so we would look at all other options ie 
apology, out of court settlement, before going to court.  
• Far too high. 
• Protects large papers but can discriminate against ordinary person. 
• As a student [publication] we often offend people but there is little we can do when 
threats are made except apologise, even when we haven’t actually done anything 
wrong. It is too expensive just getting legal advice. We have tried getting insurance 
but no company is interested. This limits our ability to critique things even if we have 
the evidence because we simply could not afford to defend ourselves if someone really 
wanted to have a go. It makes us very vulnerable and we have to protect ourselves in 
other ways, ie not printing things that could cause trouble (self censoring.) 
• Any litigation is going to cost money but the uncertainty of what it could cost 
encourages settlement out of court if possible. 
• The cash register starts ticking straight away. But such costs serve as a reminder that 
we should [not] trifle with people’s reputations. Our responsibility is considerable 
and a ‘gung ho’ approach is in no one’s interests. 
• Cost is of course a big factor and may influence smaller newspapers particularly to 




The Committee of the CPU thought the cost of proceedings was notoriously expensive. It 
reported that even in relatively straightforward cases, costs of $80,000 to $120,000 could be 
incurred.  The committee stated that the expense of defending unmeritorious cases pushed up 
the cost of newspapers, and regional and community papers found costs especially daunting. 
Settlements were attractive where the outcome, and the quantum of damages were uncertain, 
and the proceedings were lengthy. The Committee thought economic contingencies often 
outweighed editors’ concern for the truth. 
 
Two of the television broadcasters responding to this part of the survey highlighted the cost of 
proceedings, without giving more detail. 
 
Fifty-five percent of radio broadcasters responding to this part of the survey identified the cost 
of proceedings as a disadvantage. The comments below illustrate the issues raised in 
connection with cost by this group: 
• The cost of proceedings (especially if they are prolonged) and the threat of ever 
increasing damages can dissuade investigative journalism for all but the most 
powerful of media interests. Stories with the potential to reveal corruption, conflict of 
interest, misuse of public funds, and influence peddling etc may remain untold because 
of intimidation of those able to afford legal means to threaten costly and sometimes 
drawn out defamation actions.   
• [The laws are o]ften used to ‘gag’ legitimate stories and prevent them going into the 
public arena by use of threats.  Tends to intimidate smaller news organisations. 
 
Fifty-five percent of magazines responding to this part of the survey commented on the cost 
of proceedings as being too high. Typical comments follow: 
• I am becoming practiced at deflecting legal attacks without involving lawyers or other 
professionals. Quite simply, if a decent challenge is levelled against us the cost of 
defence will be too great for us to bear.  In the case where my company was 
challenged in the High Court we were able to (through excellent actions by my 
lawyer) embarrass the complainant who was ordered to go back to the District Court. 
When he did not pursue this further we could have gone for costs as his action was 
‘frivolous’. We did not because costs were too high for us to pay and it was easier just 
to let it drop. 
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• As a small company, we are very careful to avoid defamation writs. This arguably 
could be at the detriment of the content of the magazine.  The cost of defending any 
court action would pretty much bankrupt the company as we found with the first legal 
action.  We believed we were correct but because the company suing us was so much 
bigger we had to settle. 
 
Eighty-seven percent of publisher respondents responding to this question made comments 
to the effect that the cost of defending defamation actions had negative effects. The 
following comments are illustrative: 
• There is a great temptation to simply settle in order to limit substantial legal costs. 
Costs and delays make it easy to bring a weak or frivolous case. 
• If legal advice suggests that we are at risk we will always try to settle in the most 
economic fashion.  In the cases I have experienced the publisher has also been joined 
by the author in the action.  However as the authors are usually individuals with 
limited resources they tend to go along with whatever course of action is determined by 
the publisher. 
These publisher respondents also commented that insurance is too expensive: 
• Most small publishers (ourselves t/o of $4M + 18 staff) simply cannot afford 
insurance or to take risks by way of outspoken comment – except on a general basis. 
• More importantly and worryingly, insurance against defamation. Libel (insurance) is 
too expensive for most companies as it is mainly US based and therefore with colossal 
premiums. 
 
Half of the ad agency and public relations firms responding to this question raised the issue of 
cost of proceedings. Nearly 59% of these were public relations companies and 41% were 
advertising agencies. In general, these responses noted that costs were too high. However, this 
did not necessarily mean the respondent thought costs might have a chilling effect on media 
defendants. Only 24% specifically mentioned chilling effects. Forty-one percent focussed on 
costs as generally being a bad thing, while 35% thought that costs made it hard for plaintiffs, 
especially small plaintiffs, to bring proceedings.  
 
Four of the journalist and writer respondents identified costs as chilling the media and 
freedom of expression, as did three of the multi-media respondents. 
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To summarise, fifty-one percent of media giving their views on the law identified costs as a 
cause for concern. The main reasons given were: 
• Costs are too high; 
• Costs are exorbitant for small publications;  
• Insurance costs too much; 
• The uncertainty of the cost of litigation has a chilling effect. 
The concern about costs and their effect on small publications was by far the most common 
issue raised, being identified by 20% of these respondents. 
 
1.3.2 No significant difficulties with the law/ the balance is about right 
Nearly 29% of newspapers responding to the part of the survey seeking open-ended 
commentary made general comments indicating that the current law did not create significant 
difficulties, or had the balance about right. One respondent commented that the developing 
law of privacy was more of a concern. Illustrative comments are set out below: 
• Generally speaking, threats of defamation are a niggling irritant to us rather than 
a crushing burden. Our policy is to minimise them by taking all possible care prior 
to publication eg by having senior editorial executives vet problematic stories and 
where necessary, submitting them to our lawyers (which we do frequently). By far 
the majority of defamation threats are dealt with either by a simple clarification or 
correction, or simply lapse. 
• From a practical point of view, I don’t have major problems with the law of 
defamation. If the material is true, accurate and published without malice – which 
is what we should be doing – where are the problems? 
• I think that current law in practice is about right. It seems to be achieving a good 
balance between the rights of the individual and the public right to know. 
• We personally accept that defamation is subjective and always accidental, in 
essence an occupational hazard. If you set out to be provocative then you accept 
the risk. However a lot of people see media as a fair target for mercenary or 
political spin reasons. 
• Currently constructed laws on defamation seem reasonable provided one has the 
defences ie the truth, qualified privilege etc. The biggest growing problem is going 
to be in the area of PRIVACY and its definition or interpretation by judges. 
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Eighteen percent of magazine respondents responding to this part of the survey thought that 
the laws created no problems for magazines. The quote which follows is illustrative: 
 
• I believe that the defamation law as it stands is not too bad. With due care and 
professionalism, it is possible for the media to cover virtually any story without serious 
risk of a defamation action.  Reputations are important and the right of individuals to 
defend them should not be eroded just because major publishers want to be freed to 
publish emotive stories about celebrities, politicians and other newsmakers for the 
publishers’ financial gain.  ‘Freedom of the press’ is being intoned to support changes 
in the defamation law at a time when major news media are running down their serious 
news resources. This lobbying should be seen for what it really is – commercial self 
interest.  It has nothing to do with freedom of the press. 
 
One of the journalists and writers responding to this part of the survey saw no real problems 
with the laws of defamation. This view was predicated on recognition that the media should 
behave responsibly: 
• … as someone who has worked in newspapers for more than 40 years with a special 
interest in media law, I have never found it a hardship to work within the parameters 
set by the existing defamation law set up by defences etc – working within the 
parameters or around the law if necessary!  
Truth I regard as an effective defence. Turning the usual media complaints on their 
head I would say “if you are going to run it, make sure you can prove it. Don’t say if 
you can’t. 
Privilege is a great tool for revealing information and any expansion of its breadth or 
scope is to be welcomed. Eg: Court reveals much which is protected by privilege. But 
we must be there. No use bleating about cost of reportage. If we want info, be there! 
Honest opinion (formerly fair comment) is a complex, but useful defence. But again, it 
must be based on true facts and I regard that as important.  
I do not believe that the news media should be able to make allegations against people 
and not be held responsible if they are wrong or careless. 
 
One multi-media respondent commented on the problems faced by smaller organisations but 
appeared to believe overall that any problems could be overcome if the media did its job 
properly. This comment has therefore been added to that of another multi-media respondent 
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who saw no real problems with the laws of defamation, with the result that half of these 
respondents commenting on problems with the law saw no real problems. This view was also 
predicated on recognition that the media should behave responsibly: 
• The courts and justice are far too expensive for a small business to entertain. Still 
uncomfortable stories need to be told. Sticking to verified facts has generally served 
over 45 years in the trade. Facts must be dug for, not given up on or freedom of 
information suffers.  
• Personally I think the requirement to get facts right is very important and shouldn’t be 
reduced. I also think most media organisations are gutless, easily intimidated, more 
interested in multi-million dollar profits than pushing the envelope, and, quite frankly, 
contemptible. No other publisher in NZ  is as heavy hitting as we are. Advertisers or 
old-boys network pressure has a more chilling effect on free speech than the 
defamation laws. 
 
To summarise, eleven percent of all media responding to the part of the survey seeking 
general comments about the law made statements that indicated they thought the balance of 
the law was acceptable or manageable to the media. These views can be summarised as 
follows: 
• Care and responsibility can overcome most problems; 
• The balance between the public right to know and the rights of the individual is about 
right; 
• Privacy is a greater problem. 
Although this result is not useful in a quantitative sense, I suggest it is has some qualitative 
value, because the comments were unsolicited, and are thoughtful, strongly-reasoned and lack 
self-interest. The comments are also consistent with the reported experience of media defence 
lawyers on vetting.519 
 
2. Views of defendant and plaintiff lawyers on the law 
The final part of the lawyers’ survey sought the views of both plaintiff and defendant lawyers 
on the same aspects of the law as had been raised with the media. The 10 lawyers were asked 
specifically about the Lange qualified privilege defence, whether there was a need for a 
                                                          
519
  See Chapter Seven, 2.2 above. 
 204
special defence for the media, and the issue of costs. The lawyers could also nominate and 
give views on any other aspect of the law of defamation which concerned them 
 
2.1 The defence of constitutional qualified privilege 
Seventy percent of lawyer respondents indicated that they welcomed the extended defence 
generally. A sample of these views is set out below. 
• It’s a god send to the media.  Politicians used to benefit from this area of the law more 
than most.  Now, there is a greater degree of protection for the media commenting on 
a politician’s record. …I think it’s a great defence “in name” for the media because it 
will make politicians a little more wary about suing the media.   
• In my view, Lange has extended the defence of qualified privilege from that previously 
understood.  The extension should benefit freedom of expression (information) and the 
media. 
• In my view this type of defence should be available in a robust democracy. 
• Provides a defence with some degree of certainty. 
• I support the decision overall.  [In]a small country like New Zealand where MMP is 
the system, politicians too long getting mandates etc, it allows deeper scrutiny.   
• I believe the defence is very useful.   
However, strong reservations were also expressed by 60% of respondents and these are set out 
below: 
• I see serious proof problems, ...  For example, when it is “political”.  What measure 
governs “responsibility”.  It’s difficult to know when it will be applied and when it 
won’t!!  For example, when will it be “political” and when will it not?  By what 
measure are the acts of the journalist to be considered responsible or irresponsible? 
• The concept of responsibility does not sit well with the concept of qualified privilege 
which you only need when you are wrong. 
• The second Lange decision was wrong.  Justice Tipping’s judgment was wrong.  A 
conservative view had been taken of the position of the media by importing other 
areas of tort law.  Only lip service was paid to s. 14 values, as opposed to a possible 
chill of freedom of expression. 
• In purist terms, unattractive for courts (or Parliament for that matter) to import 
concepts of fault into this cause of action but to restrict it to the public figure. 
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• Lack of certainty on what will be “irresponsible” and effect on newspaper sources 
remains to be seen. 
• …so long as it does not turn the defence of honesty into one of reasonableness 
Thus, it is apparent the main objection to the defence from defamation lawyers was that raised 
by  the media,520 a fear that the defence imposes something like a duty of responsibility on the 
media, which may result in investigation of its working methods. However, one fifth of the 
defamation lawyers saw no difficulty in this: 
• I think duty of care should be on the media. It is the only profession with immunity. 
Care means reasonable care, looking at a balance from both sides.  The press can 
ensure this is done.  Good journalists take care anyway. 
• I think it is good that media methods are investigated, so long as it does not turn the 
defence of honesty into one of reasonableness. 
 
One other response also looked forward to future development of the defence, implicitly 
recognising that its ambit would be further litigated:521  
• It will be interesting to see whether there are further extensions beyond the type of 
publication named in Lange. 
These views mirror those of the media to a large degree,522 except that there was no 
suggestion that the defence is too difficult for juries to deal with or that the defence could be 
abused by the media.  
 
Just how far Lange can be extended in New Zealand still remains to be tested. There has been 
a paucity of case law, and the only other Court of Appeal decision so far is Vickery v 
McLean.523 However, it is clear from the responses to the interviews discussed in this chapter 
that the defence was being used in a number of claims which had not come before the courts 
almost immediately after the Lange litigation was finally concluded. I consider the Lange case 
to be the most significant development in modern New Zealand defamation law. I discuss in 
Chapter Nine below what that significance is and also make some suggestions as to what 
future direction this emerging common law doctrine might take. 
 
                                                          
520
  See 1.1 above. 
521
  As has indeed occurred: see Chapter Nine, 1.1 below. 
522
  See 1.1 above. 
523
  Unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 125-00, 20 November 2000. 
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2.2 A special media defence 
Seventy percent of lawyer respondents answered the question whether there should be a 
special defence for the media. Over half of these replied in the negative. Of the three who 
suggested that some sort of special protection was required, two put forward special adaptions 
of the Lange defence discussed above: 
•  Yes but I wonder whether “responsibility” should be replaced with more easily and 
objectively understood parameters eg publication is made (a) with the personal 
approval of the editor or director of news; and (b) designed to contradict either a 
statement, policy, principle or action of the particular (solicitor) individual about 
whom the statement is published. 
• It would be nice for the media to have a wider public interest/qualified privilege 
defence as seems to be the effect of the English decisions.   I believe that Lange and 
any wider defence will be tagged with a constraint that the defence will be lost unless 
the defendant proves it acted reasonably (which would normally include putting the 
defamatory matter to the defendant for comment).  The precedent is in S10 where the 
defendant must prove genuineness. 
 
The other was concerned simply to preserve confidentiality of sources. Thus, these views 
were directed more at developing the Lange defence or controlling it, rather than at suggesting 
there was a real need for a special defence for the media. 
 
2.3 Costs 
Sixty percent of the defamation lawyers made comments about costs associated with 
defamation actions. All were of the view that proceedings were costly. However, only half of 
these had strongly negative views, one of these being focussed on the cost of court fees: 
• Juries are costly and will be even more costly if the proposed changes to the scale of 
H.Ct. fees goes ahead unchanged!  In fact the whole cost of this litigation will 
increase by 20 – 25% solely on account of fees/rates. 
• Defamation proceedings are costly for all parties and the outcomes are quite 
uncertain (more so than many other areas).   
• I believe the cost of proceedings is high.   
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 The other half of these respondents did not think that the high cost of proceedings was a 
feature only of defamation proceedings: 
• All proceedings need to cost less. 
• Defamation proceedings in the District Court or the High Court can be expensive but 
no more or less than other similar litigation. 
• [Costs are] high but not enough thought goes in at an early stage, therefore 
declaration should be used more.   Need to weigh up the costs more. 
 
2.4  No significant difficulties with the law/ the balance is about right 
Five lawyer respondents made detailed comments about the state of defamation law generally 
and whether it had a chilling effect on the media. Two of these respondents carried out almost 
exclusively defendant work, one acted for defendants 60% of the time, another for 50% of the 
time, and the other did plaintiff work 80% of the time. 
 
One defendant lawyer expressed a strong view that an unacceptable chilling effect exists and 
affects television in particular: 
• the public perception of the media is that it was big and powerful and has lots of 
money… Only lip service is paid to s. 14 values, as opposed to a possible chill of 
freedom of expression... A further chill factor is that the courts are more conservative 
and more anti media at the moment.  There is a failure by the judiciary to understand 
how the media operates.  None of the members of the judiciary have acted for the 
media.  Most have acted for corporate or done family law cases and jury cases.  
Television is seen as having a “deep pocket”.  [Large damages] have a chilling effect 
in that [they create] a general feeling of “why try investigative journalism?”  In the 
last ten years, there has been a definite chill effect from awards of damages.  A 
general retreat from media freedoms in both the United States and New Zealand. 
However, the majority of these respondents did not think defamation laws had an excessive 
chilling effect: 
• There is no need to give [freedom of expression] any extra importance, nor to claim 
that the threat of a defamation claim gives a “chilling effect” to the media.  
Responsible, accurate and careful media reporting needs to be emphasised, rather 
than the promotion of freedom of expression per se. 
 208
• It should be very seldom that an article vetted by a lawyer is spiked for defamation. In 
many cases the message in an article can be conveyed by way of honest opinion – thus 
having a defence to a defamation claim. Also in many cases a small alteration in the 
language can eliminate defamation or reduce the risk to an acceptable level, without 
losing the message. It should be very seldom that a defamatory article is published 
without the journalist and the editor being aware of the defamatory content and 
making appropriate decisions in relation to its publication. It should be very seldom 
that an article which has been vetted will give rise to a defamation claim – except 
where the risk has been advised and has been accepted by the editor... I appreciate 
that these views are from someone who has trained in and specialized in the 
defamation field.  It may be that the common reporter and the ordinary editor of 
newspapers in New Zealand do not have such a knowledge of the law and that they 
are, therefore, inhibited to what they perceive they can publish. I think research would 
show that in many cases the defamation has arisen from a publication in which neither 
the editor or reporter recognized any defamatory content.  Thus, in those 
circumstances, there has not been chilling effect on that publication – as the 
defamatory content was not seen. 
• Media interests value the boundaries.  They are robust and courageous. For example 
the Independent. Warren Berryman from the NBR is well seasoned and will not let the 
threat of litigation stop him.  There is therefore no chill when you issue proceedings.  
An attempt to gag has the reverse effect.  Using the affirmative defences for finding 
other ways, cut out salacious bits and refer to proceedings if issued as much as 
possible. However, I sense broadcasters are more easily dissuaded if threatened, 
although there is more money there.  The courts will not injunct to prevent broadcasts 
however.  I think the state broadcaster backs off more than TV3. 
• Yes!  There is a chilling effect arising from our defamation laws in New Zealand.  
Whether it is inappropriate is another question.  I am not totally convinced it is 
inappropriate.  I cannot recall an occasion when a newspaper or television did not 
publish if it had the evidence required to publish.  It would usually alter words if they 
were defamatory.   I believe the vast bulk of defamations happen accidentally and they 
relate to identity, meaning, fact, or carelessness.  The question of chilling effect is 
irrelevant to those. No real investigations have been prevented by any chilling effect 
as far as I am concerned. I constantly make decisions about television programmes.  I 
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look for a bit of supporting evidence and generally speaking there will be enough to 
show that the programme is right or right enough. 
  
3.  Conclusion on views on the law  
The further data presented in this chapter, giving selected significant views of media and 
media lawyers on the law, although only qualitatively useful, further confirms the apparent 
lack of any excessive chilling effect in the law. It is clear that both media and media lawyers 
value the new defence opportunities presented by the Lange decision, but have significant 
reservations about whether it will impose some sort of duty of care on media in order to claim 
the defence.  However, a significant minority view from both groups of respondents 
recognised that some sort of duty or requirement to behave reasonably might not be too 
onerous on the media at all. These results were complemented by the responses to the 
question seeking views on the need for a special defence for media. In both media and lawyer 
groups, a majority did not think a special defence was necessary. Such results point to 
reasonable satisfaction with the current state of affairs. 
 
As to the question of costs, the views of media and media lawyers once again coincided. Both 
groups identified costs as too high and as leading to uncertainty and therefore a chilling effect, 
particularly on small enterprises. The lawyer respondents additionally identified court fees as 
problematic in particular.524 However, half of the lawyers responding on this issue thought 
that high costs were a feature of all proceedings, or could be kept at manageable levels. The 
lawyers did not identify their own charges as adding to costs, nor suggest that legal fees might 
be lowered. These results confirm that further investigation of this issue would be useful. 
However, the issue of costs is one of access to justice generally, and any study of defamation 
law and costs should be part of a more general study of the costs of civil litigation overall. 
 
A notable unsolicited view emerged from both media and lawyers indicating that the current 
balance in the law is about right. This seemed predicated on the idea that care and 
responsibility could overcome most problems the media face in telling stories of public 
importance. In particular, even some defendant lawyers thought the media could be robust and 
                                                          
524
  The New Zealand Law Society and the New Zealand Bar Association complained about the fees in 
August 2004: Complaint to the Regulation Review Committee on the Civil Court Fee Increases Effected by 
Regulation, August 2004. The Committee investigated and reported in 2005:  Investigation and complaint about 
civil court fees regulations 2004 Report of the Regulations Review Committee February 2005. It recommended 
that the Government undertake a review of the regulations that set civil court fees: ibid, 5. 
 210
courageous, and that no real investigations were prevented by a chilling effect of defamation 
laws. A shared view also emerged that most defamations arise from accident or carelessness, 
in which case, any chilling effect cannot operate because the danger of defamation has never 
been identified at all.  
 
It will be very apparent to the reader at this point that the results of my empirical study have 
remained fairly consistent, and indeed, have become clearer over time. In the next, and final 
substantive chapter of this thesis, I attempt to enhance my empirical analysis with a 





Chapter 9 - Defamation and freedom of expression:  
 the way ahead 
 
To recap, when I first analysed the data presented above, I surmised it tended to show that the 
operation of defamation law on a dynamic, generally assertive New Zealand media, backed by 
strong foreign ownership, does not produce excessive chilling effects, although clearly it 
produces some falling more heavily on small media enterprises, and on particular sectors such 
as magazines and book publishers. Even now, the findings still seem somewhat surprising. 
While the study was developed to test a positive assertion, nonetheless I was struck by the 
results. This is because the chilling effects argument has a powerful emotive appeal and has 
been strongly advanced by the media. The media is in an excellent position to promulgate and 
reinforce such a message and has a valid self-interest in doing so.525 Hence, arguments going 
the other way tend to receive little coverage in the mainstream media.526 In contemplating 
this, I concluded that the empirical results of the study would be enhanced by further 
theoretical examination of the growing influence on New Zealand law of the right of freedom 
of expression. 
 
In this chapter, therefore, I examine how the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is having 
and might go on to have, an impact on defamation law. I investigate how the common law 
could be and is being, modified in ways which also minimise any potential chilling effects. 
This involves an examination of the recent extension of the defence of qualified privilege, and 
development of the procedural requirements  relating to prior restraint and speculative 
claims.527 I conclude that these modifications of both the substantive and procedural law 
should be fully extended and applied. I then go on to suggest that a more transparent and 
consistent application of the Bill to freedom of expression issues arising in defamation cases 
is possible and desirable, and I develop a possible model which could inform such a process.  
I conclude that a combination of these strategies will mediate, ‘repair’ and limit possible 
chilling effects inherent in New Zealand defamation law, such as they are. 
 
                                                          
525
  M David Lepofsky “Making Sense of the Libel Chill Debate: Do Libel Laws Chill the Exercise of 
Freedom of Expression?” (1994) 4 NJCL 168. 
526
  My own experience tends to confirm this view. The findings of my study received no media coverage, 
critical or otherwise, other than by a state broadcaster, through Radio New Zealand’s Media Watch programme: 
interview with Colin Peacock, 4 December 2005. 
527
  A similar approach was taken in the Weaver study: R Weaver, A Kenyon, D Partlett, & C Walker, The 
Right to Speak Ill — Defamation, Reputation and Free Speech (Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 
 212
Lepofsky correctly identifies that there are competing and complimentary values at stake in 
any defamation chill debate,528 indeed in any defamation claim. Unfortunately, the media 
often presents such claims as a simplistic stand-off between a selfish, personal right to protect 
good name and reputation, and the public’s right to freedom of expression. However, 
Lepofsky unpacks this rather crude approach and identifies public interest values on both 
sides of the equation. He suggests the value of a person’s good name and reputation goes to 
personal dignity and worth as a human being,529 but also that reputation allows us to interact 
socially,530 to survive economically, and to maintain self-image and worth. 531 Democratic 
values are also served by defamation law because there is a public interest in not deterring 
good candidates for public office from seeking office by leaving them vulnerable to 
defamation.532 As to freedom of expression, the values underlying it have been identified as 
its role in facilitating the emergence of truth in the marketplace of ideas, in maintaining and 
supporting open democracy, and in promoting the ultimate good of a liberal society where 
citizens are able to say and publish to others what they want as an expression of their 
liberty.533 Some courts recognise these distinctions,534 but this is not commonplace. 
 
One complaint made by media is that in defamation (and other) cases, insufficient weight is 
given to freedom of expression, or that it is not addressed and weighed at all. The advent of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill), with freedom of expression enshrined in s 
14, presents a legal device to which the chilling effects doctrine can be allied in some way and 
perhaps enhanced. However, once again, such an approach may be too simplistic. In this 
chapter, I examine how freedom of expression and the Bill have already influenced New 
Zealand defamation jurisprudence, both indirectly and directly. I suggest that our courts are 
moving in the right direction, but that there is yet more distance to cover. I also make some 
suggestions as to the future interaction of the common law, freedom of expression and the 
Bill. 
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  See Lepofsky, n. 525 above, 197. 
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  Ibid, 197. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Ibid, 198. 
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  Tipping J in Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424, 474 (Lange No 1). 
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  Tipping J in Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1, [233], Rishworth, Huscroft, Optican and Mahoney, 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights, (2003, OUP), 309. 
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  Eg: Elias J in  the High Court in Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22, 31. 
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1. The impact of freedom of expression on the common law 
Of course, freedom of expression existed as a right prior to the enactment of the Bill,535 but 
this ‘über-right’ and indeed, all of the rights in the Bill, were both confirmed and preserved by 
it.536 More than this, bills of rights can and should be transformative,537 moving areas of the 
law which impact on rights in directions hitherto neglected, or allowing development of more 
sophisticated principle to occur at a speedier pace. In short, although freedom of expression 
could have been taken account of by the courts prior to 1990, the enactment of the Bill has 
elevated the rights consciousness of the general public, the media and the legal fraternity in 
New Zealand. This has flowed through into the case law, although not consistently, as will be 
shown. I turn first to examine a number of cases where important strides have been made in 
terms of freedom of expression. 
 
1.1 Constitutional qualified privilege 
It will be obvious that the Lange litigation is the strongest recent example of development of 
the common law motivated by concerns about freedom of expression. Remarkably, Lange 
privilege has been slow to consolidate and grow from there, with only two significant reported 
cases so far, years apart. In Vickery v McLean538 the Court of Appeal refused to apply the 
defence to statements about local council employees, but the judgment contains obiter dicta 
that it might apply to local as well as national politicians.539 As many predicted, the subject 
matter of the defence is apparently open to expansion. However, the Court also stated a 
limitation, that allegations of serious criminality did not attract the defence, because they 
should not be disseminated too widely. Overall, the judgment is cautious. 
 
More recently, Osmose New Zealand v Wakeling540 surprised many commentators, because 
the High Court appeared to extend the defence, and to treat it as one of public interest, like 
Jameel v Wall Street Journal in the United Kingdom.541 Osmose made and supplied timber 
preservative products, and it alleged two individuals, Dr Wakeling and Dr Smith, made false 
and damaging statements about those products. Although some of the statements were 
published in the media, unusually, Osmose did not pursue any media interests, alleging 
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  See Lange No 1, n. 532 above, 460-461. See also s. 28 of the Bill. 
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  See the long title to the Bill: ‘a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental 
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  Ibid, [17], per Tipping J. 
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  [2007] 1 NZLR 841. 
541
  [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359. See the discussion at Chapter Four, 2.2 above. 
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instead that the first and second plaintiffs were responsible for the chain of publication. 
However, Wakeling and Smith joined Television New Zealand, Radio New Zealand, APN 
New Zealand and Fairfax New Zealand as third parties, in a procedure rarely used for 
defamation. This decision of Harrison J dealt with applications by the media to have the third 
party notices set aside.  
 
The judge made a strike out order, because he was in no doubt that the articles published by 
the newspapers were published on an occasion of qualified privilege, and that the broadcasters 
which published would be protected by the defence of qualified privilege if the plaintiff had 
sued them directly. Harrison J found the articles were published on occasions of qualified 
privilege because the material published was of public concern. This was based on the fact 
that New Zealand has significant home ownership, and in recent years has had to confront a 
high national incidence of leaky homes suggesting some systemic failure in the building 
industry which has justified government intervention. Furthermore, the government had 
endorsed Osmose’s product following an inquiry into leaky homes. The finding of public 
interest appears to break down the limitation imposed in Lange, that the subject matter to 
which the defence of constitutional qualified privilege can apply is discussion about 
politicians, past, present or future.542 Harrison J did not justify his decision on the basis of 
extending Lange, but spoke instead in generalised terms about public interest, as if that were 
already sufficient to trigger the defence. However, it is a significant jump from Lange to 
Osmose, and the latter does not appear to take the leap on the basis of precedent.  
 
The case against the media was settled in Osmose, but in spite of the lack of detailed 
reasoning in the High Court judgment, I do support this aspect of it. This is because if more 
than lip service is to be paid to freedom of expression, the political discussion defence should 
not be interpreted in a restrictive way. There was genuine public interest in the Osmose 
publications, and the topic of leaky buildings is exactly the sort of subject matter to which the 
defence should be extended in New Zealand, thus drawing our law closer to that in the United 
Kingdom. It was accepted in Lange that our media is more responsible than that in the United 
Kingdom, and so it is incongruous for our law to be more restrictive of freedom of expression 
than that jurisdiction.  
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  Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, at 390-391, and 400 (Lange No 2). 
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The other aspect of Osmose which is striking is the treatment of the question of loss of the 
privilege. Under s 19 of the Defamation Act 1992, and as discussed in Lange, a defendant 
must not be motivated by ill-will against the plaintiff, must not take improper advantage of 
the occasion of publication, and should not be reckless, in the sense of irresponsible, in 
publishing the statements. On the question of misuse of the occasion, Harrison J accepted that 
the content of the publications by TVNZ, APN and Fairfax contained a range of views, not 
just those of Dr Wakeling and Dr Smith, and therefore this did not indicate misuse of the 
opportunity to publish. An alternative argument was raised that the media might have known 
that Dr Wakeling had previously been engaged by Osmose’s leading competitor and that Dr 
Smith was politically motivated. The judge thought that such arguments, if accepted, 
amounted to admitting that the defendants themselves had ulterior motives, which would 
deprive them also of qualified privilege as a defence to the main action. A final argument 
sought to establish that the media third parties had published with reckless indifference to the 
truth or otherwise of the statements of Wakeling and Smith. Here the judge considered the 
defendants faced the same problem of being themselves tainted by such arguments, which 
suggested they were not trustworthy and reliable despite being an apparently well-qualified 
scientist and a senior politician. The judge would not deprive the media of the defence. 
 
Unfortunately, this approach absolves the media of any responsibility at all, is inconsistent 
with media ethics, and allows the character of the originator of allegedly defamatory 
statements to determine the question of irresponsibility of the media, when it is the specific 
behaviour of the media which should determine the issue. Lange made it very clear that the 
privilege must be responsibly used: ‘There is no public interest in allowing defamatory 
statements to be made irresponsibly – recklessly – under the banner of freedom of 
expression’.543 The first duty of the media is to get the facts right if at all possible, not simply 
to republish press releases, whether they come from reputable sources or not. The question of 
the defamatory nature or otherwise of the statements in Osmose has yet to be determined at 
trial, and even reputable parties are perfectly capable of getting things horribly wrong, so it 
may clearly be irresponsible not to check the reliability of sources. The Broadcasting 
Standards Authority in fact found so in dealing with separate complaints from Osmose about 
TVNZ’s coverage, holding that the items lacked balance and the broadcaster had not taken 
steps to ensure that its sources were reliable.544 Further, other areas of the law, such as the law 
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  Lange No 2, at [48]. 
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  See Osmose New Zealand v Television New Zealand, BSA Decisions 2005-115, and 2005-140. 
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of contempt, do not give leeway for publishing in reliance on apparently reputable parties545 
The contempt convictions of the media in that case arose from the specific acts of adoption 
and embellishment by the media, not from repetition of Dr Smith’s publication.  
 
The court in Osmose was prepared to accept that none of the media third parties conducted 
any inquiries. The Court of Appeal has recently noted that qualified privilege ‘is concerned 
with the terms and circumstances in which the defamatory statement came to be 
repeated.’546The question which should then have been asked by the High Court in Osmose 
was not how apparently reputable the defendants were, but what it was reasonable for the 
media in question to do in all of the circumstances. The reputation of the defendants would be 
but one feature of this inquiry. The issues which should also have been considered were the 
degree of public interest in the story and any risk of public alarm it might cause, the risk to the 
commercial and reputational interests of the plaintiff, and how easy it would be to check 
accuracy and get the other side of the story. Taking such matters into account in Osmose may 
have made a difference to the eventual outcome. From the BSA complaint, it appears that 
TVNZ actively refused to give Osmose an opportunity to participate in the programme even 
though it requested this,547 and this is a feature of media behaviour which should not have 
been ignored. 
 
Had the plaintiffs in Osmose pursued Dr Wakeling and Dr Smith and the media parties 
jointly, I believe these difficulties with the qualified privilege defence would not have arisen. 
All defendants would have raised the qualified privilege defence, and it would have fallen to 
the plaintiffs, not Wakeling and Smith, to plead particulars of ill will or misuse of the 
opportunity to publish.548 The Defamation Act recognises that the ill will of a joint defendant 
does not infect another so as to lead to loss of qualified privilege,549 and the approach of the 
court should reflect this. Because of the unusual form the proceedings took in Osmose, it is 
arguable the judge treated the behaviour of media and non-media parties as too much alike 
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and in too generalised a fashion – in other words, he failed to give due weight to the special 
position of the media as the fourth estate.550 
 
It is my hope, therefore, that our senior courts will take the opportunity to open out the Lange 
defence to become available for publication of material which is the public interest generally, 
and, when required to investigate media behaviour under s 19 of the Defamation Act, will do 
on an individual basis but also in a generous manner which does not involve retrospective 
editorialising and which is based on a realistic view of contemporary newsgathering,551  
 
For the same reasons,  it is my view that New Zealand courts should adopt the concept of 
reportage, allowing the neutral reporting, even without verification, of both sides of political 
and other disputes of public interest, so long as there is no adoption or embellishment. The 
defence should be interpreted liberally, allowing for the nature of the publication and devices 
of language which give colour, such as sarcasm or strong description, so long as this does not 
amount to adoption of one side’s position over the other.552 Unlike the Lange defence, 
reportage should also be capable of applying to serious allegations, including criminality,553 
because it requires the position of both sides to be presented in a neutral way. The reportage 
defence is likely to be applied restrictively, in part because on one view it modifies the 
repetition rule,554 but also because although some leeway should be allowed, it requires 
rigorously balanced reporting. 
 
1.2 The approach to prior restraint 
The Bill has directly influenced the approach to the equitable discretion to order prior restraint 
in New Zealand. Since 1990, it has been emphasised by the Court of Appeal that it is not part 
of the function of the court to act as a censor, and that the jurisdiction to restrain is 
exceptional.  In TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey,555 the Court of Appeal affirmed its view 
that an interim injunction will not be granted readily in a defamation case because of the need 
                                                          
550
  In Simunovich, the Court of Appeal noted that where media repeat what is said by others, many more 
people are likely to think badly of a plaintiff, partly because they will assume the media would not have reported 
unless there was something in the story: n. 546 above, [90]. Although the Court was discussing the repetition 
rule in this context, this observation also supports the media responsibility limb of the Lange qualified privilege 
defence. 
551
  I have no doubt that legal counsel are now advising media defendants to plead the defence as one of 
public interest generally: for example, this was the advice of William Akel, leading counsel on media law, at 
New Zealand Law Society Media Law Seminar, 15 April 2008.  
552
  See Roberts v Gable [2007] EMLR 457, [61]. 
553
  Ibid. 
554
  See eg: Sedley LJ in Roberts v Gable, n. 552 above, [74]. But cf, Ward LJ in the same case, who 
thought the two do not conflict: [54] – [59]. See also Simunovich,  n., 546 above, [74]. 
 218
to preserve freedom of expression. The jurisdiction to prevent publication is 'of a delicate 
nature' and 'ought only to be exercised in the clearest cases'.556  
 
In Fahey, following broadcast of a television programme containing allegations of sexual 
misconduct by a prominent doctor against his patients, a former patient of the doctor attended 
his rooms for a consultation. In reality her purpose was to secretly film him while confronting 
him with allegations of sexual misconduct carried out on her some years before. The hidden 
camera she carried was supplied by the appellant. The doctor, who had issued defamation 
proceedings following the first programme, obtained an ex parte interim injunction preventing 
broadcast of a second programme, which used the film surreptitiously obtained. That decision 
was overturned on appeal. The respondent argued that broadcast would interfere with the 
administration of justice in the existing defamation proceedings and with a possible later 
action for trespass and invasion of privacy. The court emphasised that restraint should only be 
exercised for clear and compelling reasons and noted that where the competing rights of 
freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial could not be balanced, it might be 
appropriate to curtail media expression temporarily.557 However, it declined to do so in this 
case. There was no evidence to convince the court that screening of the programme would 
have a real likelihood of prejudicially affecting the fair determination of the issues in a later 
defamation trial. 
 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal was prepared to overlook unlawful behaviour by the 
broadcaster in refusing to exercise its equitable jurisdiction in this case. This was largely 
because of the high public interest in the broadcast. The Court balanced the competing rights 
and values by addressing the context, public interest in the broadcast, and the adequacy of 
damages as an alternative remedy. Although it considered that TV3 may have had mixed 
motives in obtaining and showing the film, the Court concluded this was an understandably 
pre-emptive course of action because the respondent had attacked the patients who had 
accused him in the first programme, and there was a legitimate interest in the exposure of 
public misconduct. The film gave the programme credence because in it the respondent went 
some distance to acknowledging misconduct.  This considerably increased the public interest 
in broadcast. Finally, there was no harm not reparable by an award of damages. Although the 
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  (1998) 12 PRNZ 443. See also Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46. 
556
  Wm. Coulson & Sons v James Coulson & Co (1887) 3 TLR 846 at 846 per Lord Esher MR.  
557
  TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey (1998) 12 PRNZ 443, applying Gisborne Herald Ltd v Solicitor-
General [1995] 3 NZLR 563, 567. See also Solicitor-General v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd, Unreported, High 
Court Wellington, CIV 2008-485-000705, 10 October 2008, [81]. 
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approach in Fahey was generous to media interests and cognisant of freedom of expression, 
the Court emphasised that its decision should not be taken to support any general proposition 
that the ends of newsgathering justify the means.  
 
Fahey is now the leading case on prior-restraint and freedom of expression and has influenced 
other areas of the law.558 Unfortunately, it is sometimes not applied when it should be. For 
example, in Brash v John and Jane Doe,559 Opposition Leader Don Brash successfully 
applied ex parte for an interim injunction restraining persons unknown from communicating 
the contents of emails belonging to Mr Brash which may have come into their possession. The 
order was very broad, requiring all copies of the emails to be given into the custody of the 
Registrar of the High Court by persons served with a copy of the order, although leave was 
reserved to any defendant to apply to the Court for rescission or variation.560 What is wrong 
with the order is that its impact on the media and freedom of expression was not considered. 
These proceedings were highly unusual and arose after Mr Brash became aware some of his 
private emails had been leaked and were rumoured to be about to be published in a book. 
Although the judge referred to a previous New Zealand intellectual property case where 
unknown defendants had been the subject of an injunction,561 that case did not involve the 
media as potential parties. However, Mackenzie J applied the ordinary tests for applications 
for interim injunctions – whether there was a serious question to be tried and whether the 
balance of convenience favoured the granting of the injunction. The Court did not require the 
applicant to proceed on notice because that would cause undue delay and prejudice. 
 
The Fahey decision requires the Court to go further than applying the ordinary tests, and 
instead look to the plaintiff to show clear and compelling reasons why an injunction should be 
granted. One effective way to do this would be in the context of a Bill of Rights analysis, 
whereby the limits imposed on freedom of expression by granting the application must be 
‘reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.’562 The Court might have done this by hearing from the media as a clear potential 
defendant in the Brash case. Media interests had been recognised about a week earlier by Mr 
Justice Eady in the United Kingdom in an application to vary a ‘John Doe’ order he had made 
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  See eg, Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (privacy).  
559
  Unreported, High Court, Wellington, CIV-2006-485-2605.   
560
  Brash v John and Jane Doe Interim Injunction and Related Orders, 16 November 2006.  
561
  Tony Blain Ltd v Splain [1993] 3 NZLR 185. 
562
  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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previously on privacy grounds.563  That judge indicated that interested media parties should 
have been given notice of the application. The Brash decision is generally defective because it 
contains no reference to freedom of expression issues or the Bill of Rights,564 and a clear and 
consistent approach to the Fahey decision in prior restraint cases would avoid such outcomes. 
I make suggestions as to such an approach below. 
 
1.3 Speculative cases  
Although rare, New Zealand courts have recognised arguments based on the Bill invoking 
available procedures to strike out ‘gagging writs’. In Travers v Television New Zealand Ltd,565 
the High Court made an order striking out defamation proceedings for want of prosecution, 
referring to the claim as a ‘gagging writ’ with no prospect of going anywhere. Although the 
power to strike out under s 50 of the Defamation Act 1992 if no date has been fixed for trial 
or no other step has been taken within 12 months of the date of the application, is 
discretionary, the onus is on the plaintiff to present adequate reasons why the matter should 
not be struck out.566 In Travers, the plaintiff could not produce evidence to show he had taken 
active steps, and the Court found the submission of the defendant asking it to give full 
recognition to freedom of speech contained in s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 to be compelling. 
 
2.  The true place of the Bill of Rights in defamation law 
The cases discussed above show how freedom of expression arguments can produce both 
substantive and procedural changes in the common law and therefore, defamation law, which, 
in turn, must logically limit and reduce any potential chilling effects. However, as discussed, 
those changes do not yet go far enough. While it is clear that judicial acceptance of well-
presented arguments about freedom of expression, or judicial willingness to fill the gaps 
where such arguments have not been made, do make a difference to the outcome, the 
approach has not been consistent. In some cases, there is brief but general reference to 
freedom of expression, in others, this is tied to the Bill but still dealt with in rather a shallow 
way, and in yet others, detailed arguments based on the Bill are addressed. I now intend to 
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  See X &Y v Persons Unknown [2006] EWHC 2783 (QB). 
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  CanWest Mediaworks indicated that it intended to challenge the order. However, Mr Brash asked the 
Court to withdraw it as soon as it became clear that an author, Nicky Hager, was intending to publish a book 
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Leader of the National Party following the publication of Mr Hager’s book. 
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  Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CP 92-SD00, 4  September 2001. 
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  Mountain Rock Productions Ltd v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 31. 
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examine in more detail how our judges have been attempting to deal with the Bill of Rights in 
defamation cases, and to make some suggestions as to a more consistent, transparent 
approach. Before turning to this analysis, however, it is necessary to briefly consider how the 
Bill might even apply to the common law generally to begin with. 
 
2.1 Can the Bill apply to defamation cases? 
As I have observed elsewhere in relation to the developing tort of privacy,567 there is no 
statutory requirement to carry out a human rights or bill of rights analysis in relation to 
actions between private citizens.  New Zealand’s Bill was intended to have only vertical 
effects: it applies to the three branches of Government and bodies exercising public 
functions,568 and thus in general only protects private citizens from the state.569 In spite of 
this, it is clear that a process of constitutionalisation of our private law has begun. Although 
there is ongoing disagreement,570 the New Zealand judiciary appears to accept it must take 
account of the rights in the Bill somehow when resolving disputes between private citizens 
and when developing the common law.571 Because this process does not produce directly 
enforceable rights, the horizontal effect is usually regarded as weakly or strongly indirect.572 It 
is given content in two ways: by arguing that judges are simply bound by the Bill as the 
judicial arm of the state, or by arguing that judges are implicitly required to take account of 
the values expressed in the Bill of Rights. The judiciary often appears to endorse or use both 
approaches.  
 
The question of horizontal effect of New Zealand’s Bill of Rights cannot be fully explored in 
this broad paper about defamation. However, I consider that the argument of Rishworth and 
others that indirect horizontality in the common law is not only inevitable, but desirable,573 is 
compelling, and opposing arguments to be rather arid. Defamation claims are suffused with a 
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  See ‘The Future of Privacy: Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’, (2007) 13 Canta LR 169. 
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  The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3. 
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  See Rishworth, ‘Human Rights’, (2005) (1) NZLRev 87. 
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Applied in Hosking v Runting’, (2004) 4 New Zealand Law Review 681. 
571
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  Jane Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’, (2004) 10 AULR 245, 249.  
573
  Rishworth, n. 533 above, 104.  
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very high level of public interest,574 and the Bill will be relevant to interpretation of the 
Defamation Act, to development of the common law, and in some cases, to both. The 
common law develops incrementally, and for it to do so without taking account of the Bill of 
Rights in some way would be to ignore a profound form of public interest,575 would produce 
distorting effects within constitutional law, and would also be seriously out of step with other 
common law jurisdictions.576 And as a matter of practice, the Bill can apply. Joseph has noted 
that although common law principles lack the precision of statutes, they are settled and 
ascertainable,577 and might thus engage with rights in the Bill.  Furthermore, our Supreme 
Court has in fact recognised this in another context by noting that the need to protect 
reputation may restrict the scope of freedom expression.578 Therefore, it is my thesis that in 
every defamation case, at the very least, some sort of application of s. 5 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act should be openly articulated to balance freedom of expression and the right 
to protect reputation and the relative public interests which exist in both. Section 5 suggests a 
useful way of balancing the interests involved because it requires that the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.579 I will now briefly examine how 
the provision has been treated in defamation cases.580 
 
2.2 The Bill of Rights and previous defamation cases 
In Lange, Blanchard J noted that two previous cases had dealt with the Bill in relation to 
defamation law.581 They were TVNZ v Quinn,582 where the issue of damages arose, and Awa v 
Independent News Auckland Ltd,583where the defence of fair comment (now honest opinion) 
was considered. In the former, the approach to the Bill is rather unfocussed and unsatisfying.  
Cooke P considered the matter more as an afterthought, not as part of his reasoning process. 
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  See the discussion at p 207 above. 
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He concluded the Bill did not require a new approach to summing up on damages. After 
briefly noting the requirements of s 5 of the Bill, Cooke P moved quickly to a conclusion that 
damages would operate as a reasonable limit of freedom of speech if they were ‘no more than 
what is necessary for proper compensation and punishment.’584 Furthermore, he considered 
the current balance in defamation law in relation to directions as to damages should not be 
altered, in part because acting to increase speech carried risk of abuse by the media.585  
 
However, there is more structure in the approach of McGechan J, who stated as a general 
proposition that he endorsed alignment between jury directions and dictates of the Bill of 
Rights, and saw this as an inevitability. Furthermore, he went so far as to suggest it was ‘the 
Court’s duty to support freedoms in the Bill of Rights, not to frustrate them.’586 But he did not 
wish to import arguments of interpretation based on other jurisdictions and Human Rights 
conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. McGechan J saw the 
problem as domestic and needing a domestic solution. Therefore, local Bill of Rights policy 
was to be kept in mind and local juries were to be given local guidance.587 He then considered 
whether there was a trend to increased awards of damages which might have a chilling effect 
on freedom of the press, 588 and whether any chilling should be automatically stifled, and 
concluded that ‘…Bill of Rights considerations are in balance. If there is a trend as asserted, it 
may need some control over aberrations, but it is not necessarily to be stifled.’589 Further, 
using Bill of Rights language, he did not see ‘a pressing need for any radical new approaches 
to quantum directions.’590  
 
In Awa, the Court simply appealed to the Bill very briefly to support its finding that the 
defence of fair comment could protect culturally insensitive statements, and said: ‘ If it were 
otherwise, freedom of expression, a right affirmed by s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990, would be seriously in jeopardy.’591 
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In the High Court in Lange, Elias J did not set out a detailed approach to the Bill, but saw s 5 
as requiring a balancing of rights in defamation cases and as allowing the common law to 
prescribe limits to freedom of expression when it is balanced with rights of reputation.592  To 
do this, Elias J considered such broad issues as the value of speech and protection of 
individual dignity,593 whether the Bill can apply horizontally,594 the requirements of the law of 
defamation in New Zealand,595 the different approaches in other jurisdictions, the chilling 
effects doctrine,596 the position and power of the news media,597 the political background,598 
matters relevant to remedies,599 and the state of the privilege defence in New Zealand.600 
Similarly, in the Court of Appeal, a balancing of values within the whole of the law of 
defamation was carried out, although in discussing the Bill of Rights, it was emphasised, as in 
Quinn, that ‘principles, freedoms, international texts and comparative experience must in the 
end be assessed in a local context.’601 
 
More recently, in Television New Zealand Ltd v Haines,602 the Court of Appeal considered the 
meanings which could be pleaded by a defendant in relation to the defences of truth and 
honest opinion, and what limits the plaintiff’s pleaded meanings could place on this. Although 
the issues were preliminary ones, their resolution clearly involved a possible limitation on 
freedom of expression, in this case, of the media. However, the judgment contains no 
indication that any Bill of Rights argument was raised or considered at all in the Court of 
Appeal, even though it involved interpretation of both statute603 and common law. The 
judgment does refer to an argument based on s 14 of the Bill rejected by Venning J in the 
High Court, but does not take this any further .604 However, an examination of the High Court 
decision reveals that Venning J devoted two brief paragraphs to a Bill of Rights analysis 
before concluding that the argument did not assist the defendant.605 I examine Haines further 
below, but use it here to show that the approach to freedom of expression and the Bill in these 
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cases appears to lack consistency, transparency and coherence. This is typical of our Bill of 
Rights jurisprudence, which is still in its infancy.606  However, I believe this developing status 
should not stand in the way of stating a number of simple propositions to clarify how the Bill 
should be applied to defamation cases. I conclude this chapter by describing below a number 
of such propositions. 
 
2.3 A methodology for applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to defamation cases 
Having traced the current state of the law, it is now possible to make a number of suggestions 
as to the normative application of the Bill in defamation cases. First, as already stated, it is 
both valid and desirable for the Bill of Rights to apply to defamation law, even though this 
appears to be giving it weak horizontal effect. The identified public interests which clash in 
defamation cases are very strong, and the public interest in their method of reconciliation 
compels a Bill of Rights analysis. Such an approach would also be consistent with overseas 
developments and with the leading New Zealand decisions.  
 
Second, the starting point must be that, as with statute law, development and application of 
the common law should be consistent with the rights and freedoms in the Bill, to the extent 
that any limits imposed by the common law on those rights must be reasonable and justified. 
This means that in every defamation case, some sort of application of s. 5 of the Bill should 
be attempted where the issue is more than a purely procedural one which has no impact on 
freedom of expression.607 The Bill should therefore apply where the court is being asked to 
fill a gap in the law,608 or to interpret the law so as to extend it609 or limit it.610 It should also 
apply to decisions which are a result of the application of defamation law, the most obvious 
illustration being where levels of damages are challenged.611 Furthermore, the Bill of Rights 
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analysis should form the centre of, or an inextricable part of, the reasoning in the case, rather 
than an afterthought.  
 
Third, the analysis should attempt to apply s. 5 as directly and explicitly as possible. 
Depending on what is being argued, this may be more effective where the Defamation Act is 
being interpreted, but can still be attempted in relation to the common law.612 
 
Fourth, in carrying out this analysis, a court is entitled to look at all matters which have a 
bearing, including social, political, legal, moral, economic, administrative, cultural, ethical, 
linguistic and comparative material.613  
 
Fifth, the defendant carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie interference with 
freedom of expression in a defamation case. The onus then shifts to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the limit is reasonable, justified and prescribed by law.614 
 
Sixth, the  process is best applied as a series of explicit steps rather than a generalised blended 
or continuum approach. It is self-evident that in seeking to render statute or the common law 
consistent with the Bill, any Bill of Rights analysis should itself comply. This requires 
precision and clarity.615 The steps which suggest themselves are:616 
(a)The objective of the relevant rule of defamation law - for example, the rule that the 
intention of the publisher of the alleged defamatory statement is irrelevant to liability - 
should be identified, and its importance, and the public interests or values in it within 
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the whole of the law of defamation, assessed. One way of doing this is to ask whether 
there is a pressing social need for the doctrine.  
(b) Next, any rights in the Bill which are or may be affected by the relevant rule, and 
the public interest in them, should be identified. Inevitably, this will be some 
manifestation of freedom of expression.  
(c) Any limits which the relevant rule of defamation law then imposes on freedom of 
expression must be able to be justified in the light of the objective. This will usually 
mean assessing the effectiveness of the doctrine and weighing it against the value of 
the speech. The higher the public interest in the speech, the harder it will be to justify a 
limit on it.617 
(d) The limits should also be assessed to ensure they minimally impair the freedom. 
This does not mean that they can only impair in the least possible manner, but that 
impairment is what is reasonable in the circumstances.618 Ambiguities should be 
resolved in favour of the freedom. 
(e) The limitations must be proportionate in the circumstances. The more severe the 
impact of limiting the right, the more important the objective identified at (a) must 
be.619  
(f) It should then be explained why, overall, the doctrine as interpreted is identifiable, 
adequately accessible and sufficiently precise, in which case it will be prescribed by 
law.620 
 
Arguably, step (f) will be complied with if all of the other steps have been applied. However, 
in keeping with the explicit nature of the suggested method of application, the final step 
requires a form of summary of what has gone before, and will act as a final check and a 
method of completing the s 5 analysis. This should also ensure that the analysis itself is 
accessible and precise. 
 
It must be conceded that the suggested approach requires a level of judicial subjectivity to be 
effective – in short, it requires balancing and judgment at almost every level – what Joseph 
                                                          
617
  Joseph points out that the limits imposed by common law doctrine can be more vigorously challenged 
than those imposed by legislation: see Joseph, n. 612 above, 1164, and Solicitor-General v Radio NZ Ltd [1994] 
1 NZLR 48 (HC) (law of contempt). 
618
  See Joseph, n. 612 above, 1163.  
619
  Butler sees this ‘proportionality enquiry’ as the most important stage in applying s 5, and suggests that 
New Zealand courts will take a broad-brush approach to it: A Butler and J Shaerf, ‘Limiting fundamental rights: 
How on earth is s 5 supposed to work in practice?’ Using the Bill of Rights in Civil and Criminal Litigation New 
Zealand Law Society Seminar Series, July 2008, 35. 
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refers to as asking whether ‘the social costs of unrestricted enjoyment [of freedom of 
expression] exceed its benefits?’621 The outcome of application in each case therefore can 
never be entirely predictable. But there is nothing new in this.  This feature of much of the 
common law flows in part from a tension between distributive and corrective justice theories, 
and is the very reason why we have judges. The value of the approach set out above is that it 
does give some predictability to defamation law which is currently missing. This is because it 
is directional, in that it specifies a series of Bill of Rights questions which should always be 
asked, and it is aspirational, in that there is an overall aim of achieving consistency with the 
Bill, and there are guidelines as to how to go about doing this.   
 
How might such an approach make a difference in defamation cases? I refer again to the 
Haines decision in the High Court, where Venning J addressed the Bill in two short 
paragraphs.622 The first paragraph quoted observations of Tipping J in the Moonen case,623 
while the second concluded that s 14 of the Bill does not require a different interpretation of s. 
8 of the Defamation Act because the latter provides for the defence of truth, the defence exists 
and is provided for by statute. Venning J therefore thought that it was not a question of 
limiting the rights or freedoms under the Bill of Rights, but interpreting the application of the 
defence. With respect, for the reasons set out above, such reasoning is deficient. It appears 
Venning J only went so far as to apply the first step in the process, of identifying the objective 
of the relevant part of defamation law and its importance, described above at (a). As 
Rishworth has pointed out, where a s. 5 analysis of legislation is involved, there is usually 
judicial deference to governmental decisions about harm which should be protected against by 
legislative provision.624 Venning J’s conclusion on this aspect is therefore not surprising. But 
that did not determine the issue, because the other steps were not applied. The result is that 
freedom of expression was not weighed at all in the process, and neither was it weighed by 
the Court of Appeal. Had it been, the decision may have been different.  
 
Another example which illustrates where an explicit application of the Bill might make a 
difference to the media in defamation cases is where there is a claim that levels of damages 
are too high. Here, the method of dealing with minimal impairment at (d) above would allow 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
620
  Solicitor-General v Radio NZ Ltd  [1994] 1 NZLR 48, 63. 
621
  Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, (2007, 3rd ed), 1160.  
622
  See n. 605 above. 
623
  Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, [15] and [16]. 
624
  Rishworth et al, n. 533 above, 177. 
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a court to investigate, as was done by the European court in Steel and Morris,625 whether an 
award of damages falls too hard in the particular media defendant. If the defendant is a small, 
financially insecure member of the media, it would be possible for a court to find that while 
levels of damages generally are not too high,626 in the particular case, they are 




This chapter of my thesis has attempted to suggest a method whereby freedom of expression 
can be weighed in a Bill of Rights analysis in defamation cases in New Zealand. Because of 
our constitutional arrangements, and the views of our judiciary on the value of speech and the 
position of the media, it is currently unlikely that speech will be given as much priority as that 
accorded it in the United States. Chapter Four has shown that our judiciary inclines to the 
European balancing approach which does not protect irresponsible media.628 It may be that in 
the future, speech will be given more primacy in New Zealand. However, that is part of a 
general debate about the status of the New Zealand Bill of Rights which is yet to be had, and 
which should involve the general public as well as the media and the judiciary. 
 
In the meantime,  the constitutionalisation of the common law should continue in the manner I 
have suggested above in relation to the qualified privilege defence, and in the approach to 
prior restraint and gagging writs. More than this, if an explicit Bill of Rights analysis such as 
that I have also outlined above is carried out in every relevant defamation case, the 
presumption in these cases will be to safeguard speech by limiting it as little as possible. In 
each case, limits will be weighed and tested properly. This could be seen as a form of buffer-
zone of protection, although not as extensive as that suggested by Schauer. 
 
Chilling effect arguments will of course, be weighed in this process. However, I have 
attempted to demonstrate in this chapter that any real chilling effects will actually be reduced 
if the Bill of Rights is applied properly and consistently, because common law doctrine 
interpreted consistently with the Bill must then become accessible and reasonably certain. In 
turn, this will reduce one of the main premises on which the chilling effects doctrine is based. 
                                                          
625
  See n. 611 above. 
626
  As in Quinn, see n. 582 above. 
627
  See pp. 148-151 above. 
628
  And even in the United States, speech is subject to a form of defamation law and media methods are 
investigated when the question of malice arises. 
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This outcome, combined with the assurance that ambiguities in the common law of 
defamation should be resolved in favour of freedom of expression, would reduce any vestigial 
chilling effect to less than marginal. 
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Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
 
It is now both timely and possible to outline some conclusions from the chapters set out 
above.  I break down this final analysis into two parts containing conclusions on the empirical 
data and a general conclusion to this thesis. 
 
1. Conclusions on the empirical data  
It will be recalled I surmised at an early stage in my empirical study that the data 
demonstrated the operation of defamation law on a dynamic, generally assertive New Zealand 
media, backed by strong foreign ownership, does not produce excessive chilling effects 
although clearly it does produce some. As the study proceeded, and I analysed all of the data, 
this early impression was confirmed as having a sound basis in fact. This conclusion appeared 
to suggest that no compelling case could be made for major reform of the law in New 
Zealand. 
 
While my study was not designed to directly compare New Zealand to other jurisdictions, its 
results were not out of line with previous studies. Although the authors of the comprehensive 
study carried out in the United Kingdom in the 1990’s concluded that there were both direct 
and structural chilling effects arising from the operation of defamation laws there,629 they 
noted different impacts in different sectors of the media,630 and ultimately acknowledged that 
their findings did not establish a knock-down case for reform.631 In the late 70’s, Palmer noted 
that despite the vitality of the tort of defamation in New Zealand, the McKay committee 
research and his own had revealed that media did not view the law as unduly burdensome 
even though many had received threats and most had altered content because of fear of legal 
consequences.632 He suggested such views arose from the media’s conception of its role in 
contrast to that of the US media which had a clearer understanding of the ‘fourth estate’ and 
its function in furthering freedom of speech.633 Barendt put forward a version of this argument 
some twenty years later when he suggested that the approach of English journalists to their  
‘trade’ as Andrew Marr has referred to it,634 has been influenced by what the operation of the 
                                                          
629
  Eric Barendt, Laurence Lustgarten, Kenneth Norrie and Hugh Stephenson in Libel and the Media: The 
Chilling Effect (1997), 191.  
630
  For example, the practice of omitting material altogether did not affect national newspapers to any 
significant degree, in contrast to book publishers and broadcasters: ibid, 191-192. 
631
  Ibid, 194. 
632
  See Palmer G, ‘Defamation and Privacy Down Under’ 64 Iowa Law Review 1209 1978-1979, 1223. 
633
  Ibid. 
634
  Andrew Marr, My Trade, A Short History of British Journalism (MacMillan, 2004). 
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law allows them to say, resulting in an unrecognised form of self-censorship.635 On this view, 
one might argue that any chilling effect is always hidden because media internalise the laws 
which regulate each jurisdiction.636 Barendt thought that such an effect was empirically 
unmeasurable, but considered it had a ring of truth for the United Kingdom.637 
 
In thinking about this, I have had to acknowledge that an internalising effect in New Zealand 
is certainly possible. However, ultimately I suggest that any such effect is very small in this 
jurisdiction. This is because I have concluded that the factual data given to me by media about 
claims and threats, and more importantly, the independent factual data from the court file 
search carried out as part of my study which revealed low numbers of court claims and no 
rampant success rate, challenge any assumption about internalisation effects in New Zealand. 
In completing the analysis of my raw data, therefore, I have been able to conclude finally with 
some confidence that not only do the New Zealand media continue to regard defamation law 
as irksome but not unduly burdensome, but that this view reflects the reality as well. In short, 
it is my view that the data collected in my survey suggests that on the whole, the media not 
only thinks it can manage and deal with threats and claims arising from alleged defamation, 
but that it does manage and deal with them in practice while contemporaneously making sure 
that important stories are told. The data supports a view, therefore, that the balance the law 
currently seeks to achieve between preserving the right to reputation and preserving freedom 
of speech and information in New Zealand is about right.  
 
The media can take heart from this. Furthermore, it can take heart from another implication in 
the data. The benign levels of threats and claims against the media, the apparent 
proportionality and reasonableness of outcomes, and the comparative lack of claims without 
any substance, suggest that on the whole we do indeed, in New Zealand, have a media which 
behaves responsibly, as accepted previously by our Court of Appeal.638 A robust, responsible 
media is in a much better position to protect and preserve freedom of expression than one 
which faces a threat of increased regulation because of its perceived excesses. 
 
However, the results I have summarised above do not mean that any chilling effect of our 
defamation laws can be ignored. The balance which exists is one in which media and the 
judiciary must remain vigilant to protect freedom of expression in the public interest when 
                                                          
635
  See n. 629 above,  193.  
636
  See also A Kenyon, Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice, (UCL Press, 2006) 15.  
637
  See Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (Lange No 1), 193. 
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appropriate. The potential for an excessive chilling effect will always exist and must be 
guarded against. Furthermore, in stating this conclusion, I do not, of course, suggest that the 
cost to the media of maintaining the current position is not excessive or conducive of a 
particular form of chill. Unfortunately, despite best efforts, the data recovered on costs in my 
study was not substantial, and the issue of whether levels of costs in defamation actions 
combined with the operation of the law are excessive when compared to other forms of civil 
action and to the rights and values being protected is deserving of further empirical study.639 
 
2. General conclusion 
Having reached these conclusions on the empirical data, I have nevertheless been forced to 
push my analysis further. This is because in 1990, New Zealand enacted a Bill of Rights 
which recognised freedom of expression 11 years before my investigation of media practices 
and views was carried out.640 Although not supreme law, the rights in the Bill are slowly 
having life breathed into them by our judiciary on a daily basis, and have become part of the 
consciousness of New Zealand citizens, including the media. The defamation law which 
formed the backdrop to my empirical study in 2001 was not the same as that investigated by 
researchers contracted to the McKay Committee in the late 70’s. Therefore, in contemplating 
the overall results of my study, I was obliged also to consider the role of freedom of 
expression in a democracy which also chooses to protect reputation, and hence the potential 
impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights on defamation law. I turn now to conclude this 
thesis by addressing this issue.  
 
My 2001 study of the New Zealand media demonstrated that the chilling effects of 
defamation law have been somewhat overstated in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, I have 
reached a further conclusion that freedom of expression is of such importance it must be 
accorded a proper place in the interpretation and application of defamation law. In the last 
part of this thesis, I identified how the common law has begun to develop along these lines 
and suggested that this development should be fully extended. I therefore argued robustly that 
there is a need for explicit application of s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights in every 
defamation case. I concluded that manifest, considered and consistent treatment of the Bill 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
638
  Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, at 398. 
639
  This was also a conclusion of the English study referred to above, n 635: Barendt et al, n. 629 above, 
189. Costs are currently being empirically investigated in the United Kingdom: see Comparative study of costs in 
defamation claims, Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy: PCMLP, Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal 
Studies, www.csls.ox.ac.uk  
640
  This Bill was promoted by the Right Hon Geoffrey Palmer, Minister of Justice. 
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will in turn protect against any potential chilling effect which might exist, so that such effect 
is, in the end, rendered entirely proportionate.  
 
What then, is the future for New Zealand defamation law? There is ample anecdotal evidence 
that defamation is becoming less of a concern to the media than the developing tort of 
privacy.641 Furthermore, Palmer goes so far as to suggest that the tort of defamation might 
even fall into disuse in the next 30 years, as a relic of a previous media age.642 He also notes 
the growing influence of privacy.  Therefore, it is intriguing to see hints in a recent prominent 
English privacy case, Mosley v News Group Newspapers, of a possible future form 
reputational interest might take. In March 2008, the News of the World in London published a 
story headlined: “FI BOSS HAS SICK NAZI ORGY WITH 5 HOOKERS.” Mr Max Mosley, 
the President of the FIA, sued the newspaper for breach of privacy, and for the accompanying 
information placed on the newspaper’s website, including video footage secretly obtained of 
the alleged orgy. He was awarded the highest damages to date for a privacy claim in Britain - 
£60,000.643 Mr Mosley is now suing in some European jurisdictions in defamation and 
privacy, some of which are criminal proceedings.644  
 
In Mosley, Justice Eady raised the possibility of having regard to the concept of ‘responsible 
journalism’ in the privacy tort and said:  
There may be a case for saying, when “public interest” has to be considered in the field of privacy, that 
a judge should enquire whether the relevant journalist’s decision prior to publication was reached as a 
result of carrying out enquiries and checks consistent with “responsible journalism”.645 
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  This non-empirical observation is based on my regular discussions with New Zealand media 
representatives. In the United Kingdom, it has recently been reported that the number of libel cases continues to 
decline, even though media content is increasing. Discussion of the issues has been somewhat confused. One 
media lawyer has commented that the increase may have occurred because the UK media is much more used to 
interacting with its audience and dealing with complaints as they arise. In that jurisdiction, Conditional Fee 
Arrangements, which allow lawyers to take libel cases on a no-win, no-fee basis, are also perceived as making 
media companies more likely to settle cases out of court.  Thus, CFAs are identified as having a ‘chilling effect’. 
However, a commercial chilling effect can also be observed in a reported increase in claims brought by celebrity 
plaintiffs. It has been suggested this development reflects a strong consumer appetite for celebrity stories, with 
competition to deliver such coverage resulting in increased factual errors: See ‘Fewer libel cases reaching a 
verdict’, guardian.co.uk, 9 October 2008,  www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/oct/09/medialaw.pressandpublishing  
See also Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee, Ninety-third session, Geneva, 7-25 
July 2008, GE.08-43342. 
642
  Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer, ‘The Law of Defamation in New Zealand – Its Recent Evolution and 
Problems’, Law, Liberty, Legislation: In Honour of John Burrows QC, LexisNexis, (2008),  339, 357. 
643
  Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (24 July 2008). 
644
  He is also bringing action against the British government in the European Court of Human Rights 
seeking the passage of a law to force editors to contact subjects before printing: ‘Feel my pain’, the Guardian, 20 
October 2008, www.guardian.co.uk/media.2008/oct/20/mosley-privacy   
645
  Mosley, n. 643 above, paras [140]-[141]. 
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This test, borrowed from the Reynolds/Jameel developments in defamation law,646 suggests 
journalists could claim a public interest defence in privacy whether they get their facts right or 
not, so long as they can demonstrate responsible behaviour. If it is to be applied to the privacy 
tort, significant distinctions between defamation and privacy begin to disappear.647 The 
orthodox understanding has been that defamation provides a remedy for untrue statements 
while privacy provides a remedy for true intimate statements. Justice Eady’s approach would 
take the emphasis off the truth or untruth element in each tort and put it instead on the public 
interest defence based on responsible journalism. If these torts move closer together in this 
fashion, what do we have then?  One possibility is a form of rights-based jurisprudence which 
is a claim for loss of autonomy, dignity and integrity, based on either publication of true or 
untrue facts, which may be defended on the basis of public interest. The latter will be clearly 
satisfied if the material contributes to an important public debate or the functioning of a 
democracy, and the journalism involved is responsible. The publication of untrue facts will 
probably attract higher damages. Whether this metamorphosis will occur, whether it will 
occur in New Zealand, how long it will take, and whether any ‘chilling effects’ might result, 
are the tantalizing questions I must leave for another day, and for further empirical study. 
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  See Chapter Four, 2.2 above. 
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Media Survey  




Questionnaire for Media 
 
 
NOTE: you are invited to participate in the research project Study of the Law of Defamation 
by completing the following questionnaire.  The aim of the project is to discover whether 
New Zealand’s laws inhibit the media from disseminating information of public interest.  The 
project will examine the behaviour of newspapers, broadcasters, book and magazine 
publishers, independent journalists and writers, public relations firms, advertising agencies, 
and internet publishers in New Zealand to determine whether avoiding possible defamation 
actions causes such publishers to amend or suppress stories, or seriously impedes freedom of 
expression.  
 
The project is being carried out by Ursula Cheer, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Canterbury 
University, who can be contacted at (03) 364 2693 or email u.cheer@laws.canterbury.ac.nz.  
She will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
 
The questionnaire is anonymous and you and your organisation will not be identified as a 
participant without your consent.  You may at any time withdraw your participation including 
withdrawal of any information you have provided.   
 
By completing the questionnaire, however, it will be understood that you have consented 
to participate in the project, and that you consent to the publication of the results of the 












Please consider and answer carefully the questions which follow which are relevant to you.  
You will know by glancing at the Summary of Contents set out below which sections will be 
relevant to you.   
 
The survey is made up of a mixture of multi-choice and short answer questions.  You may 
answer the multi-choice questions by circling more than one box if appropriate.  For other 
questions, please supply brief answers in the space provided. 
 
Do not be put off by the apparent size of the survey.  It is hoped that it should not take you 
long to complete.  You will probably not have to answer all of the survey and many questions 
are multi-choice.   
 
 
If you have any queries as you are completing the survey, please don’t hesitate to contact 









Summary of Contents 
 
Section A - Background 
Questions 1 – 18.  This section contains eighteen questions seeking general information about 
your media work or organisation. 
 
Section B – Pre-publication Procedures 
Questions 19 – 29.  This section contains ten questions seeking information about any 
procedures used by you to vet material prior to publication.   
 
Section C – Actual Experience of Defamation Statements of Claim (Writs) 
Questions 30 – 32.  This section seeks information about your actual experience of 
defamation writs.  Question 32 allows space to record general factual material about the writs 
filed against you or your organisation in the last six years.    
 
Section D – Threats of Action 
Questions 33 – 38.  This section contains five questions seeking information about your 
experience of dealing with threats of action.  Question 38 allows space to record general 
information relating to threats of action you have received in the last six years. 
 
Section E – Your Views 
Question 39 - 41.  This section seeks your views and opinions on particular aspects relating to 
the media (question 39), the advantages or disadvantages of the laws of defamation in relation 
to particulars topics or topics of your choice (question 40) and seeks your comments on any 





Please answer all questions relevant to you or your organisation.  Answer multi-choice 
questions by circling the answer (or answers) which appear most correct.  Answer all other 
relevant questions by supplying brief comments in your own words.  Attach extra sheets of 
paper where necessary. 
Section A  
 
Background 




D Book publisher 
E Individual journalist 
F Individual writer 
G Information service provider or other exclusive Internet publisher 
H Advertising agency or consultancy 
 I  Public relations firm 
J  Other (please briefly describe) 
 
 
Question 2  (Multi choice) If you are a newspaper what sort of circulation do you 
have?  (If you are not a newspaper, go to Question 5) 
A National 
B  Regional 
C Community / Free 
D Other (Please briefly describe)  
 
 
Question 3 (Multi choice) If you are a newspaper how often are you published? 
(If you are not a newspaper, go to Question 5) 
A Daily 
B Weekly 
C Bi weekly 
D Monthly 
E Bi annually 
F Other (Please briefly describe) 
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Question 4 (Multi choice) If you are a newspaper, what sort of newspaper are you? 







F Other (Please briefly describe) 
(Now go to question 13) 
 
Question 5 (Multi choice) If you are a broadcaster are you:  






E Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
 
Question 6 (Multi choice) If you are a broadcaster are you: 





D Other (Please briefly describe) 
(Now go to Question 13) 
 
Question 7 (Multi choice) If you are a book publisher, what sort of books do you 






E Other (Please briefly describe) 
(Now go to Question 13) 
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Question 8 (Multi choice) If you are a single magazine what is your circulation?  




C Community / Free 
D Business / Inhouse / Professional 
E Student 
F Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
 
Question 9 (Multi choice) If you are a single magazine how often are you published? 
(If you are not a magazine, go to Question 10) 
 
A Weekly 
B Bi weekly 
C Monthly 
D Quarterly 
E Bi annually 
F Other (Please briefly describe)  
(Now go to Question 13) 
 
Question 10 (Multi choice) If you are a magazine publisher what sort of magazines  
do you publish?  (If you are not a magazine publisher, go to Question 12) 
 
A Consumer (men/women/lifestyle/business/specialist) 
B Trade/Professional 
C Special (particular clients, in-house) 
 
Question 11 (Multi choice) If you publish consumer magazines, what subject matter is  
included in those magazines?  (If you are not a magazine publisher, go to 
Question 12) 
 
A Men / Women 
B Lifestyle 
C Business 
D  Specialist  
E Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
 (Now go to Question 13) 
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Question 12 (Multi choice) If you exclusively publish material on the Internet (as an 
Information Service Provider (ISP) or similar), how long have you been publishing?  
(If you are not an Internet publisher, go to Question 13) 
 
 A  One year 
B Two years 
C  Three - five years 
D Five - ten years 
E Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
 
Question 13 (Multi choice) Are you: 
A A Parent Company 
B A Subsidiary 
C A Partnership 
D Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
 
Question 14 (Multi choice) Please indicate a range of figures that includes 
your annual turnover: 
A 0 to $30,000 
B $30,000 to $50,000 
C $50,000 to $100,000 
D $100,000 to $200,000 
E $200,000 to $1 million 
 F Greater than $1 million 
 
Question 15 (Multi choice) Please indicate a description for the size of your 
undertaking: 
A Single individual 
B 2 to 10 employees 
C 10 to 50 employees 
D 50 to 100 employees 
E Greater than 100 employees 
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Question 16 (Multi-choice) Is any of your published/broadcast material republished on  
the Internet in one or more of the following forms? 
 
A On your own website by live broadcast 
B On other websites broadcast live (with permission) 
C On other websites broadcast live (without permission) 
D On your own website by delayed broadcast 
E On other websites by delayed broadcast (with permission) 
F On other websites by delayed broadcast (without permission) 
G On your own website (written material reproduced in full) 
H On other websites, (written material in full, with permission) 
I On other websites, (written material in full, without permission) 
J On your own website (written material, excerpts only) 
K On other websites, (written material, excerpts only, with permission) 
L On other websites, (written material, excerpts only, without permission) 
M Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
Question 17 What are the particular risks of defamation in your area, if any? 






Question 18 Do you have or have you had, any training in defamation law?   












Preventing Defamation Using Pre-publication Procedures 
 
(Don’t forget to circle more than one option if appropriate) 
 
Question 19 (Multi choice) Do you have procedures for checking material before 





Question 20 (Multi choice) If you have a pre-publication procedure, does it 
include any of the following?  
(If you never have material checked prior to publication, go to Question 24) 
 
A Checking facts 
B Obtaining an alternative point of view 
C Checking visuals and captions 
D Verifying sources 
E Specialist agreement with authors which makes them responsible 
F  Consulting a lawyer (sometimes) 
G Consulting a lawyer (always) 
H Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
 





Question 22 (Multi choice) If a procedure is not always followed, what are the  
reasons for this? 
(If publication procedures are always followed, go to Question 23) 
 
A Lack of resources 
B Time constraints 
C Employees trusted 
D The material is material which the public should know about 
E Unable to get the other side of the story 
F Other (Please briefly describe) 
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Question 23 If you do consult a lawyer to get material checked prior to publication 





















Question 25 In what circumstances is material altered prior to publication and what 
















Question 26 (Multi choice) If you receive material from independent sources  
(parties who are not employed by you) is there a special procedure for 
getting that material checked? 
 




Question 27 Do you have defamation insurance? 
 
A Yes (Go to Question 28) 
B No (Go to Question 29) 
 
Question 28 If you have defamation insurance, what does it cover and what conditions 














Question 29 Do the decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority, or the Press  




















Actual Experience Of Defamation Statements of Claim (Writs) In The Last Six  
Years (1995 – 2001) 
 
 
Question 30 (Multi choice) Have you had a defamation writ filed against you or your  
organisation in a court in New Zealand in the last six years? 
 
A Yes (Go to Question 31) 
B No  (Go to Question 33) 
 
Question 31 Please indicate the number of writs that have been issued against you or 
your organisation in the last six years: 
 
A 1 
B 2 to 5 
C 5 to 10 
D 10 to 20 
E 20 to 50 
F 50 plus 
 
Question 32 For each of the writs issued against you or your organisation in the last six 
years please supply the following information, starting with the most 
recent: 
 
(THERE IS SPACE FOR DETAILS OF SIX WRITS.  IF YOU REQUIRE MORE 
SPACE TO COMPLETE DETAILS OF OTHER ACTIONS PLEASE PHOTOCOPY 
EXAMPLE 32(i) BELOW AND ATTACH SEPARATE SHEETS.) 
 
32(i) Experience of writs filed in last six years: 
Year of writ    __________________ 









Amount of damages claimed?    $____________________________ 
 




Result? (Use approximate figures for damages if necessary). 





E Fought matter to full hearing and won 
F Lost full hearing, paid damages of 
$_________costs(theirs)$_________(yours)$________  
G Matter struck out 
H Action abandoned 
 I  Injunction 
J  Other (please briefly describe) 
 
If the matter went to trial, was it heard before: 
A A judge alone 
B A judge and jury 
 





















Please continue on back of sheet if you run out of space for this example 32(i) 
 
 
PLEASE NOW GIVE DETAILS OF NEXT MOST RECENT EXAMPLE… 
 
 




Letters Before Action 
 
Question 33 (Multi choice) Please estimate how many threats of action (ie: letters, 
phone calls etc, suggesting you have published defamatory material, or 
threatening a defamation suit, before any court documents have been 
filed) you have  
received in the last six years (1995 – 2001).  
 







F Greater than 100 
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C Stayed the same 
 
Question 36 (Multi-choice) In the last six years, which group has the majority of threats 
of action come from? 
 
A Ordinary individuals 
B Companies 
C Politicians (national or local) 
D Celebrities 
E The media 
F Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
 
Question 37 (Multi-choice) In the last six years, what proportion of threats of action 
have been made through a lawyer? 
 
A 0% 
B 1 – 10% 
C 11 – 25% 
D 26 – 35% 
E 36 – 50% 
F 51 – 75% 
G 76 – 100% 
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Question 38 Please complete the following brief details relating to the threats of action 
you have received and can recall from the last six years.  Remember – 
these matters did NOT go to court, and no court documents were ever 
filed.  
 
THERE IS SPACE FOR DETAILS OF SIX THREATS OF ACTION.  IF 
YOU REQUIRE MORE SPACE TO COMPLETE DETAILS OF 
OTHER THREATS  OF  ACTION, PLEASE PHOTOCOPY EXAMPLE 
38(i) BELOW AND ATTACH SEPARATE SHEETS. 
 
(Remember to circle more than one option if applicable). 
 
  
38(i) Experience of threats of action received in last six years: 
 
Year threat received:   _________________ 
 















D Damages to the value of $____________  




E Destruction or withdrawal of publication after publication 
F Prevention of publication 






38(i) continued (Experience of threats of action) 
Your response to threat 
A Ignored threat and heard nothing more 
B Ignored threat and received a further threat 
C Consulted within the organisation and/or sought advice of friends 
D Consulted academic lawyer 
E Consulted lawyer 
F Sent letter rejecting allegations 
G Sent letter of explanation and apology 








E Decision not to publish 
F  Withdrawal of publication from circulation after publication 
G Destruction of publication 
H Settlement, damages agreed of$__________ 
costs(theirs)$__________(yours)$_________ 
(Briefly describe what types of loss covered by damages) 
 
 
 I  Other (Please briefly describe) 
 
 
If you settled the matter, why did you settle? 
A The other party was correct 
B Advised to do so by lawyer 
C Couldn’t afford to fight the matter in court 
D Although we knew we were right, we could not prove this 
E  Could not afford lawyer’s fees 




If any damages were paid, were they paid by insurance? 
 
NOW GIVE DETAILS OF NEXT MOST RECENT THREAT OF ACTION ON NEXT 
PAGE… 
 






Question 39 In 1998 and 2000 the Court of Appeal outlined a form of qualified 
privilege defence available in defamation where the actions of politicians 
(past, present, or future) are being discussed.  The defence is available where 
the occasion justifies privilege for political speech, where there is no ill will by 
the publisher, and where the publisher has not been irresponsible.  If the 
matter is heard before a jury, it would decide if the facts show the publisher 
has been irresponsible. 
 





















Do you consider there should be a special media defence?  If so, why and what form 






















Question 40  Please use the space provided to express briefly your views on the 
advantages or disadvantages of the Laws of Defamation in New Zealand.  
A list of suggested topics follows but you may, of course, wish to comment 
on issues which are not included in that list.  Where you believe the law 
should be reformed in some way, please suggest how you might think that 




A Cost of proceedings 
B Delay in proceedings 
C Procedural issues 
D Summary judgment procedure 
E Defences 
F Injunctions 
G Trial before Judge / Jury 
H Levels of damages 


























































































Question 41 Other Comments 
 

















































End of survey.  Please return your completed survey in the stamped addressed 
envelope enclosed as soon as possible.  Thank you for taking the time to complete the 
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